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To better understand the shift in workers’ skills in the New Economy, a case 
study of professional firefighters (n=42) was conducted using semi-structured 
interviews to empirically examine skill change and the impact of technology. A 
conceptual model was designed by both introducing new ideas and integrating 
traditional and contemporary social theory. The first component of this model 
categorized firefighters’ skills according to the job-context in which theyoccurred, 
including: fire related emergencies, non-fire related emergencies, the fire station, and 
non-fire non-emergencies. The second component of this model drew from 
Braverman’s (1998/1974) skill dimension concept and was used to identify both the 
complexity and autonomy/control-related aspects of skill in each job-context. Finally, 
Autor and colleagues’ (2002) hypothesis was adapted to determine if routinized 
components of skill were either supplemented or complemented by new technologies. 
The findings indicated that skill change among firefighters was clearly 
present, but not uniform across job-contexts. A substantial increase in both the 
  
complexity and autonomy/control-related skill dimensions was present in the non-fire 
emergency context (particularly due to increased EMS-related skills). In fire 
emergencies, some skills diminished across both dimensions (e.g., operating the 
engine’s pump), yet others had a slight increase due to the introduction of new 
technologies. In contrast to these two contexts, the fire station and non-fire non-
emergency job-contexts had less skill change.  
Technology played a major role in the skill change experienced by 
firefighters. Surprisingly, aside from the introduction of computerized engine 
pumpers, the technology introduced did not diminish skill by replacing routinized 
tasks (Autor et al. 2002), and also did not create an overall decrease in firefightes’ 
skill as would be suggested by Braverman (1998/1974). Instead new technologies 
tended to create new skills for firefighters, especially in the fire and non-fire 
emergency contexts. Similar to the consistent level of skill used in the fire station and 
non-fire non-emergency contexts, with only few exceptions (e.g., computers) 
technology’s impact on firefighters’ skill was found to be rather limited in these two 
dimensions. Using the tenets detailed in the conceptual model, a more elaborate 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
As the existence and effects of the New Economy1 continue to be debated by a 
wide array of social scientists, there is one thing that is not contested – the drastic
impact technology has had on the labor force over the past twenty years. In fact, it is 
hard to imagine a business, organization, or occupation which has not been impacted 
by technology. Everything from the automotive industry (Fine and Raff 2001), 
computer/software industry (Linden, Brown, and Appleyard 2004), clothing 
manufacturers (Agnew, Forrester, Hassard, and Procter 1997), and service workers 
(Glen and Feldberg 1995) have all had their job requirements and tasks changed due 
to the influence of technology. While technology’s influence on these industries 
might not be surprising, some people may be shocked by some of the industries that 
have felt technology’s impact. A prime example is provided by Brennan (2002) who 
discusses advances in communication technologies and their effects on the business 
of sex workers. Thus, technology’s impact is everywhere, whether we have become 
so familiar with its integration that its effects go unnoticed, or it occurs in places we 
would never think to look. 
   One of the effects of technology which may tend to go unnoticed, or be 
taken-for-granted by the average person, is its continual influence on the skills needed 
by individuals to complete their occupation’s required tasks. This is an important 
topic which can impact (either positively or negatively) a variety of areas: ducation 
                                                
1 The term “New Economy” is defined here as the post-1990 era which saw an increase in productivity 
growth through accelerating changes in information (IT) and other technologies, and corresponding 
changes in business organization and practices. Thi def nition is derived using a synthesis of the 




(Form 1987; Giret and Masjuan 1999; Spenner 1985), wages and income (Attewell 
1990; Egger and Grossman 2005), workers’ dignity and value (Hodson 2001; Spenner 
1990; Rogers 1999), job stability (Rogers 1999; Smith 2001), unionization (Isler 
2007; Vallas and Beck 1996), gender inequality (Steinberg 1990; Vallas 1990; 
Weinberg 2000), training (Hodson, Hooks, and Rieble 1994; Marls and Scholarios 
2007), and policy (Vallas 1990). However, even with all of these related issues 
recognized, from the sociological researcher’s perspective skill has not been a 
primary focus in work/labor-related research (see Abbott 1993).  
This is not to imply that it has been completely absent. Often crediting 
Braverman (1998/1974) with renewing modern interest in “skilling research,” a base 
of social science literature focusing upon this phenomenon does exist, with a large 
portion of it studying this topic through the lens of some specific occupation or 
industry. Because it is rather difficult to capture the daily tasks and skills that are 
required in a single occupation (Autor, Levy, and Murnane 2003a; Spenner 1985), 
this consideration has encouraged a majority of sociological researchers to use a 
series of case studies to provide a detailed examination of technology’s effect on the 
requirements of particular occupations. No clear direction of the change in skill has 
been found from these case studies; however, a loose claim can be made that both 
past (Spenner 1985; Vallas 1990) and contemporary (Autor et al. 2003a; Szafran 
1996) research has seen an overall trend which shows a slight downskill among 
workers.2 
                                                
2 It should be noted that an issue of terminology exists here when referring to the nature of an 
individual’s skill decreasing. A variety of terms are often used to indicate the decrease in skills or skill-




While a large portion of current sociological research uses case studies to 
approach this topic, larger, multi-occupational quantitative studies have also been 
conducted by researchers. These quantitative studies have arguably been more 
common in economic research (Autor et al. 2003a), but have also been present in 
sociological research. Similar to the qualitative case study approach, the collective 
findings from these quantitative studies have also been mixed. However, the general 
claim made by these studies has been contradictory to the case studies. Research 
using quantitative methodologies has found that overall the more general pattern of 
skilling is increasing, or upskilling (Autor 2003a; Spenner 1985; Szafran 1996; Vallas
1990).3 
Taken as a whole, this body of literature has laid a foundation for the 
understanding of technology’s impact on the skill of workers. However, there is still
much room for future research to build upon. One manner in which the above body of 
literature falls short is that certain aspects of its conceptual approach may be in need 
of improvement. This occurs in a number of ways. First, an assumption is often made 
by researchers that skill is a term that needs not be defined. When an examination of 
skill takes place, it may often be unclear what exactly is being measured. We are 
often left with measurement issues of validity, and a general uncertainty. Second, 
claims are also made by researchers that the skills required by an occupation can 
either increase, decrease, and/or change (also referred to as reskilling) (for example, 
                                                                                                                                          
clarity’s sake, the term downskilling is used by the author when reviewing the literature to represent all 
of these terms. 
3 Similar to downskilling, an issue of terminology exists here when referring to the nature of an 
individual’s skill increasing. A variety of terms are often used to indicate the increase in skills or kill-
level of an individual including: upskilling, upgrading, or simply increasing. For clarity’s sake, the




see review by Spenner 1990). Without precise and clear conceptualizations, asses ing 
change in skill can be problematic as claims are being made in regards to the 
direction/manner of change without first defining the concept being measured. In 
addition, a uniform vertical direction of movement is used to view the change of skill 
without questioning its conceptual validity.  
Finally, another manner this research falls short is that it has only explored 
skill by assuming that occupations occur in a single location, or context. On the 
contrary, there are a variety of jobs and occupations that require different seri s of 
skills depending in which context this occupation is presently operating. For exampl, 
a dental hygienist performs her/his occupation not only in the examination room 
when a patient is having their teeth examined, but also at the administrative area in
which s/he is collecting patient information on insurance, scheduling appointments, 
etc. Thus, in each of these job-contexts there may be different sets of skills required, 
and the potential for each skill set to change in a different direction. 
Another missing piece of the puzzle occurs as a result of the scope taken by 
previous case studies. The majority of these research studies have maintained a focus 
of examining the changing skill of workers in either manufacturing industries o  in a 
professional office environment (i.e., a traditional “white-collar” context). Both of 
these environments have allowed a better understanding of this phenomenon, but at 
the same time are limited in their ability to generalize past these specific 
environments. While these studies have produced a richer description of skill and 
skill change (in comparison to quantitative studies), future research is needed which 




(manufacturing and “white-collar”) and onto examining occupations in industries and 
environments differing from those mentioned above. With a wide array of 
occupations that do not neatly fit into the manufacturing or professional categories, 
there is much room left to explore. 
 With the above considerations in mind, it is the purpose of this present 
research to address both of these issues (improvement of conceptualization and 
expanding generalizability of case studies past manufacturing and “white-collar” 
occupations) by a comprehensive examination of firefighters. This specific 
occupation is selected because it is an ideal occupation for the advancement of 
research on skill. First, this occupation is not contained in the industries and 
environments which have been explicitly examined by past research. Firefight ng 
falls into the public service sector, which to my knowledge has not yet been 
examined.4 It is not part of a capitalistic enterprise, yet through its large numbers of 
employed personnel is an important part of the U.S. economy. Finally, firefighters 
often operate in a variety of different job-contexts: at the firehouse, at fire relat d 
emergencies, at non-fire related emergencies, and at non-emergencies. By using 
firefighters as the occupation of focus, both an extension of generalizability to an 
                                                
4 It should be noted that a recent ethnography by Desmond (2006, 2007) has focused specifically upon 
wildland firefighters, and their negotiations of taking the risks involved with performing this 
occupation. However, in considering the sociological l terature on skill, two important points should be
made here. First, the main focus in his research only t uches upon skill, and does so using Bourdieu’s 
concept of habitus. This leads the author in the direction of considering embodied histories, 
internalized/forgotten socialization, and practical sense (Desmond 2007:12). Secondly, firefighters 
involved in handling wildland fires and those firefghters involved in handling fires occurring in 
residential/community environments possess different s ts of skills. Some skills do overlap, but due to 
the nature of these different jobs there is a great d l of differences. In particular, the four job-contexts 
in which the firefighters in the following study perform their tasks may not all be present in the 




unexplored job/occupation/sector and a more complex examination of skill can be 
achieved and help to advance the current body of research. 
In an effort to accomplish these stated tasks, prior to the literature review I ask 
two general research questions which will aide in the review of past studies, and an 
empirical analyses of the data. The first question asks: How have the skills u ed by 
firefighters to complete the tasks required by their occupation changed in the New 
Economy? In order to answer this question, the concept of skill will have to first be 
clearly conceptualized and defined. This definition will take into consideration a 
variety of items such as the type/variety of skills used, past research from multiple 
disciplines, how to accurately assess if a true change has occurred, and the variety of 
different contexts in which firefighters perform the tasks required by their occupation. 
The second research question asks: What has been technology’s role in the change of 
skill used by firefighters to complete the tasks required by their occupation? Because 
of the widespread use of technology in the U.S. economy, its continual and rapid 
evolution (Carr 2003, 2008), and its particular history in the occupation of firefighting 








Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Patterns and Causes of Skill Change 
Sociological literature 
The work of Karl Marx (1976/1867) provides a good starting point in which 
to begin understanding sociological claims made about skill. While Marx did not 
directly define the concept of skill in his work (similar to the term social class), Marx 
did make claims that capitalism would seek to alienate the working class such that 
they lose autonomy over their work. He claimed this would happen during instances 
where large capitalists employed numerous workers, and not due to the actual 
manufacturing process itself (Marx 1976/1867). However, while this environment of 
massive worker employment spawned the loss of autonomy, it did not occur in all 
environments. Marx indicated that one way in which workers could retain their skill 
was by maintaining their control over the work process (Attewell 1990). These 
Marxian roots to understanding skill remained a dominant intellectual force fr some 
time; however, after WWII his arguments were updated by contemporary claims 
about the pattern of skill change leading to what we think of as the more 
contemporary skilling debate. Although this contemporary debate has been detailed 
elsewhere (see Spenner 1983, 1995; Vallas and Beck 1996), its tenets are still 
important to discuss. 
 Within this debate, the first contemporary theoretical argument saw that 
technology would act as a mechanism of upskilling for the worker (Blauner 1964; 




workers were thought to be operating in jobs which required standardized and routine 
procedures. In this instance, technology (particularly automation) would break 
workers from these monotonous and routine tasks allowing them to gain a broader, 
more diverse set of skills than had previously plagued them. This would in turn lead 
to less direct supervision and more control over the workforce (Spenner 1983). While 
this argument itself had gained some recognition, a response to this thesis made in the 
work of Braverman received arguably more attention. In Labor and Monopoly 
Capital, Braverman (1974/1998) made “technologically deterministic” (Vallas 1990) 
claims that capitalism would use technology to strip workers of as much skill as 
possible in an effort to increase productivity and capital. As with Marx, Braverman 
never explicitly defined the term skill, but his work implied that skill included two 
specific dimensions: the complexity of tasks performed and the amount of autonomy 
individuals maintained over their work (Adler 1988). It should be noted here that 
while Braverman (1974/1998) saw this pattern (i.e., deskilling) as a general tendency 
for the majority of workers, this was not the case with everyone. While deskilling was 
occurring throughout most of the labor force, a limited number of individuals in jobs 
at the summit of this worker hierarchy would actually experience upskilling, resulting 
in a polarization of the workforce. These arguments have been widely acknowledged, 
both in a positive and negative light (for specific criticisms of Braverman see 
Meiskens 1994; Stark 1980; Wilkinson 1983).  
 With these antithetical, theoretically-based patterns of skill change 
established, there next came a position in the debate which was based primarily on 




time in the skilling conversation, researchers began to notice a large body of 
empirical research existed which did not provide any sound support to either the 
upskilling or downskilling claims. This has become known as the contingent, mixed-
change, or conditional argument (Spenner 1983, 1995; Vallas and Beck 1996). In the 
studies often cited (see Spenner 1995 for a list), depending on definition, 
measurement, methods, and timing of a study, different conclusions were reached. 
While these inconsistent empirical findings encouraged researchers to move away 
from providing support to previous theoretical claims, it can be argued that a 
dependence on empirical evidence also resulted in negative consequences. This 
inconsistent support resulted in sociologists and other researchers moving away from 
basing their research on sound theoretical arguments. The body of research made a 
fundamental shift to using methodological, conceptual, and operational considerations 
as the driving explanatory force. This shift was also expedited with the more 
widespread use of strong quantitative data allowing a more comprehensive study of 
skill (particularly the Dictionary of Occupational Titles [DOT], see Cain and Treiman 
1981; DoL 1991; Spenner 1983, 1985; the National Longitudinal Study of Youth 
[NLSY79] also began at this time, see Leigh and Gifford 1999). Therefore, 
sociological and other theoretical arguments took a back seat to the empirical find ngs 
that were being produced. 
 In response to this atheoretically driven focus, a variety of researchers set to 
reintegrate theory into the skilling debate. While acknowledging the claims of past 
research, this next argument looked to information technologies (IT) as creating new 




highly specialized focus. Arguments are made that capitalistic organizatio s 
themselves have been drastically changed by adopting new technologies and 
computers (known as “technocratic organization”; Burris 1999). In turn, this is 
requiring a different type of worker (for example see “symbolic analysts” in Reich 
1991, or the knowledge versus craft discussion in Marks and Scholarios 2007). 
Capitalistic organizations have begun to seek workers who are able to synthesize 
mental and manual tasks/functions, and not necessarily be controlled but rather 
develop a strong bond with their workplace through organizational and corporate 
commitment (Walton 1986; Zuboff 1988). This shift in the focus on skill has not only 
been due to IT, but also to the nature of the global economy becoming highly service-
oriented. It is at this point where current sociological examinations have remain d. 
Economic literature 
While these patterns of skill change have dominated and informed the 
sociological debates, a parallel argument of the nature of skill change has ensued in 
economics. While this debate has its similarities to the sociological arguments, there 
are also differences (Autor et al. 2003a). Both of these literatures have recognized the 
importance of technology to the skills of workers. With this similarity in mind, Autor 
et al. (2003a) claim that economics also receives criticism from sociology due to its 
(a) vague definition of skill, (b) limited emphasis on the role of managers and 
organizational design in adapting and implementing technology, and (c) technological 
determinism (pp. 121-122). Thus, to understand how this difference has risen, and 




1980s/early 1990s when IT and computer networks began to exponentially increase in 
the workplace. 
With a concern for the effects on wages and education, an argument was made 
by economists that the use of computers at work was inherently biased (Bound and 
Johnson 1992; Katz and Murphy 1992). At its basic level, this claim, known as the 
skill-biased technological change (SBTC) hypothesis, argues that changes in 
technology towards computerization tend to replace lower skilled workers (Pianta 
2005). Simultaneously, this new technology tends to show a bias towards workers 
with higher skills in that it requires higher skills and knowledge for current 
technologies to be effectively used (Piva, Santarelli, and Vivarelli 2005). The bias 
introduced by this hypothesis has often been used in an effort to explain and discuss 
wage inequality (Bound and Johnson 1992; Katz and Murphy 1992) and higher levels 
of educational attainment (Pianta 2005). The SBTC hypothesis had gained much 
momentum in the economic literature, especially through the booming integration of 
computers and IT in the workplace; however, (as with the case of sociological cla ms
on the impact of technology) evidence has been found that contradicts its claims 
(Pianta 2005; Piva et al. 2005). This evidence contains many limitations also found in 
the sociological literature, as shown by a statement made by Pianta (2005) that these 
inconsistencies in some manner have to do with the measurement of skill. In turn, this 
implies that further consideration is needed to be given to its conceptualization and 
operationalization (also noted elsewhere by Preece 1995). 
A response to the SBTC hypothesis followed, and recognized that skill not 




organization of the workplace. Here it has been argued that management has sought 
to adapt and implement trends which focus on decentralization and delayering, 
collective work, and multi-tasking (Caroli 2001). This has spawned the skill-biased 
organizational change (SBOC) hypothesis. The SBOC hypothesis states that new 
organizational changes and management procedures have encouraged upskilling (or 
higher levels of skills) among workers (Piva et al. 2005). While this hypothesis can be 
pitted against SBTC, more recent studies have found that SBTC and SBOC may often 
act as compliments in understanding the increasing levels of worker skill (Piva et al. 
2005).  
At this point, these two hypotheses can be taken in unison to show that an 
increasing or higher level of skill was valued in the labor force due to the increasing 
use of IT and computers and the corresponding nature of organization and 
management. While evidence has been found for both the SBTC and SBOC 
hypotheses, conclusions are similar to the sociological literature and do not produce a 
sound explanation of the nature and causes of skill change. This is shown by Piva and 
colleagues (2005) in a review of the literature on these two hypotheses where 
empirical support has varied by temporal period and country/area of focus.  
While the SBTC has played an important role in the economic literature, it has 
received criticism from sociologists for a variety of reasons (Autor et al. 2003a). 
However, intradisciplinary criticism has also surfaced. In a series of resea ch projects 
and papers, Autor and colleagues (2002, 2003a, 2003b) spoke to the fact that the 




influencing worker’s skill. They sought an alternative way to understand the influ nce 
of computers in society, by making the claim that: 
…the introduction of computer-based technology creates strong economic pressure to 
substitute machinery for people in carrying out tasks that can be fully described in 
terms of procedural or ‘rules-based’ logic and hence performed by a computer. This 
process typically leaves many tasks to be performed by humans, and management 
decisions play a key role – at least in the short run – in determining how these tasks 
are organized into jobs, with potentially significant implications for skill demands” 
(Autor et al. 2002:433).  
 
The notion here is that computerization and IT are able to either supplement 
or compliment different tasks and the skills that are needed to achieve them. Autor et 
al. (2002) detailed this in a case study of a bank which adopted new technologies. 
Here, the authors show that computers are used to automate tasks which run on 
“rules-based” (Autor et al. 2002) or “IF-THEN-DO” (Levy and Murnane 2004), 
logic. In these instances, various tasks were supplemented by this new computer-
based technology, and thus the skills required to perform them were eliminated. At 
the same time, a variety of new and old tasks were left which could not be 
supplemented by computers. However, not everyone’s skills were increased due to 
the adoption of this technology. With the goal of increased productivity, management 
played a pivotal role in the organization of the bank workers which directly impacted 
whether or not a worker’s role led to a higher or lower level of skill use: one 
department was led to adopt a broader range of skills, while another department 
adapted more narrowly defined skills to conduct simplistic, non-routine tasks (Autor 
et al. 2002). 
In recent research by Goos and Manning (2007) this finding (termed by the 




applied in a large scale quantitative examination of the workforce of Britain in the 
late 1990s. Their findings lent support to the argument that the workforce was being 
polarized. It was argued by the authors that this polarization was occurring because 
the majority of jobs which consist of routine tasks accounted for by the ALM 
routinization hypothesis fall in a middle stratum among the occupational hierarchy. 
Therefore, the tasks of these jobs are able to be supplemented by computers leaving 
only the higher and lower tiers of occupations which workers are to fill (Goos and 
Manning 2007).  
Thus, both the sociological and economic theoretical propositions and 
empirical studies have resulted in skill to be examined through a wide variety of 
manners. Taking into account this wide array of literature, I would argue that two 
findings remain consistent. The first is that the collective findings of resea ch on skill 
change have consistently found the evidence to be inconsistent. For each theory 
stated, there exists empirical evidence that can be used to either support or contradi t 
its stated tenants. Secondly, due to the varying (and sometimes incomparable) 
conceptualizations and operationalizations of skill (and there are many; Adler 1988), 
a more explicit focus needs to be given to the movement from theory onto its 
empirical testing. 
The Conceptualization of Skill 
 When studying the skill levels of workers, all researchers are faced with the 
dilemma of how to conceptualize skill. Three factors tend to place limitations on how 
skill is conceptualized. The first factor which limits conceptualization is that the 




unofficial starting point for guidance on conceptualization is Braverman (1998/74) 
who hinted at what exactly skill entails (Adler 1988), but himself never explicitly 
defined this term. When referring to skill, this use of ambiguous terminology (and 
related concepts) is something that has continued in research (Barley 1990). Second, 
because skill is not something that is easily measured in empirical research, various 
data and methodological considerations have driven our definition of skill (Spenner 
1983), perhaps more so than theoretical arguments. For example, in some instances 
the dialouge of the conceptualization and operationalization of skill is discussed 
simultaneously (Spenner 1983, 1985, 1995; Vallas 1990). Although this may initially 
have sought to clarify the meaning of the term “skill,” it may in fact perpetuate the 
confusion by blurring the lines of how skill should ideally be conceptualized and how 
researchers must settle on an operationalization. Finally, publishing bias may also be 
an additional factor in the conceptualization of skill (as with any research topic; see 
Wilson 2008). Because much emphasis is generally given to the second-half of 
studies (i.e. the results, discussion, and conclusion portions), the front-half may 
sometimes get overlooked or minimized due to space constraints.5 The literature 
summaries/reviews and methods sections which tend to hold the details of skill’s 
conceptualization may be unclear to the reader and leave him/her with unanswered 
questions. 
Braverman’s conceptualization 
While skill can be looked at as a possession by individuals (Spenner 1990), it 
can also be defined as requirements of a specific job/social role (Sadler 1970; 
                                                




Spenner 1990). The distinction stems from various schools of thought: positivism, 
ethnomethodology, Weberian, and Marxian (see Attewell 1990 for a description of 
each of these). Because of the large Marxist tradition in the literature on work and 
skill, Marx’s view on skill as related to human nature and the effects of work (Form 
1987) has lent the majority of research to interpret skill as the demands and 
requirements of a job. This view was adopted by Braverman (1998/1974) who did not 
explicitly state what he had implied by the term skill in his work Labor and Monopoly 
Capital, but did recognize two dimensions of this term which are often correlated: 
substantive task complexity and autonomy/control (Adler 1988:3; Spenner 1985:135). 
When skill is addressed by the sociological literature in a purely non-empirical 
manner, these two aspects of skill are almost surely to appear. However, this does not 
imply that other dimensions have not been added to the conceptualization. For 
example, both Parcel and Mueller (1989) and Szafran (1996) use alternative 
dimensions (described below in the following subsection). 
 Throughout past research, the most conceptually consistent of Braverman’s 
dimensions of skill has been substantive complexity. As defined by Spenner (1985), 
substantive complexity “refers to the level, scope, and integration of mental, 
interpersonal, and manipulative tasks in a job” (p. 135). This concept is truly at the 
heart of not only sociological skill research, but also research falling into other 
disciplines (Rolfe 1990). Thus, a wide central tendency of agreement appears over 
this particular dimension, and most research on skill, whether or not the term is 
defined or the dimension of substantive complexity is specifically mentioned, does 




 Although a near uniform agreement on the dimension of substantive 
complexity may exist, Braverman’s second dimension – autonomy/control – is more 
controversial. To again quote Spenner (1985), autonomy/control can be given the 
basic definition of “the discretion available in a job to initiate and conclude action, to 
control the content, manner, and speed at which tasks are done” (p. 135). However, a 
clear understanding and definition of this concept has not been universal. Form 
(1987) comments on this dimension through an argument that autonomy is not a 
particularly useful dimension in the conceptualization of skill. One reason he gives is 
that having autonomy and a direct control over one’s tasks does not imply any true 
notion of skill. The example given here is that of a maintenance worker, or custodian. 
In this position there is much autonomy, but it is not to say that a high level of skill is 
involved in the basic tasks required by this particular job. While this argument is 
based upon a conceptual reasoning, his second argument is more empirically driven. 
In this argument he states that since empirical evidence has shown autonomy/control 
to be highly correlated to complexity (found in Spenner 1980), complexity reigns as a 
superior operational measure and thus no need may be given to using autonomy as an 
empirical measure (Form 1987). 
Alternative dimensions 
As mentioned above, researchers have also argued that other dimensions of 
skill exist besides substantive complexity and autonomy/control. These dimensions 
appear to be empirically driven, in many instances using the different 
categories/arrangements of the DOT and associated statistical techniques such as 




1981; Cronshaw and Alfieri 2002; Parcel and Mueller 1989), which have been further 
proposed as being broken down into fine and gross motor skills (Szafran 1996); social 
interaction (Szafran 1996); physical activities (Cain and Treiman 1981; Parcel and 
Mueller 1989); undesirable/hazardous working conditions (Cain and Treiman 1981; 
Parcel and Mueller 1989; Szafran 1996); and adaptive skills (Cronshaw and Alfieri 
2002). Because of the empirically driven nature of these dimensions, and data 
availability, they have been more specific to researchers who have used the DOT as a 
data source. In addition, with the replacement of the DOT by the Occupational 
Information Network (O*NET), a database which contains a new skill taxonomy (see 
Mariani 1999; Peterson et al. 2001), alternative dimensions that have been used to 
conceptualize skill may in the future expand to include new dimensions such as 
technical skills, problem-solving skills, etc. It may also be argued that this may not be 
the case. For example, one study by Hadden, Kravets, and Muntaner (2004) use the 
O*NET to create skill dimensions similar to that of the DOT which allow for 
comparison. Regardless of their specific name, it is clear these dimensions are quite 
different in their very nature than those acknowledged by Braverman. 
Occupation-specific skills 
Another manner of conceptualization which has existed (particularly in case 
studies) has been examining the skills specific to a certain job (for example, see Autor 
et al. 2002; Bartel, Ichniowski, and Shaw 2003; Cronshaw and Alfieri 2003; Smith 
2001). In Smith’s (2001) work (a series of case studies), the specific tasks detailed are 
those needed to complete photocopying procedures, wood-products processing, and 




qualitative methods in an effort to understand the precise procedures that go into a 
particular job. Taking this view of skill, a very good understanding of the tasks 
specific to an individual in a particular job are described. However, the 
generalizability is somewhat limited to not only that specific occupation, but also to 
that specific job. Thus, the far too familiar trade-off between detail and 
generalizability is an issue (as it is when comparing any type of quantitative and 
qualitative study, in any topic being researched).  
Others have found using alternative research methods can allow for a greater
generalization to skills that move past the job level and are more occupation-specific. 
An increasing generalizability allows for a broader understanding of the tasks and 
skills required by specific occupations (Reiter-Palmon et al. 2006). One may even go 
a step further in arguing a need for broader skill level examinations are needed. These 
may have potential to generalize not only to a particular occupation, but also to a 
large organization/corporation, industry, and even the general labor force (Rotundo 
and Sackett 2004). 
 The notion of conceptualizing skill by the particular level in which one is 
focusing (i.e., job, occupation, industry, general labor force) has been an important 
consideration in research. In many instances different studies are addressing change at 
different levels of skill (Spenner 1985) which can lead to problematic or inaccurate 
comparisons. This is due in part to both the lack of understanding between these 
different levels and their inability to speak to one another. Obviously, this does not 




needed to be considered when it is a possibility, and (b) caution should be given in 
comparing different levels of skill. 
Routinized/non-routinized skills 
One final manner of conceptualizing skill is by whether or not a task follows a 
rules-based logic (Autor et al. 2002, 2003a, 2003b). This conceptualization is 
particularly useful if examining the effect of computers on skill change, and is 
explained thoroughly in the work of Autor and colleagues (2002, 2003a, 2003b). As it 
has already been detailed above, this manner will not be reiterated again. 
The Measurement of Skill 
Just as the conceptualization of skill poses an issue, its operationalization is no 
different. This operationalization has consistently been a challenge for rsearchers, 
and (as mentioned above) at times has even overridden the theories informing the 
conceptualization of skill. Therefore, there is no doubt that just as much attention 
should be given to creating measures of skill which can allow for accurate 
operationalization in empirical research. Although operationalization tends to be 
particular to the data source being used, there are some general patterns and 
commonalities found in the skilling literature. One of these described by Vallas 
(1990) is the nature of the methodology used. A second pattern discussed by Spenner 
(1990) is based on the type of measurement used. While both of these operational 
characterizations discussed by Vallas and Spenner differ, they share a basic
commonality for allowing us to understand skill measurement. In addition, the wide 




in the skilling research of both sociology and economics, has also driven 
operationalizations of skill. 
Methodological categorization 
Although noted elsewhere (Autor et al. 2003a; Spenner 1985, 1990), Vallas 
(1990) gives focus to the dichotomy of aggregate versus case study methods in 
empirically examining skill.6 While any trained researcher understands each of these 
has different shortcomings, this acknowledgement has been particularly important in 
the skilling literature as the varying degrees of support given to the majortheoretical 
propositions of skill change by empirical studies has been highly dependent on the 
methodology used. The first methodology includes aggregate, quantitative studies of 
a larger scale. These studies allow for a broad generalizability and have collectively 
(although not consistently) found loose support for the increase in worker’s skill 
(Autor et al. 2003a; Spenner 1985). These types of studies are not job-specific or even 
organization-specific, but rather focus upon the broader levels of industry and the 
labor force. It is through this broader focus that large scale, generalizable cl ims can 
be made about the nature of skill change. At the same time, it has been advised that 
even when using the best aggregate data available, limitations still exis. It appears 
the most commonly cited limitation is in the loss of detail that occurs throug  
aggregating skill (see Spenner 1983). In fact, as pointed out by Vallas (1990), the 
work of Penn (1982) went so far as to say that the real significance of skill cannot be 
found through aggregate studies but only through a narrower and localized context.  
                                                
6 The importance of this distinction is also noted by Barley (1990) who suggests that inaccurate 
inferences are made due to researchers not accounting for the level of analyses. Barley suggests that by 
combining different methods of study these inaccuraies can be addressed and a more comprehensive 




 The second categorization that Vallas (1990) discusses is case studies. In this 
category both quantitative studies with a narrower focus (i.e., quantitative studis 
focusing on a specific industry or organization) and qualitative studies are placed. 
The strengths of these methodological approaches enable researchers to address some 
of the shortcomings of large scale aggregate studies. They enable researchrs to 
examine skill through a variety of skill dimensions (Vallas 1990), but at the same 
time use different conceptualizations (e.g., occupation-specific, routine/non-routi e) 
to alternatively describe and understand skill. In addition, while aggregate studi s are 
able to detect patterns in skill change, it is through these case studies that the
mechanisms to which these changes can be attributed can be identified. 
At the same time, case studies also have their weaknesses. Obviously one is 
generalizability (Spenner 1983; Vallas 1990). Claims can only be made to the specific 
instance that is being studied, with some ability to loosely speculate past each specific 
case. Depending on the research this generalization may be only to workers in a 
specific office/sector at a particular corporation, or at the somewhat broader level of a 
particular organization or industry. In addition, this generalization is further limited 
by the fact that only certain types of occupations have been explored. Based on the 
interest in technology’s effects on skill, a large majority of case studies hav  
examined occupations in manufacturing (traditional manual labor environments) or in 
professional (traditional white-collar office environments). The generalizability of 
these studies cannot be applied to other sectors; for example, the public service 
sector, or the military (the biggest employer in the U.S.). In addition to the issue of 




While these trends may be important factors in influencing how skill changes, the 
narrower focus of case studies may cause researchers to not account for these pa terns 
(Vallas 1990). 
Measurement categorization 
Another manner used to address the operational issues that are present in 
skilling research is by looking at the type of measures used to operationalize the 
concept of skill. Spenner (1990) provides a basis in which this is accomplished by 
stating that skill has been measured in three distinct ways. The first manner (  
“indirect” manner; Spenner 1990) is taken by not truly measuring skill. Simply put, 
this absence of measurement occurs when a researcher takes an occupational title r 
grouping such as manager, laborer, blue-collar, pink-collar, white-collar, etc. to be 
indicative of skill. This leaves many issues on the table, including validity, and leves 
the reader guessing exactly what the term skill implies in these instances. This 
indirect manner may also not allow for an accurate comparison of findings from one 
study to other skill research. 
The measurement of skill is strengthened to some extent in Spenner’s (1990) 
second category of indirect measures. These types of measures are common in social
science research, especially when dealing with more abstract concepts (e.g., identity, 
efficacy, etc.). A wide variety of indirect measures have been used in both 
sociological and economics literature and include things such as educational 
attainment (Giret and Masjuan 1999; Green, Felstead, and Gallie 2003; Robinson and 
Manacorda 1997) and on-the-job training (Grimshaw, Beynon, Rubery, and Ward 




(1990) claims that movement away from this type of operationalization has occurred 
in the sociological literature; however, it has remained the norm in economics 
research. Contradictory to Spenner’s claim, it could also be argued that a movement 
away from indirect measures is also occurring in economic research on skill as can be 
seen with more recent economic publications focusing on skill (Agnew, Forrester, 
Hassard, and Proctor 1997; Autor et al. 2002, 2003b; Ballantine, Jr. and Ferguson 
2003). 
A final category described by Spenner (1990) is that skill can also be 
measured directly using “empirical operations and/or explicit protocols for the 
designation of skill level” (p. 408).7 Direct measures have been achieved in a variety 
of manners, including expertly through the use of job analysts, outside observers 
(including researchers), and self-reports. The use of these types of measures has 
become fairly commonplace in social science research, with one of the most 
dominant sources of measurement being the U.S. Department of Labor’s (1991) DOT. 
Because of its dominant role as a common direct measure, it is worth while to give 
specific focus to this data source. 
The DOT and O*NET 
The DOT was first published in 1939 after the Great Depression by the 
Department of Labor in an effort to meet the demand of the public employment 
service to create standardized occupational measures that could aid in job placement 
(DoL 1991). By the time the fourth edition was produced, the DOT contained 44 
                                                
7 It should be noted here that in this quote Spenner (1990) is discussing skill level in an absolute 
manner. This differs from the discussion I had earli r of skill level which implied the relative context 




variables/measures for over twelve thousand occupations (Spenner 1990). Perhaps its 
most useful feature is the DOT’s ability to be linked to data sources which contain a 
respondent’s occupation. This linkage (although often time consuming) may be 
completed to give researchers the ability to directly measure skill among data which 
did not originally have these measures present. These measures include a variety of 
concepts including worker functions, training times, aptitudes, temperaments, 
interests, physical demands, and working conditions (DoL 1991). Because of the 
DOT, skilling research has been able to measure various dimensions of skill in large 
scale quantitative studies, something that otherwise may have remained limitto the 
use of qualitative methodologies.  
While having benefits, the DOT is not without its critiques. It has been well 
advised that researchers need to take caution in using the DOT, particularly certain 
measures it contains (Spenner 1983). Cain and Treiman (1981) list three specific 
limitations of the DOT. First, the DOT measures are based on the on-site analyses of 
jobs by experts. This is problematic for two reasons. First, the notion that a job does 
not necessarily allow for the explicit generalization to the broader occupation. 
Second, if taking the conceptual notion made earlier that occupations can operate in 
different contexts (such as firefighters), this is also problematic becaus  not all of 
these different contexts are necessarily being accounted for. A second limitation with 
the DOT is that newer editions use previous editions to update occupation measures. 
Using the occupation of firefighter as an example, in the revised fourth edition of the
DOT (DoL 1991), this occupation had not been updated since 1977. A final limitation 




redundant. Since the time these weaknesses have been detailed by Cain and Treiman 
(1981), another limitation has also arisen. The last edition of the DOT is over 15 years 
old. Because its original conception was based in a period of automation, 
contemporary jobs which have appeared in the New Economy have not been detailed. 
In addition, the widespread infusion of IT and computers into the majority of 
occupations has not been accounted for in the DOT. 
In an effort to address these limitations, the DOT was retired and replaced by 
the O*NET. The O*NET made use of the new Standard Occupational Classification 
System (SOC; see Levine, Salmon, and Weinberg 1998 for details) to create a wide 
variety of occupational measures. Table 1 provides a brief overview of how the DOT 
and the O*NET compare as data sources. Although the measures of the O*NET allow 
for dimensions of skill to be operationalized similarly to those realized in the DOT 
(Hadden et al. 2004), the two data sources cannot be directly compared due to their 
differing nature (Rotundo and Sackett 2004). This consideration aside, there are 
arguably four advantages to the O*NET – all four assumptions for which its creation 
was based (Peterson et al. 2001). The first is that because the nature of U.S. economy 
has moved from production of materials to an IT-infused, global service economy, the 
actual occupations present in the economy have changed. Therefore, the O*NET is 
meant to capture these newly created occupations (Mariani 1999). 
[Table 1 about Here] 
A second advantage is that the O*NET uses “multiple windows” to examine 
the labor force. Thus, multiple measures are found in a wide variety of categories, 




(Peterson et al. 2001). A third advantage of this data source is that it provides a 
common language to describe different occupations such that new systems collect 
occupation-specific information but do so by arranging it under broader descriptors. 
Finally, the O*NET uses taxonomies and hierarchies to allow for different levels of 
description, increased validity, flexibility in choosing descriptors, and the ability to 
address future unanticipated features (Peterson et al. 2001).  
Although the O*NET has a variety of advantages, researchers should be wary 
of its potential disadvantages: its full range of validity and reliability has not been 
adequately confirmed, its continual updates (only documented by year changed) may 
not allow researchers to adequately compare studies using the O*NET, it cannot be 
directly compared to the DOT (Rotundo and Sackett 2004), and it has not yet been 
extensively researched in the areas of sociology and economics. 
Technology and Skill in the Context of Firefighting 
As with any occupation, the change in technology and need for specific skills 
has long been a part of firefighting in the U.S. Beginning in Jamestown in 1608 with 
the first recorded U.S. fire, it was quickly noted that fighting fires was no easy task 
(Smith 1978). The efforts by early colonial settlers at this fire were seen as 
completely unorganized and lacking any skill at successfully combating fire. As a 
result, the entire community in which the fire erupted was left in a state of 
destruction. With the occurrence of this and other early fires, communities made 
better strides at fire prevention. In 1631 the first ever fire regulation was en cted 
(Smith 1978). As the U.S. expanded and spawned new cities, more fires such as the 




were a result. This process of destruction leading to innovation seemed to repeat 
habitually, and has therefore been painted as a “tale of progress” (Hazen and Hazen 
1992:121). 
 While destruction may have often been seen to encourage the development of 
new technology, it is these new technologies which are perceived to spawn new 
skills. Perhaps the first clear indication of this was in 1852 with the invention of a 
reliable steam-powered fire engine created by Alexander Moses and Finley Latta 
(Hazen and Hazen 1992; Smith 1978).8 Because of the increased complexity of this 
steam-powered engine, a new series of skills were needed to properly operate it. 
These skills were not thought to be in possession of volunteer firefighters, and as a 
result, in 1853 the city of Cincinnati created the first paid fire department (Smih 
1978). A few years later (in 1856), using their new steam-powered engine this 
Cincinnati fire department challenged a New York volunteer fire company and their 
human-powered engine to a public competition (Hazen and Hazen 1992). The result 
was a victory for steam-power and a widespread use of this type of engine in the U.S. 
when fighting fires. By 1876, approximately 275 U.S. fire departments were using 
steam-power (Hazen and Hazen 1992). At this point it seems that a true movement of 
the role of firefighter from volunteer to professional occurred based on the 
assumption of “true” skill being needed for this occupation. 
 Fast-forwarding to more recent times, the destructive force of fires may have 
ceased to spawn technological innovation, but technology continues to influence skill. 
                                                
8 While Moses and Finley’s engine is the first effective and reliable steam-powered fire engine, it was
not the first ever invented. It is generally believed that George Braithwaite constructed the first steam 
engine in London in 1829. In the U.S. the first steam-powered engine was commissioned for creation 




In an examination of the folklore of firefighters, McCarl (1985) takes time to briefly 
examine the different techniques required of this occupation. These tasks and skills 
are different depending on the type of fire company in which a firefighter works (i.e. 
engine versus truck), and what responsibilities this individual has in that company 
(e.g., driving the vehicle, maintaining hoses, controlling the ladder, etc.) (McCarl 
1985). In this example, because of the use of a wide array of tools and technologies, a 
variety of skills are needed. Furthermore, depending on what tool or technology one 
is currently using, a set of unique skills may be needed. Finally, depending on what 
type of fire one is fighting, a completely different set of firefighting techniques and 
skills may be needed. For example, while some skills may be shared to combat urban 
fires, a different set of skills are required to handle wildfires (Desmond 2006, 2007). 
 Within firefighting, the consistent fusion of technology with skill continues 
into the present day. Computers and IT have now begun to be used in training 
simulators. These simulators have capabilities of allowing for the scientific study of 
the elemental properties of fire and its interaction with natural and man-made 
environments (Emmons 1990), but also to simulate situations in which firefighters 
must be trained to operate (Marchant, Kurban, and Wise 2001). The implications for 
adopting these technologies are multifaceted: they can minimize costs to local/state 
governments, minimize risk of injury/death of firefighters, and improve the scientific 
study of fire and fire-related technologies themselves. In addition, these technologies 
have also led to research and technology centers to be created, in some instances 




 While technological innovation has continued to be a driving force in 
firefighting, its adoption is not always smooth. Coleman (2004) makes note of this by 
saying that whenever a new technology is introduced to firefighting, it is not
universally adopted. There are two factors that can play an important part in 
technology’s adoption. The first is that there needs to be a certainty that the specific
technology is useful and effective (Coleman 2004). Until this is the case, technology 
may not be widely accepted among fire departments. A second factor hindering the 
adoption of technology is its acceptance by individuals. Even when an organization 
adopts a new technology or procedure, the individuals do not always use this 
technology. This acceptance/non-acceptance tends to be driven by the underlying 
culture of the individuals employed at an organization (Dadayan and Ferro 2005; 
Vallas 1998). In fact, this issue of acceptance of new technology has been present
among fire departments since the 1800s when the steam-powered engine was 
introduced (Smith 1978). In a more contemporary example, Weinschenk, Ezekoye, 
and Nicks (2008) provide a description of using standard operating guidelines by 
firefighters to complete a variety of tasks required by the job; however, they do 
acknowledge that even with these guidelines instituted by a fire department, actually 
adhering to these guidelines may be more of an issue of acceptance by a fire 
department than their formal implementation. 
 While one may most often equate the skills and technology used by 
professional firefighters to the actual task of fighting a fire, there are different skills 




fire, and rather in a different context (Coleman 2004). Vielkind (2007) provides a 
good example of this by quoting a question from a New City Fire Department exam:
“As a rookie firefighter you are responsible for cleaning the kitchen. You arrive for 
the beginning of your shift to find the kitchen area is a mess. And there is a bowl of 
chili spilled on the floor from the firefighters from the previous shift. The reason the 
kitchen is such as a mess is due to the previous crew having gone out on a call to a 
fire during their dinner, and they are still actively fighting the fire…What should you 
do with the following circumstances?”   
 
While the above question is rather controversial (see Vielkind 2007 for further 
details), it is used here to show that a wide variety of tasks are needed to be 
completed by firefighters, and the skills that they require are often overlooked when 
studying this particular occupation. Skills and technology do not only impact the 
tasks firefighters must complete at the scene of a fire, but also at the fire ouse (see 
NFPA 2007 Chapter 5), at the scene of other types of emergencies (e.g., automobile 
accidents, medical calls) (see NFPA 2007 Chapter 5), and perhaps even in other 
situations which occur outside of the firehouse and are not emergencies (e.g., 
installing and maintaining smoke detectors in residential homes). In addition, because 
this occupation is one that operates in multiple contexts (as opposed to a bank teller, 
for example), and uses a wide variety of skills in these different contexts (Coleman 
2004), there may be a much more complex pattern of how technology is influencing 




Chapter 3: Theoretical and Conceptual Arguments 
 
Theoretical Argument 
The body of literature on skilling is extensive. A wide array of theoretical and 
empirical research exists which has focused upon the nature of skill change, 
technology’s influence on skill, organization and managerial influence on skill, 
different conceptualizations of skill, and the methodologies and measurements used 
in skill research. While we have learned much from these studies, it is sometimes 
disheartening to see that we are left with as many questions as there are answers. 
With this in mind, the following section seeks to use past research to create a bett r 
understanding of skilling and skill change not only by building upon past research, 
but also proposing new theoretical and conceptual arguments. 
In the present research, I plan to adopt some of these existing arguments to 
build a conceptual model which will act as a guide for understanding skill change and 
technology’s impact on firefighters. In addition, a new conceptualization is proposed 
which further develops this literature. It is this integrative conceptual model that I will 
follow in the present research to create a comprehensive understanding of skill 
change and technology’s impact in firefighting. 
The job-context skill level 
As noted above, it is important for a researcher to clarify the level of skill 
being examined. The term skill level is used to refer to the level of analyses in which 
the skills being examined can be generalized. This clarification may prevent 




between skills at broader levels (i.e., industry, general labor force; for xample see 
Rotundo and Sackett 2004) and at micro levels (i.e., occupation, job; for example see 
Bartel et al. 2003; Smith 2001). For example, focusing on the broader occupational 
level skills required by a firefighter as a public service sector employee may overlook 
the micro job-context level skills needed by a firefighter. Thus, I take this part cul r 
conceptual element of skill level as the building block of my conceptual model.  
Although a variety of skill levels have been discussed (Rotundo and Sackett 
2004; Spenner 1985), I find the present conceptualizations of skill level to be lacking. 
I argue that when focusing at the more micro levels, a full understanding of the 
manners and intricacies of skill change may be overlooked. In turn, this limits the 
ability to make generalizations in regards to skill change. To better understand the 
changing nature of skill further conceptualization is needed. Thus, I propose that in 
addition to the industry, organization, occupation, and job levels of skill discussed in 
the past literature (Rotundo and Sackett 2004; Spenner 1985), there is an additional 
skill level which past research has not considered: the job-context level. To further 
understand this level, I will take as an example the particular job of interest in this
study - firefighting.  
Based on the traditional conceptualizations of skill levels, at the job and/or 
occupation levels we could expect firefighters to possess a specific set of job skills. 
The set of skills that would first come to mind are those related to the tasks needed to 
be completed in controlling and suppressing residential and commercial fires. 
However, this occupation requires a variety of additional skills which are not 




automated external defibrillator [AED]; filing standard reports; running fire drills at 
local schools; even the cliché of rescuing a cat stuck in a tree [see Maile 2004]). 
Therefore, these additional skills may be overlooked, yet are important to this 
particular occupation. To better account for these skills I argue that depending on the 
context in which a firefighter is operating, a unique set of skills is needed to complete 
the tasks that are required within that particular context. In the case of the firefighter, 
I claim these skill sets may fall into four distinct job-contexts: (1) at a fire station (or 
firehouse), (2) at the scene of a fire related emergency, (3) at the scene of a on-fire 
related emergency (e.g. EMS call for an automobile accident), and (4) a non-fire non-
emergency (e.g. checking residential smoke detectors) (Figure 1). By using this new 
skill level of “job-context”, I believe that a more accurate and intricate understanding 
of the nature of skill change in firefighting is able to be achieved. 
[Figure 1 about Here] 
While the claim is made here that these four job-contexts are distinct, this is 
not meant to imply that overlap does not occur. There may be some particular tasks 
which require similar skills which occur at (for example) a fire station and at the 
scene of a fire emergency; or at a non-fire emergency and at a non-fire non-
emergency. However, it is argued that in each job-context the larger set of skills 
which are required and used are distinct to that particular context. Thus, by failing to 
acknowledge the job-context, or unconsciously only acknowledging one (or even 
two) of these contexts, the result may be that an entire set of skills is overlooked. In 




has impacted this change could be missed by the researcher and result in inaccurate 
conclusions. 
On a final note, while I have been explicit about the use of the 
conceptualization in the present research, it is important to make clear that the 
implications of this novel conceptualization of the job-context skill level are not 
limited to firefighting, or even the public service sector. Many other jobs and 
occupations operate in multiple job-contexts. A few occupations which are prime 
examples of how this job-context skill level conceptualization can better the 
understanding of skill include: police officers (i.e., at a police station, during no -
criminal offenses, during criminal offenses, etc.), accountants (i.e., at main 
office/corporation, at a residence performing private tax consulting, at a business 
performing business organization consulting, etc.), and even military officers (.e., at 
a military base, in combat situations, in non-combat situations/missions). 
Skill dimensions 
The above discussion of skill level and the argument for use of a job-context 
level to truly understand skilling does not exhaust the theoretical approach used in 
this research. However, I do use skill level as a conceptual basis in which I further 
create a model and build my theoretical argument. While (to my knowledge) this job-
context level I am proposing is something entirely new, there is a further need to 
specify what is being measured in each context. For this, I first turn to the skill 
dimensions suggested by Braverman (1998/1974). Assuming the existence of 
different skill dimensions creates a basis to determine how precisely skill is changing. 




Treiman 1981; Parcel and Mueller 1989; Szafran 1996], physical activities [Cain and 
Treiman 1981; Parcel and Mueller 1989], adaptive skills [Cronshaw and Alfieri 
2002], etc.), I believe that Braverman’s (1998/1974) proposed dimensions remain the 
two central dimensions of skill.  
Braverman’s dimensions (substantive complexity and autonomy/control) 
parallel each other and provide a unique method for understanding skill. My 
argument for using these two dimensions over other proposed dimensions is based on 
two specific justifications. First, these dimensions have been widely used, and I 
believe they act as a basis for understanding skill as the demands and requirements of 
a job. This view follows the Marxian approach to skill and its relation to human 
nature and its effects on workers (Form 1987). At its core, I feel this understanding 
takes not only a correct definition of skill, but also a concern with the importance of 
skill, and why it is an important topic of research in the social sciences. The second 
justification is that Braverman’s dimensions were theoretically informed and do not 
fall into the trap of using empirical findings as the sole driving force in their 
conceptualization. Braverman drew upon both theoretical literature (influenced by 
Marx) and empirical observations (his personal experience in manufacturing) to guide 
his conceptualization. Thus, his dimensions – substantive complexity and 
autonomy/control – are different in nature from those alternative dimensions 
proposed by more recent research which may use a more atheoretical basis for 
guiding their creation (Spenner 1985). 
It is also important to be explicit in what precisely is implied by these 




rather uniform view of Braverman’s (1998/1974) dimension of substantive 
complexity. As stated by Spenner (1985), this “refers to the level, scope, and 
integration of mental, interpersonal, and manipulative tasks in a job” (p. 135). This 
understanding of the dimension of substantive complexity is what I adopt in the 
present research.  
The second dimension I am adopting in my research is that of 
autonomy/control. This dimension refers to “the discretion available in a job to 
initiate and conclude action, to control the content, manner, and speed at which tasks 
are done” (Spenner 1985:135). Unlike the more widely agreed upon dimension of 
substantive complexity, the dimension of autonomy/control has been questioned. For 
example, in an assessment of the sociological research on skill, Form (1987) 
discusses whether or not this autonomy/control dimension should be re-thought, or 
even abandoned. While I do agree with the proposition that a re-thinking of 
autonomy/control may be in order, I do not believe that completely abandoning this 
dimension is a proper course of action. 
The issue I have with the conceptualization of the autonomy/control 
dimension stems from the question of what exactly is skill. In taking skill to be 
defined by the tasks needed to be completed in a particular occupation, and (per 
Marx) the effects that they have on human nature, I do not think that the 
autonomy/control dimension at face value is indicative of skill, but rather only related 
to skill. In particular, having discretion over one’s job does not equate in itself to a set 
of tasks which need to be completed: having more or less discretion does not translate 




skill (e.g., organizational structure, type of work one is completing, signifier of 
occupational status). However, having more or less discretion does affect a worker’s 
decision-making, problem-solving, self-control, and other discretion-related ac ion 
needed to perform a particular task. Therefore, these are the particular 
autonomy/control-related skills which I seek to understand in this dimension. Thus, 
for clarity’s sake I will refer to this dimension as utonomy/control-related. 
For a better understanding of how these two dimensions parallel on another, I 
will use an example of one task that was mentioned by firefighters as an important 
skill: using a ladder. This skill has been a basic skill in firefighting even whe only 
local volunteer brigades existed (Smith 1978), and continues to be important in the 
current day (Maile 2004; NFPA 2008). In using a ladder, a particular amount of 
complexity exists. This may vary not only according to the task being performed (i.e., 
ventilation, rescuing victims, etc.), but also the particular type of ladder being used 
(i.e., ground ladder, aerial ladder, etc.). At the same time, the use of a ladder also 
requires a particular amount of decision-making and discretion (i.e., when to raise the 
ladder, placement of ladder, etc.), all related to the autonomy/control of a firefighter 
when completing that particular task. Thus, one particular skill such as using a ladder 
simultaneously contains each of these two dimensions of skill. 
The last clarification needed is exactly how I apply these two skill dimensions 
to the job-context skill level. Their integration is fairly simple in that I rgue for each 
job-context, separate substantive complexity and autonomy/control-related 
dimensions exist (Figure 2). For example, the set of skills used at the fire station have 




holds true for fire related emergencies, non-fire related emergencies, and non-fire 
non-emergencies. 
[Figure 2 about Here] 
Routinization/non-routinization classification 
The final component adopted in the current research is Autor, Levy, and 
Murnane’s (2002, 2003a, 2003b) routinization hypothesis (also called the ALM 
hypothesis). This hypothesis is useful in the examination of firefighters becaus  it 
gives a particular focus to computerization. This hypothesis states that tasks th t 
follow a rules-based logic are able to be programmed – thus supplemented – by 
computers, or IT, eliminating the repetitive/routinized skills needed to perform them.9 
More recent research has produced findings which provide support for this hypothesis 
(Goos and Manning 2007), and it appears that this categorization is useful in 
understanding the manners in which current technologies are affecting and changing 
the skill of workers. 
I believe that using this classification in the current research is particul ly 
beneficial when examining the impact that technology has had on skill change of 
                                                
9 It should be noted that Autor et al. (2002) also argue that management’s decision plays an important 
role as to whether or not this technology is initially dopted. Therefore, even if computers/IT are able 
to supplement rules-based tasks, this does not necessarily imply that management will automatically 
adopt this technology. Therefore, technological determinism does not necessarily occur. In specific 
regards to firefighters, it has been noted that technology adoption is mediated by organizational or 
cultural acceptance (Dadayan and Ferro 2005; Vallas 1998), and in some instances this may be 
hindering the ability for technology to have an effect on skill. In addition, accounting for the time 
period of interest, broader organizational changes have been instituted which have changed the number 
of skills which are needed by firefighters. For example, as stated in the literature, with the attacks of 
September 11th a new set of skills have been institutionalized into the fire service which addresses how 
to effectively recognize, handle, and address terrorism (Hawley 2004). Thus, while this process of 
management/organizational adoption of technology is an important aspect in studying skill, and it is 
acknowledged as an important variable in skill change and the impact of technology, it falls outside of 
the scope of this current research. It obviously will be discussed if needed to be, but will not be 





firefighters in the New Economy. In particular, this conceptualization often provides 
a way to assess how technology (specifically computers and IT) has changed the tasks 
performed by firefighters and the skills used to complete them. It is important to no e 
that this categorization cannot be applied to all tasks and skills that are used. By 
definition, this hypothesis will only be used to determine how computerization and IT 
have impacted skill. Thus, its scope is narrower than the other conceptual components 
detailed above (i.e., skill level and skill dimensions). However, using this 
categorization in combination with these theoretical and conceptual elements I have 
previously discussed provides a more complete model for understanding skill change 
and technology’s impact. 
As displayed in Figure 2, I argue that four different job-contexts exist, each 
with two different skill dimensions. However, to account for the ALM hypothesis, 
this model needs to be further developed. Thus, I argue that for each dimension, in 
each job-context, this routine/non-routine categorization can be applied to further 
account for skill change resulting from technology (Figure 3). To again clarify, I will 
use an example discussed by a few of the firefighters I interviewed: navigating 
vehicles to the scene of a fire. 
[Figure 3 about Here] 
To perform this task, firefighters must have the skill to navigate their vehicles 
to the scene of a fire. Both dimensions are present here: substantive complexity (i.e., 
knowing how to operate a fire engine/truck, etc.) and autonomy/control-related (i.e., 
providing/following the actual navigational directions, making decisions on which 




introduction of global positioning systems (GPS) computerization has had a direct 
impact on the skills used to perform the task of navigating vehicles to the scene of a 
fire. The potential to affect both the substantive complexity dimension and 
autonomy/control-related dimension is present. Controlling and driving a vehicle 
(substantive complexity) may be more instinctual and non-routine, and thus GPS 
technologies may not substitute skills used to manually operate a fire engine/truck. 
However, the ability of the GPS technology to give directions (autonomy/control-
related) for which specific roadways to follow has the potential to supplement this 
skill dimension to some extent. While this particular technology is only provided her  
as an example (and should not be interpreted as findings of the research), it does 
provide a brief example of how the routine/non-routine categorization can be applied 
to both dimensions of skill to enable a more comprehensive understanding. 
Through the development of a new level of skill (job-context), the modified 
adoption of Braverman’s (1998/1974) skill dimensions, and the adoption of Autor et 
al.’s (2002, 2003a, 2003b) routinization hypothesis, it is believed the resulting 
conceptual model provides a more holistic, theoretically informed platform on which 
to examine skill change in the New Economy. While used in this specific situation to 
study the skill change of firefighters, the potential of its use expands beyond this 
current occupation of interest and to various other occupations. 
Summary 
Based on a review of the theoretical and empirical literature across multiple 
disciplines, and a specific consideration of the occupation of firefighter, I have 




two research questions of this current project: how have the skills used by firefighters 
to complete the tasks required by their occupation changed in the New Economy; and 
what has been technology’s role in the change of skills used by firefighters to 
complete the tasks required by their occupation? In answering these questions, the 
model will allow for movement past the up/down dichotomy and theoretically 































Chapter 4: Methodology and Study Design 
 
 
In order to answer the stated research questions, data was collected from 
professional firefighters at two different fire departments in the stat of Maryland: the 
Waterville City Fire Department (WCFD) and the River City Fire Department 
(RCFD).10 The reasons for selecting these two fire departments are two-fold. First, 
both fire departments consist of a very high proportion of pr essional firefighters as 
opposed to volunteer firefighters.11 While the difference is arguable, there exist 
alternate training programs for both volunteer and professional firefighters, with 
professional firefighters receiving a larger amount of training than volunteers 
(Zigmont 2007a, 2007b). Because this would have a direct impact upon the nature 
and level of skills which are possessed by a firefighter, the sample is drawn only from 
the professional firefighters at these departments. The second reason in which these 
two fire departments have been selected is to allow for more heterogeneity in r gards 
to the amount of technology that has been introduced to the fire department, the size 
of the fire department, and the setting in which these departments operate. This will 
allow for not only a better understanding of how technology has impacted the skills of 
firefighters, but also extend the ability to generalize the findings which result. 
                                                
10 Names of these departments are fictional. 
11 “Professional” firefighters may often also be refered to as “paid” firefighters, or even “municipal” 
firefighters. Due to the fact that in some situations volunteer firefighters are paid for their services, I 




Context and Fire Department Background 
The WCFD context and background 
Waterville City, located in western Maryland, was founded in 1762. It has a 
rich history, including a role in the U.S. Civil War, historical railroads and rilroad 
companies (e.g., the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad), and the Chesapeake and Ohio 
Canal. While the city is not a massive metropolitan area, it is of a respectable size. 
According to the U.S. Census Bureau (2008), approximately 36,700 individuals 
resided in Waterville City in the year 2000. The residents of this city reside in just 
over 17,000 housing units. Of these units, 7.3% are vacant (slightly lower than the 
year 2000 national average of 9.0%) (Census 2008). 
 Responsible for these residents and housing units is the WCFD. The WCFD is 
a city-wide fire department which is run by the local government of Waterville City 
and serves within the city’s boundaries. Like Waterville City, the WCFD also has a 
long history dating back to the late 1700s. As with any fire department (Coleman 
2004), the WCFD has a mission statement, which is as follows: 
“To improve the quality of life through fire prevention, fire safety education, fire 
suppression, rescue and other special services to all the people who live, work or 
invest here.” 
 
The WCFD has numerous firehouses; however, only six of these stations are active 
(or working stations). The others remain as historic buildings. In addition to these fire 
stations, the WCFD has an administrative building centrally located within the city. 
This building is connected to a local farmer’s market and is near other local 
government buildings. This administrative building houses offices for the WCFD fire 




classrooms, and an equipment/vehicle storage garage are also part of this building. 
This building is also where many in-house training classes are held and the shift 
meetings occur.  
 The six fire stations serve as home for seven different active apparatuses used 
by the WCFD. Five of these apparatuses are engines, and two of them are trucks.12 
Although not housed at a station (but rather at the administrative building), a utility 
vehicle (Ford Crew Cab) is also used for emergencies that also remains in service and 
responds with the apparatus. While these vehicles are standard to fire departments, 
WCFD is unique in that it does not currently have any ambulance/emergency medical 
service (EMS) vehicles under its care/possession – something that has increaingly 
become an integrated part of fire departments across the U.S. (Walter 2004). 
Waterville City remains using an ambulance service separate from the WCFD when 
emergencies occur. This partnership of the WCFD and a separate and independent 
ambulance or EMS provider is based upon a long partnership between these two 
parties, and from my data collection shows no sign of changing in the future. 
 Operating these buildings and vehicles are approximately eighty professional 
firefighters. Although not part of the sample of interest in this current research, it is 
worth mentioning that the WCFD also does have active volunteer firefighters on staff 
(approximately 20-25).13 All of these firefighters operate on three different shifts (A, 
                                                
12 An engine and truck (also known as ladder) are two distinct types of companies (i.e., teams of 
“firefighters with apparatus assigned to perform a specific function in a designated response area” 
[Wutz 2004:26]). Engine companies are charged with providing water to the scene of a fire, securing 
hoses for the water supply, and attacking/extinguishing fires. Truck companies transport firefighters 
who are charged with search and rescue, forcible entry, ventilation, using ladders, and securing utilities 
(Wutz 2004:29). 
13 Active volunteers refer to those volunteer firefighters who have been trai ed and certified and can 
ride on an apparatus to an emergency call. This terminology is used to distinguish from those other 




B, and C). Each shift works a rotating schedule, where a firefighter works a 24 hour 
shift and does not have to report back for duty until 48 hours after his/her shift (i.e., 
24-on/48-off). As for the chain of command (see Wutz 2004 for a description of the 
chain of command concept), the WCFD is run by a Fire Chief who oversees the entire 
WCFD. Serving under the Chief is a Deputy Chief who handles the day-to-day 
operations and equipment maintenance. Both of these individuals do not work on the 
24-on/48-off schedule, but rather a standard day schedule (Monday to Friday, 
9:00AM to 5:00PM). Both of these positions are administrative in nature, and thus 
they do not regularly participate in emergency response calls.  
Under these two individuals are battalion chiefs and captains. Each WCFD 
shift has its own battalion chief and captain who direct and manage each shift, and are
involved with the management of any emergency calls that occur during their 
respective shifts. They also serve as the link between the firefighters and the 
administration. Finally, under the battalion chiefs and captains are the professional 
firefighters. The only distinction among firefighters is that some of them ar fire 
apparatus operators (FAOs, or simply called “drivers”). The FAOs are the firefighters 
who drive the apparatuses to the scene of an emergency. WCFD firefighters are able 
to become FAOs based on their (a) seniority, and (b) through a bidding process 
within the WCFD. In addition to the various chiefs, captains, and firefighters 
mentioned above, the WCFD also has a number of individuals who are employed to 
serve other types of duties: fire prevention, public education, administrative support, 
etc. 
                                                                                                                                          
is on professional firefighters, these active volunteer firefighters will not be discussed for the 





The RCFD context and background 
Founded in the early 1700s, River City is one of the oldest cities in the state of 
Maryland. As with Waterville City, it also has quite a rich history, stemming all the 
way back to the Revolutionary War and including a devastating fire which destroyed 
a large portion of the City’s downtown area. During the height of industrialization, 
River City was heavily involved in the U.S. manufacturing and shipping industry. As 
with many urban U.S. cities, the spawn of post-industrialization took its toll and 
manufactures began to close. The movement of these businesses brought a decrease 
in population in River City, a shift in the demographics, and an increase in poverty 
and violence. In recent decades, this population has again begun to change as pockets 
of gentrification have sprung up throughout River City. This has subsequently 
resulted in large socioeconomic disparities between certain areas of city blo ks (or 
neighborhoods, as they are referred to by the River City government and its 
residents). 
The RCFD is a city-wide fire department which is run by the local 
government of River City and serves this specific city. As with River City itself, the 
RCFD has long history and recently celebrated its 150th year anniversary. The RCFD 
was initially established as a completely volunteer department up until the mid-1800s 
when five paid fire companies (one truck and four engines) were established. Riv r 
City is a large metropolitan area and in 2006 contained over 631,000 residents 




located in approximately 296,000 housing units contained in the city, 19.7% of which 
are vacant (fairly higher than the 2006 national level of 11.6%). 
The current structure of the RCFD has shifted drastically over the past few 
years due to changing personnel in the fire chief position, budgetary issues, and also 
the increase in the number of non-fire emergency calls. This evolution is ongoing, 
and was even felt during the final stages of data collection. In fact, while I was 
conducting interviews with firefighters at the RCFD, budget issues forced the closing 
of a truck company. At the same time, two new medic units were added to the RCFD 
roster to help meet the annually increasing number of medical calls which needed a 
response. Thus, after this organizational change, the RCFD consisted of 41 fire 
stations. Apparatus and rescue vehicles were stationed at 39 of these houses – one 
served as the RCFD’s headquarters, and the other the department’s communications 
building. RCFD had a variety of apparatuses. Thirty-six of these apparatuses were 
engine companies, and (following the disbandment of the single truck company 
mentioned above) 18 were truck companies. Unlike the WCFD, the RCFD does have 
medic units within its department. Twenty-four medic units were included in the 
RCFD (this includes the two recently added units). In addition to these apparatuses, 
RCFD also had a number of specialty units including a heavy/specialty rescue 
vehicle, a hazardous materials vehicle, multiple fire boats, mobile command vehicles, 
aerial rescue, and others. 
The RCFD has approximately a total of 1,700 employed professional 
firefighters, and no active volunteers. These firefighters work on four diffeent shifts 




first two shifts in their schedule consist of two ten-hour day shifts (approximately 
from 6:00AM to 4:00PM), the next two days consist of two fourteen-hour 
evening/night shifts (approximately from 4:00PM to 6:00AM), and in the remaining 
four days in a RCFD firefighter’s schedule s/he has off. Therefore, every day in this 
eight-day rotating schedule, a shift change occurs where the firefighters from one 
shift replace those firefighters from another shift. This rotating schedule is established 
so firefighters from a specific shift always replace firefighters from another specific 
shift (Table 2). 
[Table 2 about Here] 
With the large size of the RCFD, the Department’s command structure is 
rather extensive. Overseeing the Department was a Fire Chief who had two assistant 
chiefs underneath him. One of these chiefs oversaw operations, while the other 
planning/administration. The Assistant Chief of Operations oversees four shift 
commanders and the EMS Deputy Chief. The Assistant Chief of Planning and 
Administration oversees five different support divisions, each headed by its own 
Deputy Chief: the Fire Academy, Community Risk Reduction (includes the Fire 
Marshal and the Fire Investigation Bureau), Information Technology Services, 
Logistics, and Support Services. 
At any given point in time, one of the four shift commanders is on-duty and 
supervising all firefighters currently on-duty. This includes a battalion commander for 
each of RCFD’s five battalions (battalions are distinguished by geographical 
location). In each battalion there exist a particular number of apparatuses. Each 




apparatus, which includes the firefighters working that engine on all four shifts. On 
the three shifts a captain does not work, he has a lieutenant who serves as the 
commanding officer (three lieutenants in total). For example, if a captain is on-duty 
for Shift A, one of his/her lieutenants will serve as the commanding officer on Shift 
B, one on Shift C, and one on Shift D. When active, all engines and trucks have four 
firefighters on them at any one given point in time. One of these firefighters is the 
commanding officer (either captain or lieutenant). One is the driver of the apparatus 
(called a pump operator, or PO, for the engine; called an emergency vehicle driver, or 
EVD, for the truck), while the other two are simply firefighters working under th  
commanding officer.  
As for the EMS vehicles (ambulances) operated by the RCFD, they are 
operated by two firefighters. One of these firefighters is trained as a full-fledged 
paramedic. The other may be trained as a paramedic, or may only be certified to 
provide basic life support (i.e., is an EMT-B). In this instance, the EMT-B firefighter 
is there to provide support to the firefighter trained as a paramedic. 
Data Collection Procedures 
Procedures for the WCFD 
While similar methods of data collection were used for both the WCFD and 
RCFD, the procedures in which these data was collected did slightly differ. The data 
collection process for WCFD began in November 2008, and continued in 
January/February 2009. The data collection began as I was put in contact with a 
battalion chief and captain pair by my WCFD key informant. Once this contact was 




activities which occur on a daily basis at the Fire Department. During this initial 
observation, I was able to sit down and talk with this aforementioned pair about the 
WCFD, observe and talk to a number of firefighters working that day, and attend an 
hour-long monthly shift meeting. The shift meeting also served the function of 
allowing me to introduce myself to approximately one-third of the WCFD 
firefighters, and explain the research I was conducting. 
 This initial observation occurred in November, and I did not start conducting 
interviews until January. The reason behind this was that during the end of the 
calendar year, many of the firefighters had accrued overtime and needed to us the
vacation time they had accrued by the end of the calendar year (i.e., “use it or lose 
it”). Thus, a large number of firefighters were taking off during the month of 
December (the end of the calendar year), which limited the number of interviews that 
I could conduct at that time, and placed limitations on the number of experienced 
firefighters who would be available to participate in interviews. In addition, the shifts 
of individuals who used their vacation time were subsequently covered by firefighters 
who did not regularly work that specific shift which made it more difficult for the 
battalion chiefs and captains to know who would be working when, and assist me in 
setting up interviews. Therefore, the interviews did not begin until after the end of the 
calendar year.  
 For some interviews, the firefighters volunteered to sit down with me and 
participate. These types of interviews were arranged through the shift meeting I 
attended during my first observation at WCFD, or as I was out at fire stations 




through the Battalion Chief and Captain pair with whom I was in frequent contact. 
These individuals spoke with certain firefighters who agreed to spend some time 
during one of their shifts talking with me. The majority of the interviews were 
arranged by the Battalion Chief and Captain. This arrangement was made at the 
request of the pair, as they believed it was a more efficient manner in arranging 
interviews, and allowed for the flexibility needed when dealing with the various 
emergency and non-emergency tasks that were to be performed during each shift. 
While most firefighters at the WCFD I interviewed were very willing to participate 
without hesitation, there were two participants who did have some hesitation about 
the interview process.  
 All of the interviews with WCFD firefighters occurred at either one of the six 
fire stations in Waterville City, or at the main office/administration building. With 
three of these six fire stations (and the main building) being located in a main 
downtown area, and the other three just outside this downtown area, on any given day 
the data collection process could involve a combination of walking and driving 
between different stations. Thus, by constantly moving between different sections I 
was able to see a large majority of Waterville City itself. In addition, depending on 
the station and time of day, these interviews could be conducted at various areas of 
the fire station – the kitchen area, vehicle bay (i.e., garage where the apparatuses were 
stored), firefighters’ quarters, and/or training rooms.  
Each interview was also conducted while the interviewee was working a shift, 
to the knowledge of WCFD. However, since these individuals were working a shift 




population. At the same time it did also present a difficulty in that it was hard to 
schedule an interview in advance. The very nature of the tasks required by the 
firefighting occupation sometimes made it difficult to schedule interviews. 
Emergencies faced by firefighters are “dynamic and complex” (Van der Vecht, 
Dignum, Meyer, and Neef 2008:83), and both fire and non-fire related emergencies 
could occur without warning. On a handful of occasions the interview I was 
conducting was delayed or interrupted by an incoming call (which may or may not 
have needed a response from the interviewee). Therefore, through the very nature of 
the firefighter occupation, as the interviewer I needed a larger degree of flxibility 
compared to conducting interviews with other populations. While the WCFD and its 
firefighters knew which days I would be in Waterville City to attempt to conduct 
interviews, once I arrived in the City the ability to interview a firefighter truly 
depended on a variety of variables I simply could not control. 
In addition to this initial observation and 20 interviews, I was also able to 
observe another monthly meeting, and ride along on a non-fire emergency response 
call in the WCFD utility vehicle. It should be noted that the result of this response call 
was a fatality due to cardiac problems, and as the utility vehicle I was in approached 
the scene, it was no longer needed and put back into service (i.e., freed to respond to 
another emergency call if the situation arose). However, this did allow me the 
opportunity to observe the procedures used by the two firefighters to navigate and 




Procedures for the RCFD 
Initial data collection for RCFD began in November 2008 with two 
observations at one of the 39 fire stations. This particular station housed three 
vehicles (an engine, truck, and medic unit), and was where my key informant for the 
RCFD was stationed. During each of these observations, I was shown around the 
station and the apparatuses. These visits also included having dinner with the 
firefighters at the station. It quickly became apparent that dinner was an important 
part of the shift for the firefighters in River City. With each fire station having at least 
four firefighters on every shift (usually more as there tended to be more than one 
apparatus in a fire station), this served as a time when the firefighters could all sit 
down and socialize. As all my data collection occurred during RCFD’s evening shifts,
this was a good method for building a rapport with these firefighters. Thus, whenever 
I visited a fire station I had not yet been to, sitting down for dinner with the 
firefighters was something to which I was normally invited. The majority of he meals 
were spent with local news on in the background, and this stimulated many comments 
and remarks about local events, sports, and politics. In addition, for every meal that I 
shared with River City’s firefighters, a portion of the meal was spent with the RCFD 
firefighters discussing my research and answering any questions they may have had. 
From February through July 2009 I interviewed 22 individuals at the RCFD. 
To arrange these interviews, the key informant had put me in contact with various 
officers (either a captain or lieutenant) of a specific fire company to arrange a time for 
an interview. It is important to note here that the number of calls the firefighters in 




Therefore, even further flexibility was needed when interviewing firefighters at this 
location. Subsequently, arranging a time for an interview was not so much as a 
specific time per se, but rather an evening that I could come up to a station for an 
interview. This would tentatively be set before or around dinner, but the specific time 
an interview was conducted varied depending on the number of calls they would have 
that evening. 
Through the course of my interviews, I visited five different fire stations 
throughout various neighborhoods within River City (this included the one at which I 
did my initial observations). Some of these stations were located in areas with high 
poverty and crime (I did witness an illegal drug activity occurring directly next to a 
fire station as I was walking on my way to conduct one interview). Others were 
located in areas with rapid gentrification occurring, and even during devastating 
economic times they contained small refurbished row homes still selling for $300,000 
and higher. Thus, while only visiting a portion of the stations in River City, there was 
obvious variation between the neighborhoods and persons each of these houses 
served. Twenty of the 22 interviews were conducted at fire stations, occurring in 
different areas of these stations – the vehicle bay, watch room, kitchen, personal 
quarters, and offices of a commanding officer(s) – depending on with whom and 
when I was conducting the interview. For the other two interviews, one was 
conducted at the residence of the interviewee, while the other was conducted at a 
volunteer fire station in a county bordering River City where the firefighter being 





This research drew two independent samples of firefighters, one from the 
WCFD and one from the RCFD. While the method used in creating samples for these 
two different departments was similar, it also differed slightly for each one. This 
difference existed for two reasons. First, there were structural differenc s which 
played a role. For example, department structure, department size, personnel, and city 
environment all had a hand in determining the exact method used to create each 
sample. Second, the relationship with the individuals who served as my key 
informants from each respective department also had a role in determining the 
sample. For the WCFD, I was put in contact with the key informant via a mutual 
colleague. Thus, this relationship was new, and was developed within a professional 
context. However, as for the RCFD, the individual who served as my key respondent 
was known to me on a personal level, and a relationship here had already been 
developed. 
Sample of WCFD firefighters 
Twenty individuals from the WCFD were included in the final sample. This 
sample included 18 standard firefighters (14 which were also FAOs), a Battalion 
Chief (also certified as a firefighter), and the Fire Prevention Officer (also certified as 
a firefighter but does not actively engage in fire suppression – only on rare 
occasions). The sample was rather homogeneous; however, based on observations 
and interactions with other WCFD firefighters this appeared to be very representative 
of the WCFD firefighter population. All 20 firefighters interviewed were white males, 




Sample of RCFD firefighters 
As for the RCFD, the sample of interviewees included 22 individuals, all 
certified as firefighters. For eighteen of these firefighters, a regular shift included 
being on active duty and regularly running calls. Of these 18, three were captains, and 
three were lieutenants. Two were also certified past basic life support as full-fledged 
paramedics. The remaining four individuals interviewed consisted of a deputy chief 
who served as a shift commander, two captains who were current serving as fire 
investigators with the Fire Investigation Bureau, and an ex-RCFD firefight r (also 
certified as a paramedic) who recently retired only two months prior to being
interviewed. The sample was more heterogeneous than that of the WCFD; however, 
the majority of individuals interviewed at RCFD were still white males (17 
interviewees). The remainder of interviewees included four black males and one 
black female. One individual interviewed in the late 20’s, but the remainder of RCFD 
interviewees fell in the age range from mid/late 30’s to early 60’s. These 
demographics were not specifically representative of the RCFD, but rather only the 
older, more seasoned firefighters who had numerous years of service in the RCFD 
and were able to discuss skill change in RCFD over the past 20 years. It should be 
noted that while the majority of the sample was still Waterville males, the 
demographics of the younger firefighters in River City were more diverse. 
Interview and Questionnaire 
It could be argued that to ideally observe the skills used by firefighters in each 
job-context, and the impact of various technologies at each of these contexts, 




impossible, and has been used successfully to study wil land firefighters (albeit 
ethnographic methods; Desmond 2006, 2007). In fact, perhaps it could be more 
readily used to study firefighters in two of the four proposed job-contexts: the fire 
station and non-fire non-emergencies. However, due to the unpredictable nature and 
danger involved in the remaining two job-contexts (fire emergencies and non-fire 
emergencies), it is rather difficult to use observations as a primary method of data 
collection. While some observations were conducted in the present research at both 
the WCFD and RCFD, interviews were relied upon as the dominant data collection 
method. 
 The proposed conceptual model (see Figure 3) was used as a guide when 
constructing the questions contained in the interview questionnaire. However, 
because the firefighters were being interviewed for specific details on changes in the 
tasks they need to complete, new and updated tools/technologies that have begun to 
be used in their job, when these changes occurred, etc., it was sometimes difficult for 
the individual to recall this precise information. This issue can further be complicated 
when a firefighter has worked at more than one fire department, or is simultaneo sly 
working for either the WCFD or RCFD and a volunteer company (something that was 
somewhat common for firefighters in the WCFD). Therefore, each interview started 
with using a version of a life history calendar (LHC) which highlighted the 
interviewee’s career in the fire service. LHCs have been shown as effectiv  tools in 
helping to increase the ability of an individual to more accurately recall the order of 
different life events (Axinn, Pearce, and Ghimire 1999; Belli 1998). In the present 




service by month/year, but also the different lengths of time at specific fire 
departments, and the different companies they served on while working for each fire 
department. Once completed, they were able to be used as a reference during the 
interview by either the interviewee or interviewer. The idea of beginning each
interview with a LHC came from the questionnaire pre-testing for this present 
research (detailed below). 
 After completing the LHC, a semi-structured questionnaire was used to ask 
the interviewee questions in regards to skill change and technology (see App ndix 
A). A semi-structured approach was chosen for the interviewee with a specific 
rationale in mind. This was because that for each firefighter, the specific tasks in 
which they needed to complete on a regular basis varied both between firefighters and 
departments. The specific fire department, shift worked, officers, fire station, 
assigned apparatus, and even the position on the apparatus have potential to play a 
role in determining the tasks that each individual firefighter needs to complete on a 
regular basis, and the tools and technologies that they may encounter while 
performing these tasks. The strength of using a semi-structured format is th t it allows 
for more flexibility when interviewing (Barriball and While 1994), specifically 
important when accounting for the unique role a firefighter has in his/her respective 
fire department.  
A similar series of questions was asked for each of the four job-contexts 
detailed. For each context, there were two streams of inquiry used. The first was 
having the firefighter “walk through” the time spent in each specific job-context. For 




discuss the actions taken from the time they receive a call at their fire stat on and 
responded to this call to the time they had finished suppressing the fire and were 
pulling the apparatus back into the station. After this was detailed, further questions 
were asked about the specific tasks completed throughout this process to better 
understand the specific method of completing the task, the level of autonomy in this 
context and during specific points of the process, and the manners in which it may (or 
may not) have changed. A second series of questions was asked in regards to specific 
technologies that were used in each respective job-context. This allowed more 
elaboration on exactly how certain technologies were used, when they were 
introduced to the fire department, the manner(s) in which they altered the 
performance of specific tasks, and how they impacted the firefighters’ set of kills. In 
addition, per the ALM hypothesis (Autor et al. 2002, 2003a, 2003b) a specific focus 
was given to the impact of computerization. The interviews ended with a series of 
questions on an individual’s demographics, and training. These questions were not 
essential to the research questions; however, they helped provide a background 
context for better understanding each firefighter’s individual experiences. 
Preparation and pre-testing 
Three specific procedures were used in an effort to prepare the semi-
structured questionnaire used in this study. First, I read a number of materials to 
familiarize myself with the different tasks, tools, and technologies used by 
firefighters. These materials included reading professional trade journals (i.e., 
Firehouse and NFPA Journal), reviewing training materials and standards for 




reading books on the specific histories of the WCFD and RCFD. Second, as detailed 
above I also was able to perform preliminary observations at both the WCFD and 
RCFD before I begun interviewing at each site. This allowed me to better familiarize 
myself with the locations themselves, and more importantly included time to meet 
and chat with some of the firefighters at each department.  
Pre-testing of the questionnaire was also completed as final step in preparation 
for the interviews. This was done by interviewing a few firefighters outside of the 
WCFD and RCFD. The pre-testing resulted in two specific noteworthy (but not 
major) changes. As mentioned above, the first of these was the introduction of the 
LHC at the beginning of the interview. The second change was made in that the order 
in which the firefighter was presented with questions regarding the different job-
contexts was altered. It was quickly apparent during the pre-testing that the 
firefighters would identify most with the fire related emergency job-context (perhaps 
not too surprising). Initially this context was not the one which the interview first 
touched upon; however, after making this discovery it was decided it would be best to 
ask about this context prior to the other three. This measure acted as a mechanism for 
preventing the interviewee from providing minimal detail on the job-contexts 
proceeding fire related emergency, as the firefighter would tend to provide short r 
answers for other three contexts until this one (fire related emergency) was reached. 
Once the fire related emergency job-context was discussed, the firefighters tended to 




A Final Note on Interviewing 
As a final note, it is important to stress that conducting interviews on a sample 
of individuals who have an unpredictable and sporadic schedule does present some 
unique considerations. I quickly realized this during the interview process. The most 
important consideration was that at any given time during an interview, it could be 
interrupted. The most common method of interruption was for the interviewee having 
to respond to an emergency call. This was more of an issue when conducting 
interviews in River City, as the RCFD had a much larger number of calls for which 
response was required. Thus, a degree of flexibility was needed when interviewing 
firefighters, and the recognition that an interview could be interrupted without a 
moments notice. Furthermore, there was no guarantee that an interview would be able 
to be continued at a later point in time. Luckily, there were only two instances (one in 
WCFD, one in RCFD) in which I was not able to complete the full interview as it was 
interrupted by an emergency call.  
Aside from these two interviews, all other interviews which were interrupted 
were able to be completed at a later point in time during the same day/evening shift of 
the firefighter. In these instances I was able to remain in the fire station and wait for 
the firefighter to return from a call to complete the interview. As mentioned above, 
another consideration was that it could be somewhat difficult to actually schedule 
interviews. For example, a participant may agree to meet me at Fire Stat on One at 
6:30PM; however, there was no guarantee this would be able to happen. In numerous 
instances emergency calls requiring response would create scheduling conflict. This 




this example 6:30PM), but perhaps one occurring at 10:00AM the same day had a 
domino effect. An early response may have pushed back other scheduled tasks a 
firefighter needed to complete on his/her shift, and as a result affected the scheduled 
interview to a point where it was not able to be completed until a later point in time, 
or even until some other day. 
Finally, since all of these firefighters were interviewed during a work shift, 
during the interview they were still “on the clock.” Although the chiefs, assistant 
chiefs, and deputy chiefs for both the WCFD and RCFD supported the research being 
conducted, the firefighters still had many other tasks that all needed to be completed 
by the firefighter during his/her shift. This was further complicated with issues such 
as having limited “manpower” (particularly WCFD; term used verbatim by the 
firefighters I interviewed), and having a larger number of response calls (as with the 
RCFD). For example, some of these interviews were conducted while a firefighter 
was on watch (i.e., at the station’s communication center where calls were rec ived), 
cooking/preparing dinner, or training new firefighters (in a classroom environment). 
From the researcher’s standpoint, these may result in potential complications and 
create a non-ideal situation in which to interview; however, they are the reality of 
conducting research on a population which works in an occupation that may often be 
unpredictable. Therefore, as the interviewer I had to be as prepared as possible when 
entering the field for data collection and dealing with these challenges. 
Coding 
Once completed, all interviews were transcribed so that they could be 




coding took place in three stages. First, the specific job-context to which the skill or 
tool corresponded was identified. Second, the coding of the data was then refined to 
identify each individual skill and tool/technology that was discussed by the 
interviewee. Finally, each transcript was again examined, processed, and refine  
through a third stage of coding. This included coding that identified for each skill or 
tool/technology any instances of skill dimensions (i.e., substantive complexity or 
autonomy/control-related) or routinization/non-routinization. Analytical software – 








Chapter 5:  “The Wet Stuff on the Red Stuff” – Fire Related 
Emergencies 
 
Brief Introduction to the Results Chapters 
 As stated in the first chapter, two broad research questions were asked 
regarding the skills used by firefighters in the New Economy and the impact that 
technology has had on these skills. The first question asked: how have the skills used 
by firefighters to complete the tasks required by their occupation changed in the New 
Economy? The second question asked: what has been technology’s role in the change 
of skill used by firefighters to complete tasks required by their occupation? In order t  
answer these two questions, past literature was consulted and a three-tiered, 
integrative conceptual model was created to use as a guide to more thoroughly and 
systematically answer these questions. The first portion of this model states th t in the 
firefighter occupation, four distinct job-contexts exist. These include fire related 
emergencies, non-fire related emergencies, the fire station, and non-fire non-
emergencies.  For each of these job-contexts, the skills that are used to complete 
required tasks within these contexts each have two dimensions: substantive 
complexity and autonomy/control-related. These two dimensions are derived from the 
work of Braverman (1998/1974) and pertain to the level of mental, interpersonal, and 
manipulative tasks in a job (i.e., substantive complexity; Spenner 1990), and the 
decision-making, problem-solving, and discretion related actions needed when 
performing a task (i.e., autonomy/control-related). Finally, the third portion of this 




hypothesis that routinized tasks (i.e., those that follow a rules-based, or IF-THEN DO 
logic; Levy and Murnane 2004) and the skills required to perform them have the 
potential to be replaced by computers or computerized devices. Here, the 
routinization hypothesis could affect either of the two dimensions which compose of 
one’s skill. 
 With these two research questions in mind, this three-tiered conceptual model 
was used to discuss in detail the various skills used by firefighters to perform the task 
required by their occupation. This was done by examining each individual skill that 
the firefighters I interviewed claimed was needed to perform the required tasks of 
their job. Thus, in order to understand each individual skill, first the manner in which 
each individual skill was performed was detailed. Throughout the process of detailing 
each skill, the complexity and autonomy/control-related dimensions of this skill were 
discussed. This included whether or not any change in these dimensions had occurred 
in recent (i.e., the past 20) years. Finally, any types of new technology that were 
present and used while performing this skill were also detailed. This discussion 
included whether or not these technologies impact one’s skill according to the logic 
discussed in Autor et al.’s (ALM) (2002, 2003a, 2003b) hypothesis, but also included 
any affect these technologies may have had on either of the two skill dimensions. 
Instances in which skills among the Waterville City Fire Department (WCFD) and 
River City Fire Department (RCFD) differed will also be discussed. Finally, each 
skill will be discussed in detail along with other skills used in its corresponding job-




generalizations to be made regarding the overall change in skill for that particular job-
context, and the impact that technology has had on that particular context. 
 Thus, the remainder of the dissertation will be structured as followed. This 
present chapter will discuss the skills used by firefighters in the WCFD and RCFD 
during fire related emergencies following the structure discussed in the preceding 
paragraph. Following this, three chapters will use a similar structure to examine skills 
used in the remaining three job-contexts in which firefighters perform their jobs: non-
fire related emergencies (Chapter 6), the fire station (Chapter 7), and non-fire non-
emergencies (Chapter 8). Finally, Chapter 9 will draw conclusions from the data 
and discuss (in a broad sense) the overall skill and skill change of firefighters, and the 
impact of technology by comparing the findings from each individual results chapter. 
This will also include relating the findings of this study back to the past body of 
research literature, discussing the limitations faced when conducting the present 
research, and also citing broader generalizations and implications for future research 
to consider. 
Introduction to Fire Related Emergencies 
Firefighters operated in four different job-contexts, often within the time 
frame of a single shift. Somewhat surprisingly, out of all four of these contexts, fire 
related emergencies were where firefighters spent the least amount of time during any 
given shift. In fact, during one interview with a RCFD captain, he produced his fire 
company’s record book and showed me that over the past few years the amount of 
fire related emergency calls that firefighters responded to had been steadily 




broad generalizations to the rest of the RCFD, the WCFD, or any other fire 
departments for that matter, there is national evidence showing that since the late 
1970s there has been a steady decrease in the number structure fires in the U.S. 
(Karter, Jr. 2009). Increasing emphasis on fire prevention; more widespread use of 
fire prevention technologies such as smoke detectors, alarms, and sprinkler systems; 
and other safety measures such as increased public education programs and local 
government mandates were a few issues that were discovered throughout the 
interviews as playing a role in this trend. Thus, it would appear that these widespread 
prevention efforts have proven effective in lowering the destruction caused by fires. 
 With this decreasing trend in mind, there are two items that should be noted. 
First, although the least amount of time of a firefighter’s shift was spent fighting fire, 
it was the defining characteristic to these firefighters of their occupation. This was 
rightly so: the skills required to fight fire were something completely unique to this 
occupation, and they are the defining characteristic of firefighters. Many firefighters I 
spoke with clearly stated that they never wanted a fire to occur in somebody’s home. 
However, if one did occur, they wanted to be one of the persons there attacking the 
fire, and assisting the residents who needed this help. For almost all firefighters, even 
with the large number of other non-fire related skills required and tasks to perform, 
and the number of fires regularly needing to be combated decreasing, the reason th y 
became a firefighter was to fight fires. 
  The second point that is important to be made clear was that the amount of 
time spent fighting fires was not indicative of the amount of skill used. As will be 




their own levels of required substantive complexity and autonomy/control-related 
skill dimensions. Because every minute it takes a fire department to respond to and 
begin to suppress fire can lead to increased destruction and injury, the first ten to 15 
minutes of firefighting are when the large majority of these skills are being executed. 
While to the unassuming viewer many of these tasks may appear rather simple, a 
rather high level of skill is needed to successfully perform them. In this chapter,  
number of skills will be detailed. The first skills are those used in preparing for a fire. 
These include receiving an emergency call, navigating/driving to the scene, and 
sizing up the fire. The second series of skills are used at the scene of a fire, most of 
them within the first few minutes of arriving to the scene, and are specific to the 
particular type of apparatus at which a firefighter is positioned. For those firefighters 
on an engine, this includes establishing water supply/operating the engine and 
suppressing the fire with this supply. For those on the fire truck, this includes forc d 
entry, search and research, using/throwing ladders, and ventilation. Another series of 
skills that are used during a fire scene are more ongoing, revolve around newer 
technologies, and are needed throughout the firefighting process. These include 
properly using the personal protective equipment (PPE) and the self-contained 
breathing apparatus (SCBA) with its integrated personal alert safety system (PASS) 
device. Finally, a series of skills are needed after the fire has been “knocked down.” 





Preparing for a Fire Related Emergency 
Receiving an emergency call 
As with any type of emergency call, the first task of a firefighter when 
responding to a fire is to receive the location of the fire and prepare to arrive t that 
location. It generally takes less than one minute for firefighters to perform this task. 
In fact, the firefighters I interviewed stated they ideally aimed to complete this task 
within 30 to 45 seconds. Thus, while it might not be the most difficult task to 
perform, successfully and efficiently executing any task in such a limited time frame 
is in itself a noteworthy feat. In addition, considering that unsuccessfully completing 
this task (e.g., receiving the wrong address of the fire, not knowing where) could have 
adverse effects on subsequent tasks, its successful completion is quite important. 
 The first aspect of this task important to discuss is the manner in which the 
firefighters actually received the call. As could be assumed from the media’s 
portrayals of firefighters, an emergency call was initially received by a loud bell, or 
gong (as it was referred to by the firefighters) going off, reminiscent of a bell that 
indicates a round of a heavyweight boxing match coming to an end. The gong went 
off during any emergency call.14 After spending time in numerous fire stations with 
these firefighters, it was clear that this bell was loud enough to get every firefighters 
attention. However, following this gong there were a series of radio tones that 
indicated the specifics of that individual emergency response such as what type of 
                                                
14 Responding to an emergency was a skill that also fell in the non-fire emergency job-context. While 
the general process was the same, there were some rather minor and subtle differences that did change 
the process of completing this particular task. Thetask as detailed in this chapter refers specifically to 
responding to fire related emergencies. In the nextchapter (Chapter 6), responding to non-fire related 




emergency call it was, and what fire companies needed to respond. Along with these 
tones, an announcement from the 911 call center was also provided that gave a brief 
description of the emergency response. 
 As I mentioned during the methods section, there were instances in which 
interviews were interrupted by these emergency responses. However, in addition to 
my interviews at times being interrupted by these responses there were also numerous 
times in which an incoming emergency call did not immediately pertain to the 
interviewee’s fire company. Sitting through these instances during the interviews, I 
was able to experience firsthand the process of a firefighter receiving an icoming 
call, and discerning whether or not it was related to him/her. As I was sitting down 
with a firefighter conducting an interview, when the gong went off, the interviewee 
would quickly pause the interview and enter a fully alert state. This heightened 
awareness may not only have included a verbal pause, but in some instances it could 
be seen through the direction of the interviewee’s eyes, whether it be a glance
upward, or even just a focused stare given right towards me, as though the firefighte  
was staring right through me. This alertness would remain until the tones began, at 
which time the firefighter would know even before the call was voiced by the 
operator if it pertained to him. However, it is important to note here that as I was 
interested in interviewing more experienced firefighters who could discuss changes 
throughout the New Economy (i.e., over roughly the past 20 years), this alertness and 
rapid response could have been something more unique to those with more 




In total, this process had literally lasted one to five seconds, yet it was 
extremely surprising to see the amount of skill that these firefighters usd to discern if 
the call pertained to them, and what type of call it was. As far as substantive 
complexity was concerned, during this situation a firefighter would use their sense of 
sound to mentally process the incoming call within seconds to such an extent that 
they knew how to physically respond to the call. In addition, within these few seconds 
a number of autonomy/control-related aspects were also present, such as making the 
decision if the call pertained to oneself, deciding what gear is needed to be worn to a 
specific type of call, and what specific seat one needs to sit on in their respective fire 
engine or truck. Thus, while these tones dictated precisely what types of incident the 
firefighter needed to respond, there was still a large number of decision-maki g and 
discretion available to the firefighter during the reception of an emergency call. 
During the instances in which this call is received, for all firefighters this task 
involves properly dressing in one’s own PPE gear. This specifically involves one’s 
boots, pants, coat, and helmet. In addition, depending on the position in which a 
firefighter is riding on the apparatus (detailed later this chapter), this may also involve 
donning the SCBA. In some instances, if firefighters are not properly dressed at th  
time their apparatus is leaving, this process is finished inside the apparatus.  
This skill of receiving an emergency call has long been needed by firefighters, 
and has not changed over the past 20 years. In completing this task, it is not overtly 
complex, and there is little room for the firefighters to decide what equipment is 
needed to be worn. For each fire emergency, the PPE (and potentially SCBA) needs 




technology has not changed in the New Economy to the point where it has affected 
the method in which this task is performed. New synthetic materials have been used 
to construct PPE; however, this has yielded no real change in the process of getting 
equipped and donning the gear needed to respond to and properly address a fire 
related emergency. Furthermore, although the process of getting dressed is a 
routinized task, the same manual procedures are needed to get dressed and enter the 
apparatus to leave for a fire related emergency, and have not been altered by any 
technological advancement. 
The gongs and tones have long been a part of the process of receiving an 
emergency call for firefighters; long before the New Economy came to frui ion. 
While these components still remain, more recently the alerting systems have 
changed through computerization. However, worth noting is that these changes have 
left both the WCFD and RCFD with slightly different methods of responding to an 
emergency call. For the WCFD, this change occurred during the process of receiving 
calls and was initially altered through use of more multi-sensory alerting systems. For 
example, these alerting systems had begun to be integrated with the lighting systems 
at the fire stations throughout the WCFD. Therefore, when firefighters would be 
sleeping and they received a call, in addition to the gong and tones that would sound 
off at the station, a portion of the station’s lighting system was automatically 
activated so that the lights would automatically be turned on to help raise the 
firefighters from their sleep more quickly.  
At the same time, these alarms that would occur during the night had also 




certain calls pertaining to a specific fire company in that station were sounded. Calls 
that did not specifically pertain to an individual fire company were not received. This 
allowed the firefighters to continue sleeping, and minimized the disruption that 
occurred to their rest. As I had discovered through the course of my interviews, this 
increased selectiveness was a product of the broader push towards increasing the 
safety of those firefighters. As discussed by one firefighter at the WCFD: 
Firefighter: When that bell goes off and you come out of a dead sleep, you have 
adrenaline in your body, fat cells, because your body’s thinking it’s time to fight, or 
it’s time to run. As long as we go on the call, you burn up that stuff. When you don’t 
go on the call, you don’t burn that up. So, it’s too early to determine this, but in the 
fire service I think the average age I saw one time, the length that you’re supposed to 




Firefighter: Because of this, heart attacks and things like that, from years and years 
and years of getting woke up. Now that these calls are less, that age is cre ping back 
up again. Now it’s going to take years to find out if it’s really making a difference. 
But now if Engine Four [the engine on which the firefighter was stationed] runs a 
call, they just hit Engine Four’s tone. I don’t hear Engine One. No there’s also a tone 
in town that they hit that opens everybody up at the same time, even though…but 
that’s for like a big fire or a serious emergency that everybody needs to hear it 
anyway. (Author’s notation in brackets) 
 
Here the WCFD firefighter was discussing some recent research reports on 
firefighters, and how the results had begun to be integrated in an attempt to minimize 
the physiological effects that can occur to a firefighter’s body through the constant 
adrenaline rush that occurs when receiving a call; effects that may be particularly 
emphasized when sleeping.  
This initial portion of the process of receiving an emergency call was routine. 
For each individual call, the firefighters had to hear the gong/tones, process the 




reported, these skills were not removed; however, the amount that they were used was 
minimized as the sheer number of incoming calls requiring response was decreased. 
Thus, this change in the alerting system at the WCFD did remove some elements of 
the skill required responding to an emergency call, particularly those 
autonomy/control-related elements in which a firefighter had to initially decide if s/he 
was required to respond to an emergency. It should be noted that while the selectivity 
of incoming calls was more widespread through the WCFD firehouses, the 
computerized, multi-sensory changes in the alerting systems were not uniform. While 
this technological change existed in some fire stations, others appeared to have n t 
yet received this technology, and subsequently this change did not affect the skills 
used by all firefighters in responding to an emergency call. 
In the RCFD, over the past 20 years computers and printers had been 
introduced and connected to the alerting system. In fire stations in River City, the 
alerting system was connected to printers. When the gong went off and an emergency 
call was sent to a fire station, printers that were connected to the system would ideally 
activate and generate two types of documentation. The first was a sheet of paper 
which contained a map detailing the location of an incident, the roads surrounding it, 
and the closest fire hydrant locations. This print out had an effect on driving and 
navigating to the actual fire and will be discussed below. However, the second sheet 
of paper which was also printed out for an incident contained information regarding 
the location of the incident (e.g., the number of times the RCFD has been called to 
this particular building/residence). In regards to these particular sheets of information, 




information can now instantaneously be given to the firefighter for him/her to 
process. Whether or not this additional information is used specifically to aide in the 
performance of responding to an emergency call is another story. Therefore, this 
could arguably be viewed as increasing the complexity involved in the process of 
receiving a call, while at the same time its affect on skill could also be argu d as 
somewhat negligible. 
Navigating and driving to the scene 
Immediately following the reception of an emergency call and preparing to 
leave for the scene of a fire, firefighters are then faced with the task of navigating and 
driving to the scene of the incident. This task is clearly the responsibility of the
drivers of the fire engines and trucks; however, through the course of my interviews 
and time spent around the fire stations, it became clear that both the officers (battalion 
chiefs, captains, and lieutenants) and (in some instances) firefighters not certified as 
drivers are also involved in successfully completing this task. 
As part of the preparation for leaving, the driver of the apparatus first needs 
the information on the location of the incident. This information is provided by the 
911 center on an incoming call at both fire departments. However, as noted above the 
alerting system technologies at the RCFD have changed, and subsequently also 
altered the method in which the drivers (pump operators [POs] and emergency 
vehicle drivers [EVDs]) obtain the information used in navigation. When I asked one 
River City firefighter about how the task of navigating and driving to an emergency 
has changed, I was given a rather good summary of the impact of computers on this 




Firefighter: It has in the computers and printers. They, um, give us maps, but they’re 
all broken. They run out of money and they didn’t get it fixed and we’re back to, you 
know? 
 
Interviewer: The same way you used to do it? 
 
Firefighter:  We went for year here, years here, without having any printers. And 
now we got these computers in here. That’s phenomenal. I mean, there was appoint 
where I thought I was…keeping up with technology and now I feel like I’m gettin  




Firefighter:  But we have this computers (sic) on there now and I think it’s great. It’s 
phenomenal. For me, it tells me where we’re going and then I can really read about, 
you know, how many times this person’s called and really get into some dirt and stuff 
like that. And there’s maps (sic) there, electronic maps and stuff like that. But yet also 
in my opinion it’s made a lot of us lazy too, where guys used to study maps. Like 
look [points to a wall near the alerting system computer], there’s a map of our first 
alarm district right there. So it’s a dual-edged sword where everybody’s kind of 
depending on the printers and maps to tell you where you’re going and not 
remembering, you know? 
 
Interviewer:  Yeah. 
 
Firefighter:  Especially if like what if you’re not in quarters, and you’re out on the 
street and you get a run? Well, you’re not here to pick up a printed out map! 
(Author’s notation in brackets; firefighter’s emphasis italicized) 
 
This discussion by the firefighter provides a good description of the effects computers 
have had on navigating to the scene of an emergency. Following the routinization 
hypothesis, it would be expected that the routinized aspects of the skill required to 
navigate a fire apparatus to the scene of a fire are beginning to be removed by th  
installation of these computers and the accompanying printers. The roads and streets 
of the City create a fairly standardized grid in which the driver of an apparatus can 
navigate along to arrive at the fire.15 Therefore, there is an indication that the 
                                                
15 In an interview with one WCFD, there was actually n interesting insight made that was relevant to 
the notion of roads and throughways in Waterville City and River City creating a routinized grid. This 




introduction of these computers and printed out maps of the incident location and 
surrounding fire hydrant locations has begun to remove some skill needed for 
navigation. In this above example, the RCFD firefighter recognizes this not 
necessarily as a removal of navigation skills, but rather an increase in “laziness.” 
 In addition to the effects of these computers in the fire station, just a few 
months prior to when I began conducting interviews at the RCFD, computers were 
also placed in the fire engines and trucks to help firefighters with navigation. Pr r to 
conducting any of my interviews, I was aware of the introduction of these computers. 
This was through a series of television advertisements for a local university which 
boasted their geography department’s role in the introduction of these computers to 
the RCFD’s apparatuses, and how it was improving the jobs of the firefighters at the 
RCFD. With this advertisement in mind, I came in expecting these computers wihin 
the apparatus to have a noticeable impact on navigating to the scene. However, I was 
surprised during the course of my interviews that when these computers were 
mentioned, it was only in passing. I would be told that they did exist, but generally 
the firefighters claimed that they were not often used by the drivers. The reason for 
this non-use was less clear. In a few instances the firefighters at River City who 
mentioned these vehicle computers stated that they had not yet been trained on these 
computers, and therefore without this training these devices were not used in a 
manner that had a real impact on successfully navigating to a fire. Thus, from my 
                                                                                                                                          
creating new roadways, with the exception of one area in town in which is continuing to be 
developed). Thus, this minimizes the amount of new roads needed to be learned by drivers, and 
maintains the routinization that may be available in th s aspect of navigating to the scene. As River 
City is also a very historic city, the same logic could arguably be applied for the RCFD. Although this 
interviewee’s data provides support for this argument, he was the only one to mention the lack of 




interviews I was not able to draw any real conclusions on the impact of these 
computers. However, it could be argued that based on the general pattern found 
between the fire station alerting system computer and its impact on navigating to the 
fire scene, there is a potential for these computers in the fire engines/trucks to have a 
similar effect on firefighters’ skills. Albeit this effect it had yet to be realized, and 
subsequently no current impact on the skills used by these firefighters was felt. 
 An important point that was also raised by the River City firefighters was that 
although these printout maps existed, their availability also was dependent on whether 
or not these technologies were functioning properly. There was always a posibility 
for these computers to malfunction. During these instances, the routinized skills that 
were beginning to decrease due to the introduction of these computers were again 
needed. Furthermore, these printout maps were only available to the firefighters f 
they received the call at the fire station. During instances when they were els where, 
for example at an elementary school participating in a public education lesson, they 
are not able to rely on these maps that were available to them at the fire station.16 In 
sum, although these computers could be seen as decreasing the amount of skill which 
was needed to navigate to an emergency, in certain instances (such as during a 
computer malfunction or when being called for an emergency when not stationed at a 
company’s respective fire station) the same skills that technology had decreas d were 
actually again needed. While the potential for change in skill was present, the drastic 
impact had truly not yet been realized 
                                                
16 Due to the introduction of computers to the apparatuses used by the RCFD, there is a potential for 
the manners in which the maps are received to change. For example, these maps may eventually be 
able to be received to firefighters when they are on their apparatus and not at the fire station. However, 
the interviews did not provide any clear evidence that his type of change has occurred, or that there 




 While the RCFD had some aspects of their skill used in navigating to the 
scene of a fire altered by the introduction of computers, there were also non-
routinized aspects that affected those firefighters responsible for navigation at both 
departments. As noted by one firefighter from Waterville City: 
“So the driver’s responsibility is to know where he’s going, what’s going to be the 
safest route of travel. Based on the time of day it could vary depending on whether or 
not it’s rush hour, whether or not there’s, you know, a possible train, things of that 
nature. The route of travel is the driver’s responsibility. And basically you have to 
make sure everybody in the apparatus is seated, belted in, ready to move the 
apparatus safely.” 
 
While the local roads and streets dictated certain pathways which the driver of an 
engine or truck could navigate to the scene, other factors must be accounted for such 
as the time of day, potential traffic patterns, railroads, one-way streets, 
roadwork/construction, road closures, and even the location of fire hydrants. 
Therefore, a certain localized knowledge was required here by those firefighters 
responsible for navigating to the scene of a fire. This knowledge had the potential to 
change day-to-day, or even hour-to-hour, and included a number of decisions that had 
to be made by the firefighters with which computers could not assist. 
 In addition to these non-routinized concerns that required a considerable level 
of autonomy/control-related skills, the order assigned to an engine or truck also 
played a role in navigating to the scene: 
“As you approach the scene it makes a big difference in what you’re driving and what 
order you’re arriving in vehicle-wise. Try to think of your approach and what the best 
way is, whether you’re first-in engine and you’re going to have to pump and supply 
the attack lines for the engine for the fire, or whether you’re second-in engie and 
have to find a fire hydrant to pick up or the ladder truck when you’re trying to think 
about your job as you’re pulling in and trying to figure out if you can use the ladder 
on top, the aerial ladder, or are you going to have to be throwing ground ladders. Um, 




in your head. And that normally depends on whoever the driver is talking to, whoever 
(sic) the other person on whatever vehicle it is (sic).” (WCFD firefighter) 
 
With multiple vehicles reporting to the scene of a fire, and multiple tasks that need o 
be completed to successfully and safely suppress the fire, an increased level of 
substantive complexity and autonomy/control-related skill dimensions are introduced 
in the final stage of navigating to a scene. These drivers need to know exactly what 
order his/her apparatus is assigned, and subsequently where his/her vehicle is to be 
positioned at the scene. Furthermore, the precise structure needs to be considered at 
this stage. For example, even if the a vehicle is to be positioned in front of the 
working fire, the positioning of apparatuses around a single family home on a five 
acre tract of land may be different than that of a middle row home with three other 
residences connected on each side. Finally, as there are multiple vehicles responding 
to the same incident, this also creates a need for caution as multiple vehicles are 
approaching the same incident at high speeds. Thus, even with the precise route 
dictated by the print out map, the drivers also may have to alter this route to allow for 
all responding engines and trucks to properly reach the positions they will be taking 
to help suppress the fire. This not only requires judgment on the individual driver’s 
part, but also communication with other apparatus drivers of the decisions being 
made by each one. 
 In addition to navigation, the task of driving in itself also required additional 
skills needed by the firefighters. Obviously, this entailed knowing how to drive the 
vehicle itself. In fact, formal training and certification was required at both fire 
departments in order for a firefighter to be allowed to drive an apparatus. Thus, this 




the same time, this also did not imply that other firefighters did not assist the driver 
while s/he was driving. If a firefighter was riding in the front passenger’s s at, they 
could assist the driver with watching for traffic and communicating with other 
responding vehicles; basically serving as an extra pair of eyes and ears for the driver.  
 Upon initial examination, one might often consider the ability to drive a 
vehicle as a rather standard skill that a large majority of persons in the U.S. possess. 
However, it was extremely clear that operating a fire engine/truck while speeding to a 
fire requires a higher level of skill than is generally needed to operate a standard 
automobile. Many factors play a role in increasing the level of both complexity and 
autonomy/control-related aspects that are part of driving. While interviewing these 
firefighters, the most stunning detail about this task was to hear about the discretion 
that firefighters need when driving to an incident. As many firefighters at both 
departments discussed, when a structure is on fire, every minute matters. However, 
safety is also an important issue not only for the firefighter’s themselves, but also for 
the regular citizens. A driver must be able to successfully balance the urgency of the 
emergency call and the safety of themselves and others. For example, an emergency 
response call that is due to a smoke alarm sounding and only has the potential of fire 
may not require the amount of speed that a response call involving flames showing 
out of a second-story window needs. Again, there is certainly much more skill needed 
than operating a normal vehicle. 
 Although technology has not had as major an impact on driving as it has on 
navigation, it has never-the-less changed the driver’s skills. Older fire engines and 




have been purchased by the fire departments now automatically shift gears. While 
this is not a computerized technology, it still follows the logic stated in the 
routinization hypothesis. These new automatic engines have been able to remove the 
routine procedures needed to shift gears. For most firefighters who serve as driver , 
this is no longer a skill that is needed. As jokingly stated by one of the captains from 
the RCFD, the drivers can now “just put it in dumb and go;” a statement is a 
wordplay on the “D” that automatic vehicles have which signifies “drive,” while also 
recognizing how technology has removed this skill from the drivers. Lastly, it is 
important to note that this change did not happen uniformly across all fire companies. 
Specific companies may have gotten automatic apparatuses before others. For 
example, in the RCFD it appeared that these new automatic vehicles were given to 
firefighters in the early 1990s; however, two firefighters in the WCFD serving on one 
specific fire company stated that it was not until recently that their manually operated 
fire truck was replaced by an automatic. Furthermore, this manually operated truck 
was still “on reserve” in the department (i.e., it is not used on a daily basis by the
WCFD firefighters, but still present if it is ever needed). 
 Throughout the interviews, there was quite a high level of substantive 
complexity and autonomy/control-related aspects of skill involved in the successful 
completion of navigating to a fire related emergency and driving a fire apparatus. In 
fact, the levels of involvement of both these skill dimensions are arguably quite 
surprising compared to what the lay observer might expect. At the same time, the 
introduction of both computerized (i.e., computers accompanying the alerting 




consistent with Autor et al.’s (2002, 2003a, 2003b) routinization hypothesis in that 
some of the routinized procedures in successfully navigating and driving to a fire are 
being removed. This decrease in skill particularly affects the complexity of navigation 
and driving, as much of the discretion and decision-making dimensions of these 
particular skills are involved in the non-routinized aspects of this skill. At the sam
time, other factors such as the malfunction of technology also pose the need for these 
original routinized components of skill to remain, even if they are not used regularly. 
Giving a size up 
Upon arriving at the scene, as dictated by the standard operating guidelines of 
both departments, the final task needed to be completed by the firefighters prior to 
physically fighting the fire is giving a size up. As there are numerous fire companies 
responding to any one incident, the company that first arrives at the scene is harged 
with giving a brief description over the radio to the remainder of the incoming fire 
companies: 
“In my opinion, and with most people, the proper size up would consist of three 
elements.  Number one, your occupancy. Number two, your obvious fire conditions. 
And then number three, what are you going to do? What’s your move? And to just 
simplify things, what’s the building? Do you have a dwelling? Do you have a 
commercial structure? Do you have a warehouse? What do you have? As far as 
obvious fire conditions, there’s only three. You can only have fire, smoke, or nothing. 
Just make it simple. You don’t have to give it a really heavy description. And then the 
following, what you’re going to do, you only have three choices. Are you going to 
investigate because you have nothing going on? Are you going to try and make a 
really quick interior attack? And that would (sic); that’s being more offensive. Or are 
you going to roll back and say this is really out of our capabilities and we’regoing to 
back up and pretty much be defensive.” (RCFD firefighter) 
 
The task of giving a proper size up is not overly complex, and as the above quotation 




is believed by most to be adequate in providing the necessary information that the 
firefighters need to quickly begin fighting the fire when arriving at the scene.  
Although both the WCFD and RCFD may have a departmental mandate 
stating that a proper size up needs to be given, the interviews revealed that notall 
firefighters thought as systematically about the “proper” information that should be 
given. In certain instances, it appeared that firefighters gave rather minimal detail: 
“When we get to the scene, if we’re the first on the scene, we will give a status report 
as we pull up. You know, ‘Utility three is on the scene, side alpha,’ which is the front. 
‘I have heavy fire on the second floor,’ things like that. And you might tell a hydro 
[hydrant]  location to the first-in engine so they know what to expect.” (WCFD 
firefighter; author’s notation in brackets) 
 
Others gave more description and detail during the size up: 
“Once we arrive on the scene, I give a brief initial report. Say…we go for a h use 
fire. If I got fire showing, what floor, what side of the building we’re on, what floor’s 
the smoke and fire showing from, things of that nature. Uh, just to paint a picture for 
the oncoming units and the Battalion Commander.” (WCFD firefighter) 
 
Thus, although this task may not be extremely complex, the amount of detail that is 
given in a size up is to some extent dependent on the firefighter’s own discretion. 
Thus, the autonomy/control-related aspects of completing this task appear to be more 
apparent than those related to complexity, even if certain firefighters did not view he 
task in this manner. Finally, in regards to technology, no true changes occurred to the 
firefighters’ skills regarding giving a proper size up. 
At the Scene of a Fire: Engine Companies 
After receiving a call, navigating and driving the apparatus to the fire, and 
giving a proper size up, firefighters next begin a series of skills specific to their type 




fact, one firefighter from River City even stated that an outsider viewing the first ten 
minutes of the scene would interpret it as complete chaos occurring with firefighters 
running around in all different directions. However, upon talking with the firefighters 
about their specific duties, it becomes clear that each firefighter at a scene has 
specific tasks that need to be completed if the emergency is to be properly handled. 
These tasks are predetermined not only by the type of apparatus to which a firefighter 
is assigned, but also to the specific position on that apparatus that the firefighter is 
serving. Those firefighters serving on fire engine companies have two main tasks that 
need to be performed: supplying water/operating the engine and suppressing the fire.
Supplying water/operating the engine 
The first task that an engine company must perform is to actually supply water 
that can be used to suppress the fire. While not all engines are the same – there are 
different makes and models which have slightly different features – they all provide 
water to a fire in a similar manner. To quickly describe how an engine functions, i  
should be noted that on each engine there are large (up to five inch) hose lines called 
supply lines. These supply lines are able to be connected to a fire hydrant and carry 
water from this hydrant to the fire engine. In addition, each engine also has hose  that 
are called attack lines. These attack lines are smaller in diameter (e.g., one and a 
half/two inches) and are used to spray water onto the fire. Unlike the supply line that 
connects to any one engine, more than one attack line can be simultaneously used by 
firefighters to suppress fire. Thus, the water enters a fire engine via a supply line, and 
the engine itself serves as a pump to build and regulate pressure needed to adequately 




who operates the engine itself, all firefighters in the engine company work on some 
extension of the apparatus.  
In order to establish a fully operational water supply, the first portion of the 
task involves finding a working fire hydrant. While each engine itself carries 
approximately five hundred gallons of water, this amount of water is not enough to 
successfully suppress a working structure fire. Therefore, this external water supply is 
needed. Connecting the engine to a hydrant involves a firefighter serving as the lead-
off and is charged with manually connecting the supply line to the fire hydrant and 
turning on the water, as detailed in an interview by a RCFD fire captain: 
“And then I have somebody who is supposed to lead off from the hydrant, and that 
would be getting the water supply. When we pull up to the corner, one of us will yell 
to ‘em which side it’s on, whether it’s on my side or the driver’s side. And then he 
would get off. He had to go back and he has to un-strap a connection that goes into a 
large fitting on the hydrant. Take a quick look inside of it to make sure there’s not any 
debris or bottles or anything in there that’s going to clog up our hose. Then he takes 
and there’s a swivel connection on the hydrant valve itself. And there’s little handles 
that he can grab with his hand and basically screw the thing onto the hydrant. Um, at 
the same time we are traveling to the fire. So the hose which has been laid onto the 
back is just flipping off.” 
 
This quote describes the procedures needed to be completed by the lead-off 
firefighter. The levels of each skill dimension needed are not at an extremely high 
level regarding the establishment of this water supply. In fact, the completion of this 
initial task leaves little room for decision-making or other autonomy/control-related 
aspects – each fire hydrant has a particular manner in which the supply line is to be 
connected. In regards to complexity, while it appears that only basic physical act ons 
are required, the need to perform this task quickly and correctly does add a subtle 




 Although the use of fire hydrants and supply lines has existed for a long 
period of time, these tools had been recently changed. The first change was that the
diameter of supply lines has increased to five inches which allowed for the flow of 
more water to the fire engine. However, in regards to any changes to the actual t sk of 
supplying water to the engine from the hydrant, there appeared to be little actual 
change in the amount of skill that was used. However, while the majority of 
firefighters who operated an engine discussed the lack of change to this portion of 
water supply, there was one firefighter I interviewed who did discuss the shift to 
sexless couplings used to attach the fire hose supply lines to the fire hydrant. 
According to this firefighter they were much easier to establish this connetio , and 
did remove some of the pure physical strength needed to perform this task. Although 
this one firefighter discussed these sexless couplings, it did not appear that these wer  
prevalent throughout either River or Waterville City based on the remainder of the
interviews I conducted. 
 With the supply line/fire hydrant connection established, the next portion of 
successfully establishing the water supply is to attach the remaining end of the supply 
line to the fire engine itself. Each engine has a certain length of supply line; how ver, 
the amount of this supply line that is used is dependent upon the distance between the 
fire hydrant and the fire engine: 
“Once we stop in front of the building, we pretty much have two choices. We do have 
something called a hose clamp. That is on the back step of the engine, and we can 
clamp off that hose so that nothing can get past the other side of the clamp. Or, if the 
driver’s pretty quick, he can go ahead and pull the hose off to the next coupling 
section, undo it, bring it over to the intake of the pumps and hook that up really quick 





Thus, it is the driver’s responsibility to make this connection. While it requires the 
same basic procedures used in establishing the hydrant/supply line connection, in this 
instance the driver needs to exert more discretion as in the supply line/engine 
connection there is the added factor of water flowing through the supply line; 
something that is not faced by the firefighter establishing the former connection. 
 While both fire departments established a water supply in a similar manner, 
there was one subtle difference between the two. At the WCFD, it was often solely 
the decision of the driver/pump operator to decide what size supply line was to be 
used to establish the water supply. This discretion was needed by the driver simply 
because it was the driver and one additional firefighter that were the only personn l 
aboard the fire engine. There was no officer (i.e., captain or battalion chief) to provide 
input as to how one should make this decision. However, at the RCFD there was an 
officer (i.e., lieutenant or captain) aboard the fire engine that would also provide input 
in this decision. This did not imply that the decision-making was completely rmoved 
from the driver, but rather it was a decision that was made collectively between he 
commanding officer and the driver. 
 The final portion of establishing a water supply was actually operating the 
engine. After analyzing data for the numerous tasks required of the firefighters in the 
fire related emergency job-context, the task of operating the engine was the one that 
had changed the most in the New Economy. This change affected both the complexity 
and autonomy/control-related aspects related to the completion of this task, and was 
directly the result of the computerization of the fire engine. This recogniti n was 




interviews only further verified this finding during the course of my data analyses. In 
the past, fire engines were manually operated and required quite a bit of skill to
successfully supply the proper amount of water to the attack lines so that the fire 
could successfully be attacked. The skill required here was somewhat a more 
complex process on these manually operated engines: 
“The old way, up to not that long ago, maybe five years ago to four years ago, you 
actually had to physically open each valve. You controlled the engine, controlled the 
speed, you controlled the friction, you knew what you had to set each valve at, each 
gauge at.” (WCFD firefighter) 
 
As this firefighter describes, the drivers who operated the engines had to manually 
adjust multiple valves that governed various pressures. However, the simple changing 
of knobs was not all that was required to operate the engines. As another WCFD 
firefighter states, firefighters controlling the pump on the engine also had to use 
his/her eyes and ears in addition to physical adjustment of various valves: 
Firefighter: That was pretty much a basic, basic fire engine where you pull a lever 
and you had to keep an eye on the gauge and it was the old; I call it the old school 
where you have like your incoming line, your supply line, you like kind of lean 
against it. Or you put your foot on it. And if you start to feel that thing go limp that 
means you’re dragging. You’re trying to pull more water than the supply. So ou had 
to learn to start the gauge and back, throttling back. That kind of thing. 
 
Interviewer:  So it’s a lot more manual? 
 
Firefighter: Yeah, yeah, manual. You had to keep your eyes and ears open 
particularly, listen to the pump and listen to the radio. 
 
 In addition to feeling and listening to the pumps, there was also a large 
amount of mental complexity involved. The proper pressures used had to be 
calculated by the firefighter so that the gauges could be properly set. Variables such 
as the length of hose, the diameter of the hose, the number of attack lines being used, 




the attack line all played a role in calculating the proper pressure to effectively supply 
water via the fire engine. Thus, these manually operated pumps on the fire engines 
truly required the integration of mental and manipulative tasks. However, there was 
also a clear decision-making aspect to this task. In each situation the individual 
operating the pump on the fire engine was also able to use some discretion as to how 
much pressure is established: 
“You have to calculate, understand where to pump the line, what pressure to put in 
the line. That’s basically a benchmark, but depending on who’s on the line you can 
adjust it a little bit. If we, the two guys on the van [utility vehicle] , the firefighters 
that will probably be going in the fire, they’re pretty big guys and if the fire’s really 
rocking pretty good I might give them a little bit more, so they have more water and 
more punch to get in there a little further. Where if it’s two little guys I might back it 
off a little bit from the benchmark. Still gives ‘em plenty of water to do their job, but 
they’re efficient enough that it’s done better because they’re not struggling moving 
the line, or having too much pressure.” (WCFD firefighter; author’s notation in 
brackets) 
 
These manually operated pumps on the fire engines clearly required a large 
amount of skill to successfully operate. However, during the New Economy both the 
WCFD and RCFD began to see a shift from using manually operated pumps to using 
computer-controlled pumps. While both departments had switched over to computer-
governed pumps, the RCFD had these types of pumps for sometime (according to the 
interviews, my best judgment was for about ten years), while the WCFD was still in 
the process of completely shifting over to computer-controlled pumps. According to 
one firefighter from Waterville City, “four out of five” engines were governed by 
computers – one was still manually governed. 
The portion of this task that was computerized was the process of initially and 
continually adjusting the gauges so that the correct pressures were provided. Thus, 




in operating the pump on the engine was able to basically be removed from the skills 
used by the firefighters. Again, this decrease occurred in line with the ALM 
hypothesis in that the mathematics and physics behind supplying the pressure to the 
attack lines were standard, and although prior to this the firefighters operating the 
pump could make some adjustment that was arguably outside of this routinized 
procedure, the computerized equipment still was able to be used in a manner that 
could remove this skill from the firefighters. Important to note is that this decrease 
occurred along the lines of both substantive complexity and autonomy/control-related 
dimensions. A firefighter from the WCFD details this: 
“Now these things do it themselves. Like the engine will increase in RPM [rotations 
per minute], decrease all by itself. You’re standing there listening to it and it’s 
adjusting and sending water where it needs to go. You still have to activate the valve, 
but once that’s activated the pressure governor, it’s called, controls the pressure in 
each line so if we’re flowing two lines at once, and somebody shuts one line down 
it’ll reduce the pressure in this one over here so that this guy ain’t getting everything.” 
(Author’s notation in brackets) 
 
Not only are the computerized pumps able to govern pressure, they can also account 
for the use of a different number of lines being used. Thus, the introduction of 
computers to the task of operating an engine to supply water clearly had a decre se in 
skill for all firefighters certified able to operate the apparatus, noticeable enough that 
more than one firefighter even made the classic comparison that is was so easy a 
“monkey could do it.” 
Suppressing the fire 
With the water supply established and the engine pumping the attack lines 
with water, additional firefighters at the scene are charged with the task of spraying 




duty must first find the fire. While interviewing the respondents, one point that was 
made explicitly clear by the firefighters was the actual difficulty itself in finding the 
fire. When they would enter a structure that was on fire, the smoke filled environment 
prevented them from seeing more than inches in front of their face. Therefore, they 
also had to depend on their other senses in order to find the fire. This meant that the 
firefighters had to use their sense of feel to push towards the heat until they could 
finally see the orange glow created by the fire. When discussing the result of a fire in 
a structure, the interviewees made clear that it was not simply that you walk right in 
and can see the fire, but rather it required a use of one’s senses to locate it. One 
firefighter from the RCFD even went so far as to discuss at some length how eerie 
this process was, and how at a basic human instinct level, it is an extremely unnatural 
feeling for a human being to push forward blindly in a smoke filled, toxic 
environment towards an overwhelming sort of heat that one knows has the potential 
to be a deadly.  
 Once the fire was located, one firefighter working the attack lines was able to 
turn on the water and begin to spray the fire. Fundamentally this was a rather physical 
task. Here a firefighter’s adrenaline has been pumping at an extremely high level. 
While using the hose, it is quite a physical task to establish control of the hose with 
the amount of pressure that the engine is pumping through the attack line. A 
firefighter must be able to simultaneously control the hose itself through the use of
physical strength while being able to spray the fire in certain patterns. These patterns 
are important to ensure that the suppression is effective. In addition to the control of 




have to balance this attack with consideration of the safety of him/herself and the 
other firefighters inside the structure: 
“It doesn’t seem like a lot. It seems like dumb firemen go in an put water on the fire 
and it’s game over. It’s much more than that. Um, how we use our water. What type 
of stream we use on the fire. If we extinguish the wrong part first could determine if 
we get burned, if somebody else gets burned.” (RCFD firefighter) 
 
Thus, the level of complexity involving the performance of interpersonal and 
manipulation is at a much higher level than the shear physical strength and control 
needed to simply hold and turn on a hose. 
 In regards to the level of autonomy/control-related aspects needed by 
firefighters to perform this task, seniority played an important role. As most new 
firefighters came into the department without the formal training to operate a pump, 
they tended to be the firefighter on the attack line (referred to as the pipe man in the 
RCFD). However, as these firefighters were still rather inexperienced, they were seen 
as lacking the knowledge needed to effectively make decisions regarding the proper 
extinguishment of a fire, and were given direct supervision when suppressing the fire 
with an attack line. For example, one senior firefighter who sometimes served as an 
officer discussed a younger firefighter who recently joined his company: 
“Firefighting, especially when you’re new like him, his vision is very narrow. All his 
job is to have the pipe, go through as much shit as he can as quick as he can to find 
the fire. That’s all he knows. He will learn over time that there’s a lot of things to 
look for. You know when we pull up we have to figure out what color smoke; what 
the smoke’s doing.  Where the fire is, where the fire could be. If there’s people 
trapped, where are they, how we (sic) getting there.” (RCFD firefighter) 
 
In these instances with a younger firefighter, their officer would be suppressing the 
fire along side with them as to ensure they are properly working the hose and doing 




building. In the case of the RCFD, the officer of a fire engine would physicall  be 
going into the building with the firefighter manning the attack line to assist with 
extinguishing the fire. As each engine always had some firefighter serving as the 
officer, there was always an individual on the attack line with the rookie firefight r 
guiding them through the process. In the case of the WCFD, in most real working 
fires, the individual on the attack line also had their captain stationed on the inside of 
the building and providing similar guidance. However, since there was only one 
captain per shift at the WCFD, there was not a one-to-one ratio such as in the RCFD. 
Because of this it could be argued that there may have been a higher ability for 
rookies in the WCFD to possess these autonomy/control-related aspects compared to 
those firefighters in the RCFD. 
A reoccurring theme that about two-thirds of my interviewees mentioned was 
that when fighting fire, you really learn by doing. The more fires a firefighter 
responds to, the more experience they gain. The more experience they gain, the more 
they are able to develop the autonomy/control-related skill aspects of fighting fire. 
Therefore, when more senior firefighters worked using the attack lines, the officers 
may have still been in this supervisory position. However, the dynamic shifted some 
and allowed for the firefighter him/herself the ability to use more discreton 
concerning using the attack lines. This notion was made quite clear during the 
interviews and reaffirmed in the data analyses. However, during the course of my 
analyses, another pattern emerged among the senior RCFD firefighters I ad 
interviewed. When discussing this shifting autonomy between the officer and 




firefighters also played a role in allowing more discretion to the firefighter while 
performing this task. Firefighters who had served on the same engine company for  
number of years appeared to develop a high level of trust among one another. Perhaps 
this is not surprising given the risk inherently involved in the firefighting occupation; 
however, it allowed for this relationship to shift from more of a supervisor/supervise 
dynamic to a peer/peer dynamic. Therefore, while the amount of experience was a 
critical factor for both firefighters from Waterville and River City in regards to 
suppressing fire, those interviews of RCFD firefighters also revealed that the 
development of this trust and peer/peer relationship also played an important role in 
the shifting autonomy of suppressing a fire. 
A few firefighters stated that over the course of the past twenty yearsthat 
fighting fire was still “putting the wet stuff on the red stuff.” Throughout the course 
of my interviews, this appeared to hold true for the majority of cases. However, there 
were a few instances where firefighters did discuss some change in the task of 
suppressing the fire with water. One of these changes was spawned by technology,17 
and did not really have a real impact on the skills involved in this task. However, the 
recent increase in practices to increase the safety of firefighters while in the fire 
related emergency job-context did have some potential to change these skills, even if 
                                                
17 There were actually two technologies that were discus ed by a few firefighters during the course of 
my interviews as having an affect on the suppression of fire; however, the analyses showed that only 
one of them appeared to have any real impact on the skills used by firefighters. This second technology 
was the use of foam systems. Basically, foam is a substance which can be added to a water supply to 
potentially create a liquid material more effective than standard water to help extinguish fire. The us  
of foam would most likely add skills needed to both supplying water/operating and engine and 
suppressing the fire. However, the use of foam was only mentioned by approximately one-quarter of 
the interviews in the WCFD and only one interview in the RCFD. In addition to the low number of 
firefighters interviewed who discussed foam, those that did discuss this technology also stated that i 
was rarely (if ever, in the case of the RCFD firefighter) used to suppress fire. Therefore, there was not 
enough strong evidence that this technology was having a real impact on the firefighter’s skills and it 




not yet fully realized. The first technology that came into play over the past twen y 
years in regards to working the attack lines were different types of nozzles: 
“In my career there’s been what’s called automatic nozzles. In other words, these 
nozzles from the same diameter hose can flow much more gallons per minute, of 
water, with using the same delivery device; the same hoses. And depending on what 
the pressure’s set at is how many gallons per minute you get out of the hose. And it 
put more control of the fireman on the end of the line because if somebody got the 
pressure jacked way up on the old hoses you could hardly hold onto it. You had to 
really back it off, and when you backed it off you were losing your gallons per minute 
which could be dangerous for you. Now you can back it off and still have above what 
the old lines would be at their maximum…There’s nothing automatic about them as 
far as electronic or motors moving. It’s still all manual stuff; it’s justthat having that 
vale inside that allows more water to pass through.” (WCFD firefighter) 
 
As clearly stated by this firefighter, improved nozzles did not specifically hange the 
method used while actually using a hose. However, what it did do was decrease the 
pure physical strength required to operate an attack hose through a more efficient 
design of the nozzle. 
 In the past ten years, there had also been an increasing push to improve the 
safety of firefighters while completing their tasks at the fire related emergency job-
context. This reoccurring theme arose in different manners throughout the course of 
my interviews. While this safety push was occurring, it specifically meant two 
potential changes to the skills used of suppressing a fire. First, in the past ten years 
national guidelines have begun to set a standard that state for each working fire 
incident there must be a rapid intervention team (referred to as a RIT team) stationed 
at the scene. The responsibility of RIT teams is to stand by a fire in the instance that a 
situation arises where a firefighter inside the burning structure is in need of any form 
of emergency assistance. These types of instances particularly include getting injured, 




manner. Generally it was cited by firefighters that it is ideal for the RIT team to be on 
location at a fire related emergency prior to them entering the structure. How ver, this 
procedure appeared to not always be followed precisely according to the guidelines as 
it was also extremely important in the firefighters’ eyes to begin fightin  the fire as 
soon as possible.18 Thus, these RIT teams potentially had the ability to alter the skills 
used for those firefighters suppressing fire with the attack lines (and other firefighters 
inside the building performing other tasks); however, at this point in time this impact 
was not cited by the firefighters as something that had really changed the manners in 
which they throw water on the fire. 
At the Scene of a Fire: Truck Companies 
At the scene of a fire, the engine companies are charged with the process of 
establishing a water supply, preparing to throw water on the fire, and suppressing the 
fire. While these firefighters on the engine company are performing these asks, the 
firefighters on the truck companies are busy performing other tasks vital to the safety 
of citizens who may be trapped in the burning building and other firefighters, in 
addition to others that must be completed if the fire is to be completely extinguished. 
Among other things, this includes forced entry, search and rescue, throwing ladders, 
and ventilation. 
Forced entry 
The first task that firefighters in truck companies are charged with was to 
force entry into the burning structure. Forcing entry into a building was purely a 
                                                
18 This is similar to the findings of Weinschenk et al. (2008) who discuss the implementation of formal 




physical task where firefighters would use a variety of tools to break open a locked 
door or other barriers which prevented them from getting inside the structure to 
rescue any victims and fight the fire. This task was not always needed: some fire 
emergencies may have not had any obstruction. However, when this forced entry was 
needed, it tended to be left for the truck companies. While the basics of the task were 
not overtly complex in regards to the mental capabilities of a firefighter (it drew more 
on the physical and manipulative abilities of a firefighter), one of the reason that 
forced entry tended to be left for the truck companies was that it was on the fire 
trucks where many of the tools needed to force entry were stored. For example, while 
both types of apparatuses had the basic hand tools (e.g., axes) used for forced entry, at 
both the WCFD and RCFD it was the truck companies that carried hydraulic rescue
tools that may be needed to gain entry.19 
Interesting enough, I was informed during my interviews by firefighters that 
these hydraulic tools had originally been used during stock car racing, such as 
NASCAR, when drivers needed to be cut out of one of their race cars in certain 
emergency situations .20 While these hydraulic rescue tools have been available for 
quite some time elsewhere, they had only been placed on fire trucks in the past 20 
years. This is not to say they were never used by the fire department prior to this 
instance. For example, in the RCFD there was a special (or heavy) rescue unit (see 
Chapter 6) that had long been in possession of a hydraulic rescue tool. Even when 
                                                
19 Hydraulic rescue tools were also referred to as Hurst® tools (after a particular manufacturer that 
makes these types of tools), and also the Jaws of Life® (a reference to a particular brand/model of 
these hydraulic rescue tools). These terms will be used interchangeably throughout the present study as 
well. 
20 NASCAR stands for National Association for Stock Car Auto Racing. It is a national business 
venture in the U.S. that oversees and sanctions various auto racing events, with its most major race 




the fire trucks at River City were equipped with these tools, the special rescue unit 
still carried a larger, more powerful hydraulic rescue tool.  
With that extremely brief history of the hydraulic rescue tool, it is also 
important to quickly explain how it works. The tool’s base consists of a hydraulic 
pump that is connected by a cord to a tool. The types of tools that are connected to the 
hydraulic pump can be changed depending on what the firefighters’ needs are. During 
the course of my interviews, the firefighters who worked in truck companies who 
used hydraulic rescue tools discussed two specific parts of the tool that could be used. 
The first were cutters which were simply a series of blades that were strong enough to 
cut through the exterior of a car. Obviously, these tools were mainly used in the 
instances of automobile accidents during non-fire related emergencies (see Chapt r 
6). The second tool that connected to the hydraulic pump and was discussed during 
my interviews was a piece of equipment called a spreader. This spreader allow d for 
a firefighter to pry apart two objects, mainly a sealed or locked door of an 
automobile, or (in this instance) of a house or a building.  
Obviously, the hydraulic rescue tools brought with it the need to learn the new 
skills that were required to use them. It is important here to note that although these 
tools were mainly used by truck companies, it did not imply that firefighters wo king 
on fire engines were not responsible for this skill. In fact, all firefighters were cross 
trained. This implied that although the main tasks performed while at a fire related 
emergency were specific to the type of apparatus one is riding; all firefighters were 
responsible to be in possession of the knowledge and skills needed to ride upon the 




successfully perform the associated fire related tasks for that apparatus. For example, 
the firefighter on the truck who may primarily be responsible for forced entry a d 
other duties assigned to the fire truck must also know how to use an attack line to 
throw water on the fire. On the other hand, those firefighters on engine companies 
must also understand how to throw ladders, for example. It should be noted that this 
did not apply to the responsibilities possessed by the driver of an engine (i.e., 
operating the pump to supply water) or a truck (i.e., operating the aerial ladder). The 
ability to possess all these skills was important at both departments if a situation arose 
where firefighter from an engine company needed to fill in as a firefighter on a truck 
company for an entire work shift, or even during a single fire related emerg ncy. 
Forcing entry with either basic hand or hydraulic rescue tools appeared to 
have been a rather straightforward physical task. Furthermore, besides the type of 
tools used, there was not a large room for any type of discretion. However, the 
interviews revealed that the characteristics of the areas surrounding a fire stat on may 
also play a role in increasing the level of discretion that is needed by the firefighter, 
as certain firefighters noted that technology external to their apparatuses may also be 
used to circumvent the damage created when using physical strength to force entry. 
The area in which the WCFD was responsible for was one example of this: 
“I don’t know if people really call it technology or not. One thing that’s been 
instrumental, well it’s saved communities a lot of money, is the Knox Box system. 
It’s a little safe they put on the outside of the buildings, and the building puts their 
phone numbers, their contact numbers in this little safe, and they put the keys to that 
building in that little safe. And of course we have a master key. So we can get in that 
Knox Box, get the keys out, let ourselves in the building...” (WCFD firefighter) 
 
This Knox Box system had (approximately in the past 15 years) become widespread 




prevented the firefighters from needed to damage any property as no forced entry is
needed. While this tool can be used in instances of an actual fire, during false alarms 
(see Chapter 8) they can also be used as well. 
 While this is one example in Waterville City how the local area can influence 
the performance of forced entry, there was also evidence of this in River City. One 
particular fire station of the RCFD was located in an area that was very impoverished 
and had an extensive amount of vacant buildings which in turn was a factor for the 
task of forced entry. I interviewed a number of firefighters positioned on the truck 
company at this station who discussed how the area affected their forced entry. For 
example, when discussing the tools used in these instance: 
“For like chainsaws and stuff for cutting. We have a lot of vacants [houses] for 
getting the plywood off and stuff like that. But basic it’s just been a toolbox full of 
crude tools showing up with a bunch of raging bulls breaking the place open.” (RCFD 
firefighter; author’s notation in brackets) 
 
Due to the large number of vacant houses needing to be responded to by this 
particular fire company, the manners of how forced entry was completed was 
different then other companies in River City or even Waterville City. While t e use of 
saws may have not commonly been used to force entry by other fire companies, in 
this particular area the large number of boarded up vacant houses required saws to be 
used more often. 
Search and rescue 
As soon as the forced entry (if needed) was completed, arguably the most 
important task of the firefighters on the truck was to search for and rescue any 




discussed this made clear it was not an easy task. As for the first thing to consider, i  
addition to the danger that the fire itself presented, other factors also hindered the 
ability for this task to be completed by the person(s) performing it. As mention d 
above, the smoke inside a burning building creates an environment where a firefighter 
has extremely limited vision. As one Waterville City firefighter stated, “it was almost 
like closing your eyes and trying to walk. You had to feel with your hands.” Thus, 
this drastically adds to the difficulty of navigating and orienteering oneself through 
the environment. In addition, the trapped persons themselves can unintentionally add 
a level of complexity to this task. The situation is not always as we see in the movi s 
where a victim inside a house on fire is hanging out the window and yelling to get the 
attention of the firefighters. On the contrary to this, people who need to be rescued 
may attempt to intentionally hide from the fire, and although unintentionally, wind up 
hiding from the firefighters as well: 
“And people do different things. They’ll probably hide under the mattress. They’ll go 
in the bathroom and get in the shower. So you have to check that area. Put mattresses 
over ‘em thinking that will protect ‘em, so you got to check on top of the bed, under 
the mattresses, in between the box spring.” (RCFD firefighter) 
 
Therefore, when a firefighter is in a structure that is on fire and s/he is searching for 
victims, the fire, smoke, and victims themselves can all work to increase the difficulty 
pertaining to searching for the victim and successfully rescuing him/her. These
factors create not only a certain level of complexity for the firefighter, but also a level 
of heightened autonomy/control-related aspects that need to be possessed by the 
firefighter. The firefighters not only need the mental and manipulative integration 
needed to navigate and search a structure that is in flames, but also must be able to 




both environmental and factors related to the victim him/herself. Because of this, the 
commanding officer on a truck in the RCFD was normally the one who (after forcing 
entry) would also search for any victims inside the structure, as s/he was a firefighter 
with a greater level of experience and training. 
 When discussing search and rescue, one tool that was mentioned was the 
thermal imaging camera (TIC). This camera became widespread in the two 
departments over the course of the past five to ten years. The TIC allowed a 
firefighter to locate heat patterns. This in essence allowed a firefightr to see through 
smoke, or even some types of walls. In the instance of performing a search and 
rescue, the TIC could allow one to see and locate a person by showing the specific
heat patterns of their bodies. As with the introduction of many other devices used in 
the fire related emergency job-context, in order to use them these cameras required a 
new skill that was not previously present in the fire departments. This meant that as 
firefighters in both departments now began to use the TICs, they were also required to 
train on them so that they can be properly and efficiently used. As with other 
technologies that entered the fire service, these TICs did have some drawbacks that 
firefighters needed to be aware of in order to effectively use the camera. One RCD 
firefighter laid this out quite nicely when recalling some of his experiences when 
using the TIC: 
“You’re looking at the camera but your depth perception is completely off. I’m 
thinking I still got another foot before I hit the stairs, and I was [smacks his hands 
together signaling that he fell down the steps] at the top of the steps already. So 
your depth perception’s off. And it’s weird. Like the ice house fire. Took a thermal 
imager in there, couldn’t see nothing. All I see is bright light which is indicative of 
fire. If this is all fire, I’m dead. Done! But in hindsight it was the reflection off the 
ice…So, I mean, the thermal imaging’s come a long way….Thermal imagers (sic) 




ejected, can’t see through trees in the dark.  You know, take the thermal imager, scn 
the tree line, and you’ll be able to find somebody [snaps his fingers] that quick. Um, 
they don’t work in water. If somebody’s submersed under water, it doesn’t work.  It 
reflects the top.” (Author’s notation in brackets) 
 
Both fire and non-fire related emergencies were discussed here, but provides a good 
explanation of the skill required to use a TIC. 
 Although the TIC was a relatively new technology, the specific models of 
TICs available at each department were quite different. At the RCFD, the TICs 
equipped on the fire trucks were older models which many firefighters who worked 
on the trucks claimed were bulky and difficult to use while fully dressed in your PPE, 
SCBA, and carrying your hand tool. These TICs had a screen that went over one’s 
face that showed the heat image. This screen was connected by a wire to a large,
“bulky” battery pack that the firefighters also had to carry. In contrast, at the WCFD 
this older style TIC model had been replaced by more modernized versions that were 
much smaller in size. These newer cameras were handheld models which allowed for 
an easier use. The same skills were required by the firefighters in the WCFD to read 
the imager; however, these versions were simply more convenient to use. 
Subsequently, the model and style of these TICs appeared to have played a roll in 
how they were used by firefighters while performing search and rescue. In th  RCFD, 
although a TIC was standard on each fire truck, the firefighters did not normally use 
them while searching for victims. Instead, they were primarily used during overhaul 
(see below). However, at the WCFD the firefighters I interviewed stated that they 
were used not only for overhaul, but also while searching for victims. However, there 
was one exception, where a firefighter from one truck stated that although they can be




victims most commonly used is still by physically feeling one’s way around. As 
discussed later in detail, clearly the most common use of the TIC in both departments 
was to assist with the overhaul process (i.e., ensuring the fire is completely 
extinguished and all hazards are contained; see below). 
 While searching was one portion of this particular task, the rescue was 
another. While victims are not always able to come to a window, in some instances 
they are. Here, ladders can be used to remove the victim from the building. In these 
instances, the victim him/herself could again increase the difficulty of this task. 
During ladder rescues, the panic and fear a trapped person is experiencing may set in 
which may make for a not cooperative situation for a firefighter who is trying to 
remove them from the building both quickly and safely. A prime example of this was 
found in a photograph that caught my attention in the WCFD administration building. 
Here was the picture of an almost completely naked man hanging upside down three-
quarters of the way out of a second story window. The building he was in was in 
flames A standard ground ladder had been placed up against the building in front of 
the window, and a firefighter from the WCFD was near the window on the ladder. I 
did not initially ask about the photograph, but it was explicitly brought up two or 
three times over the course of my interviews, and as I found out this citizen was 
trying to jump onto the firefighter on the ladder to exit the burning building. In this 
instance, it took some effort to calm this individual down to a state where (with the 
assistance of the firefighter) he could safely get onto the ladder and successf lly exit 




this instance provides an example of how the individual him/herself can make the 
process of rescue difficult, regardless if a search was even needed. 
 As mentioned above, searching and finding a victim is in itself a rather 
difficult task; however, the rescuing of a victim can require just as much skill. Even 
when a person is located by a firefighter, the firefighter still has to navigate n the 
harsh environment created by the fire and smoke. Another point important to note 
here was that the buildings themselves can create a more deadly environment that 
works against the firefighter when trying to rescue a victim: 
“You know, we’re getting into more hydrocarbon-based products. You know and all 
the foams in furniture. You know, everything like that burns hotter, faster, gives off 
more toxic fumes, where 40 or 50 years ago it really wasn’t. You know, the wood-
based products for the most part. The fires are burning hotter and faster and the 
atmospheres are getting to a point where they wouldn’t have.” (RCFD firefighter) 
 
Fires are now creating more toxic environments that are not only a concern on the 
part of the firefighters’ safety, but also for the safety of the individuals needi g 
rescued. This increasingly toxic environment is creating a deadlier environment than 
was previously present. In turn, this works against the firefighters in that even if th  
victims have been found, the ability to get them out safely of this environment may 
require a more accelerated rate. Not only are the flames a danger for the person being 
rescued, but the smoke and toxic fumes that are released by the burning housing 
material can be just as dangerous to the victim. 
Using ladders 
Using ladders was another task performed by firefighters on truck companies. 
There were two different types of ladders used here, ground ladders and aerial 




Economy. Ground ladders could be used by all firefighters, and was generally the 
duty of the firefighters on the truck who were serving as drivers or performing any 
type of search and rescue. The procedures used from ground ladders have been the 
same for “maybe a hundred years” (quoting one WCFD firefighter). This basically 
involved placing (or referred to by the firefighters as “throwing”) a standard ground 
ladder up against the building to areas that either needed to be opened for ventilation, 
or that could be used by other firefighters to gain access to the building or rescue
victims. Even if the firefighters did not initially need access to a building throug a 
particular area such as a window, for preventative safety reasons it was important that 
these ladders were placed there anyway. If a firefighter inside the structure was 
fighting the fire and needed to make a quick exit, these ground ladders allowed them 
to do so quickly so they would not become trapped and need to be rescued by 
members of the RIT team or other firefighters. While the process of placing ground 
ladders itself may have not required a substantial amount of substantive complexity or 
autonomy/control-related skills, and had not changed in the past 20 years, this task 
did require a large amount of physical strength to quickly place a ladder in the proper 
position. It was in this aspect that a change did occur; the ladders themselves were 
now being made with material that weighed less and would require less physical 
strength to throw. However, this new material did not affect the actual skill 
dimensions in any way – the same skill needed when using ground ladders prior to 
the New Economy was still needed in the present day. 
While the ground ladders were common place in many fires, in some 




to extend anywhere from 75 to 100 feet and was bolted to the fire truck. The aerial 
was operated in both departments by the tiller, and was used to transport firefighte s 
to and from heights that were not able to be otherwise reached. Generally, the driver 
of the truck would be the firefighter to go up the ladder to ventilate. As mentioned 
above, the aerial was not always used. The firefighters I interviewed statth t this 
was the case for a variety of reasons. The most prevalent reasons that surfaced 
included: (a) in certain instances the fire being fought simply did not require the 
firefighters to be able to go to that great a height, or (b) the specific situation did not 
allow for the firefighters to use the aerial ladder because space limitations (i.e., the 
aerial was hindered by obstacles such as tree limbs, power lines, or even the narrow 
size of the alley/street where the burning structure is located). 
While the skill required to use ground ladders may have been minimal, there 
was inevitably much more skill required to properly operate the aerial ladder. What 
had remained constant was the fact that the tiller manually had to operate the controls 
of the aerial from the back of the truck. For example, in older models of the fire 
trucks: 
“I mean we were riding in open; the tiller was an open cab and one of them literally 
you were sitting between the ladder rungs. You had a windshield and a seat that when 
you got out if you were going to have to use it you threw a switch, or pulled a lever 
down, let the windshield went (sic) out of the way, hit another lever and the seat 
would flop out of the way and then you had to take the tiller wheel out between the 
ladder rungs and you had a place to put it, if you were using the aerial.” (WCFD 
firefighter) 
 
However, with newer models being introduced to the fire departments in the past 20 
years, these portions of the preparation for the task of using the aerial had been 




situated between the aerial ladder itself. This removed a number of the steps used a
preparation when completing this task. This new style of truck with fully enclosed 
cabs was now commonplace at both the RCFD and WCFD, and in both departments 
had removed this longer process required to prepare to use the aerial ladder. 
While this portion of the preparation to use the aerial ladder was shortened, 
there was some evidence provided in two interviews that this new computerization 
has also added more skill to using the aerial. It should be noted that these three 
interviews were all from the WCFD and discussing one particular apparatus th  the 
department purchased approximately ten to 12 years ago, and may not be 
representative of the second fire truck used by the WCFD. This increase in 
knowledge concerned the process of establishing outriggers from the fire truck when 
using the aerial ladder.21 As explained by one of these WCFD firefighters who served 
as a tiller on this specific apparatus: 
Firefighter: It’s just like here in town, there are times we cannot fully extend out 
outriggers. Uh, well it could just be a matter of inches to do that. Well, there’s sensors 
on there that if you’re not fully extended we have to do other, flip other switches and 
do other things to get it to work, um, which is built into the truck. If you’re not 
thinking about it at the time, it will actually stop you from extending to an area that  
short-jack. If you’re short-jacked is what they call it. If you’re short-jacked you’re 
going to that side it won’t let you do it unless you have a couple of switches you have 
to be pushing and you have to constantly hold to continue to do that. So it kind of 
makes you think about what you’re doing. 
 
Interviewer:  It’s like extra steps? 
 
Firefighter: Yeah, yeah. And it can throw some guys off because it’s not something 
you do that much, you know? And the first time it happens to most people they go, 
you know, they’re like ‘Ok, now what’s wrong? Why won’t this thing go? Why’s 
there a buzzer going and all like that?’ And then they, usually they’ll be able to figure 
it out. It’s like ‘Oh, okay. This is what I need to do.’ 
 
                                                
21 The outriggers were simply mechanical legs that were extended from the fire truck to prevent it from 




Thus, while properly setting the outriggers on this apparatus was a skill previously 
needed to complete the task of using the aerial ladder, these newer aerial ladders
sometimes created a situation where the outriggers would not be fully extended due to 
the fact the computerized sensors would not allow it. As described by this firefighter, 
in these instances the firefighter operating the aerial ladder had to understa why it 
was not fully extending, if they had additional room to fully extend it, and 
subsequently the procedures used to manually override the computerized sensors 
located on the fire truck. 
While this above example was related specifically to one apparatus in the 
WCFD, there was evidence among all firefighters who worked on a fire truck 
company that fire trucks had become increasingly computerized (as with the fire 
engines). However, unlike the engines, the process used to control the actual aerial 
ladder was dependent on the particular structure that was on fire, and not on a 
standard pressure that was routinized as when using certain attack lines (this was in 
contrast to the process used to prepare to use the aerial). Therefore, although the 
preparation to use the aerial ladder was routinized, and these newer models appeared 
to have removed skill from the substantive complexity dimension in preparing to use 
the aerial, the use of the aerial ladder itself was non-routinized and subsequently not 
affected by the computerization. In fact, in this instance discussed by the WCFD 
firefighters, there may have even been the case where the introduction of computers 
could have added some skill needed to properly operating the aerial ladder right after 






The fourth task specific to firefighters working on a truck company was to 
ventilate. The reason this task was performed was to create a safer environment for 
the firefighters inside fighting the fire and performing search and rescue. Ventilation 
helped remove both heat and smoke from the structure, and also helped remove from 
the structure some of the toxic fumes created by the burning materials. Ventilation 
also helped prevent (quoting a firefighter from the RCFD) two “evils in firefighting.” 
All fires need a certain combination of fuel, oxygen, and heat to exist. The removal of 
any of these three items will extinguish the fire; however, in certain instances this can 
create an extremely deadly situation. The first instance is when a fire burning in an 
airtight room depletes all the oxygen in that room. The heat and fuel still remain in 
this room, and the instance that the room’s airtight seal is broken and oxygen is 
introduced back into that environment, the result is an explosive situation of flame. 
This is called a backdraft.22 In the second “evil,” a room may have oxygen and may 
have a smaller fire burning, but it lacks the heat required to reach an ignition 
temperature. In this instance, heat can continually build from the fire in the room or 
elsewhere in the house via gases produced by the fire. This process heats the entire 
room until the room reaches a certain ignition temperature. The result is an 
instantaneous flame that engulfs the room and its contents. This is called a flashover. 
                                                
22 This was the same phenomenon featured in Backdraft, a 1991 American film of the same name. 
Interesting enough, references to this movie and others (e.g., Ladder 49) did come up throughout the 
course of my interviews where a handful of the firefighters I interviewed mentioned how these movies 
did not accurately portray the experiences of firefighters in the fire related emergency job-context, 
romanticized fighting fire, and did not paint an valid portrait of the process of fighting fire and the skill 




Through the process of ventilation a firefighter may remove heat from a particul r 
room which can help prevent both a backdraft and flashover from occurring. 
Ventilation typically occurred from high points in a structure. As the goal of 
ventilation is to remove heat from a burning building, this logic of ventilating the 
highest point of the building follows a common knowledge that most of us learned in 
our primary schooling: heat rises. Thus, in many instances firefighters physically go 
on the roof of a building to perform this task: 
“So I go to the roof, open the roof, open that roof up. Either the skylight or the scuttle, 
and the scuttle is a lot of work because usually it’s got tar paper over top it and you 
got to chop all around it, lift that hatch open and usually it’s like a false ceiling, like a
drop ceiling, and you drop down and that may open up and let ‘em out. If you don’t 
have none of those, then you got to chop a hole in the roof which is a hell of a lot. 
Basically we got axes and we’re just swinging away, you know?” (RCFD firefighter) 
 
In this instance, an RCFD firefighter who drove a truck discussed the process he uses 
to combat fire in the homes around the area for which his truck company was 
responsible. Furthermore, depending on what due truck the firefighter is on, the task 
of ventilation can differ. This RCFD continued and described the duties of the second 
due truck in regards to ventilation and how sometimes he handles this task while he is 
on the first due truck: 
“And then after that’s done, if it’s going to be a while before the second truck 
company gets there, then you actually go to the rear and you have two tools on the tip 
of the ladder. You don’t have to carry tools up, you just grab the tip of the ladder and 
throw them in. Take maybe a long six foot hook, lean over the back of the roof and 
break out the back windows. The second truck company’s going to come back and 
open up the back windows too, so it saves a lot of time.” 
 
This is a prime example of how ventilation occurs, but also the nature of how first 
and second due companies work together to fight fire. While both may be performing 




more quickly account for an entire building. Furthermore, this also shows that 
although firefighters may have specific tasks assigned to them each time they en er 
the fire related emergency job-context, there is always additional room to perform 
needed tasks.23 
 As with forced entry, search and rescue, and using ladders, there was also 
evidence of changes in homes in recent years affecting the completion of this task: 
“These lightweight constructions of new things (sic). These homes are very 
dangerous. If a fire’s going pretty good in them, they’re susceptible to collapse. The 
trusting systems they use in the roofs are very weak, so you think twice before you 
send these guys from the ladder truck up on top of the roof to ventilate because the 
roof could collapse and you’re going to kill two firemen. So a lot of things have 
changed…” (WCFD firefighter) 
 
Thus, again it appears that the buildings themselves can create more dangerous 
environments for firefighters to perform their tasks. In fact, two firefighters from the 
WCFD who worked on the same truck discussed how in some instances this has led 
them to ventilate using the aerial ladder, thus preventing them from even having to set 
foot on the roof. Thus, it does appear that the procedures used to ventilate have 
changed. However, this change did not specifically appear to create a shift in t e 
complexity involved in performing this task – firefighters were still using physical 
force coupled with basic hand tools to tear holes in the ceiling and break out 
windows. In addition, these firefighters ventilating a building also knew the 
procedures to ventilate as soon as they arrived on the scene. Thus, it could be argued 
                                                
23 Another example of firefighters performing more than their required tasks at any one given fire was 
evident during the interviews I conducted with firefighters in the WCFD who served as pump 
operators. As described in the methods section, the number of firefighters during each incident was 
more limited at the WCFD compared to the RCFD (or even National Fire Protection Agency [NFPA] 
national standards). Therefore, once these pump operators established the water supply needed and the 
pump was running properly, they often would throw a ground ladder or two to assist those firefighters 
on the truck. This task could be completed relatively quickly and done so simultaneously while 




that the autonomy/control-related aspects of this task created an increasing concern 
for the safety of firefighters on the roofs of buildings, subsequently leading to the 
increase of using discretionary skills. In this instance technology – albeit ext rnal 
from the fire departments themselves – did play a role in the task of ventilation. 
 One final thing to mention, in three interviews I conducted at the WCFD, the 
use of fans in the ventilation process was also mentioned. Basically, this simply
involved high-powered fans that could be placed by firefighters to help blow non-
heated, non-toxic, fresh air into a burning building. However, as these tools were only 
mentioned by three firefighters, it was unclear the extent that they were used (at either 
the WCFD or RCFD), and not enough evidence could be drawn from the interviews 
to discuss how these tools either created or changed the skills used by firefighte s. 
Furthermore, these were never mentioned during any interviews with firefighters 
from River City, and thus it was unclear if these devices were used at all in his
department. 
Using Firefighter’s Gear 
Each firefighter has an assigned task that they need to complete depending on 
the type of apparatus on which they are working (i.e., engine or truck). In addition, 
the particular position on that apparatus where the firefighter is sitting also determines 
what particular task they will be completing. The position a firefighter is sitt ng is 
particularly pronounced in the RCFD as they have four firefighters working on a 
single apparatus during any one shift. However, in the WCFD, only two firefightrs 
are assigned per apparatus during any one shift. Therefore, here there is somwhat 




apparatus, one’s position on that apparatus, or even which fire department the 
firefighter was working at, there was a likelihood that they had to use their personal 
gear while performing the various tasks discussed above. This was not identifie  by 
these firefighters as a task which had to explicitly be performed; however, throughout 
the interviews the firefighters at both departments discussed various considerations 
and knowledge that needed to be possessed in order to properly use their gear to its 
potential, and even to maintain their own safety. Thus, even if not explicitly seen by 
these firefighters as a skill per se, there was obviously a certain level of complexity 
and autonomy/control-related aspects that went into the use of this equipment. 
Personal protective equipment 
Obviously, firefighters could not perform their tasks in the fire related 
emergency context without certain clothing. This type of clothing was referred to as 
personal protective equipment, or PPE for short. This was also referred to as turnout 
gear. Over the past few decades the PPE has changed drastically. This recent change 
actually occurred prior to the time period of interest of this study. Before the New 
Economy, the turnout gear consisted of long, heavy coats. The boots were of three-
quarter style and could be pulled up above one’s knees and close to his/her thigh and 
the helmets worn were metallic in nature. To quote one WCFD firefighter, at some 
point the manufactures of this gear and the fire services started taking the gear and 
looking at it “a little more scientifically.” With this new perspective, the gear 
“changed from something that kept you dry to something that now actually is 




main goal of the PPE is the firefighter’s safety; perhaps not too surprising given the 
larger push towards safety of the firefighters while actual fighting fire. 
 Obviously these safety improvements were only able to be reached through 
the use of new technologies in the form of fabrics and synthetic composite materials. 
For example, as the helmets used to contain metallic materials, there was a risk of 
firefighters being electrocuted during instances where a live wire may be present in 
the scene. Thus, new materials that contained no metal were now being used. In 
addition, the design of the helmets was created in such a manner that they allowed for 
an extra layer of protection. The helmets worn by the firefighters in the WCFD gave a 
prime example of this: 
“Of course helmets have changed now. They have six-point harnesses in for fall 
protection. They’re actually break-away helmets. People don’t realize they are break-
away helmets. When you put your helmet on and put your chin strap on, the top layer; 
if something hits it’ll actually break away and fall off of your head, but you still have 
the impact liner just in case something else falls on your head or you fall. People 
don’t realize that, there’s actually two helmets there.” 
 
As for the remainder of the PPE, instead of a rubber material, the turnout gear 
was now made using Nomex/Kevlar-type material which had a much greater het 
resistance than the old rubber gear. In addition, this new material used to construct the 
turnout gear allowed for an increased level of mobility among the firefighters. This 
PPE also now fully encapsulated the firefighter: in addition to the coat, gloves, and 
pants, and boots, they also wore hoods which covered their heads (including ears) and 
part of their face. Furthermore, the design of some of these articles of gear had lso 
changed to create this more encapsulated environment. At the RCFD, a change in the 
coats created a better seal between the firefighters’ gloves and coat. Prior to this new 




gloves and coats while the firefighters were moving a certain way (i.e., fully 
extending his/her arms). Now, this newer PPE had a hole near the end of each coat 
sleeve which a firefighter could insert his/her thumb. Subsequently, this prevented 
one’s wrist from becoming exposed when his/her arm was fully extended, and 
potentially burned. This is an example of one particular alteration to the turnout gear 
that had occurred within the past 20 years, but it is not the only one. Although they 
may not be as drastic as the transition from the rubber material to the Nomex/Kevlar-
type material, these changes were still constantly occurring: firefighters in both 
departments stated that turnout gear is constantly evolving and being improved upon, 
with the ultimate goal of these improvements being to maximize their safety. 
Due to the new style and technology of the gear, firefighters were better 
protected from heat and flame. This also had consequences to how they were able to 
fight fire. Because of these new materials, and the full encapsulation, firefighters 
could now push further and deeper into a structure to fight a fire as the gear could 
now withstand environments that would not have physically been able to be 
withstood by the firefighter prior to this new gear. Firefighters could now physically 
perform their duties in environments that the human body was physically not 
supposed to be able to withstand. Thus, while discussing the PPE, there appeared to 
be a large consensus among the firefighters that this created a double-edged sword. In 
addition to the benefits of being able to go further into the fire, there were also 
potentially negative side effects of this: 
Firefighter:  One thing I’ve noticed though since we’re more encapsulated with all 
the turnout gear, I’m finding we’re going further in the buildings and sometimes 




your ears start burning, it was time to back up. But now since your ears are coverd I 




Firefighter: So yeah, it’s good if somebody’s trapped, we need to make a rescue, it’s 
good to have all this on but other times I think we’re going in a little too far 
sometimes. (RCFD firefighter) 
 
This quote from the firefighter provides an example of two explicit issues that were 
negative by-products of the turnout gear. The first was that firefighters could now get 
into situations that they were only physically able to withstand due to this gear. 
Therefore, when in these situations the firefighter was completely depen nt upon 
this gear for survival. To put it bluntly as did a RCFD deputy chief I interviewed, if 
the gear failed, “you’re dead.” It created a false sense of security among the 
firefighters. In addition, a few of the older firefighters serving in officer positions also 
stated that this was particularly problematic with new recruits. These younger, 
inexperienced firefighters did not yet have the knowledge to determine of what 
particular environment may be too dangerous to be in fighting fire, and ability to 
mentally weigh this with the limitations of the gear and one’s own human body. 
 In addition to the danger these environmental factors posed to the firefighters, 
certain instances where the room had a high level of heat, there was also the potential 
of this gear itself to turn from protective to harmful. This new style gear had w t 
was referred to as “moisture barriers” which prevented liquid from penetrating the 
turnout gear itself. However, to account for perspiration, these barriers also needed 
the ability to breathe and allow for moisture from the firefighter to escape this 
encapsulation. This new technology was not completely fine tuned and could 




properly allow for the moisture to escape. This was again related to situations where a 
firefighter enters an extremely heated environment: 
Firefighter: And the real aggressive firefighters will just go charging in and most of 
the burns come from steam ‘cause they get inside and you’re working and you, you 
have 100 pounds of equipment on and you got adrenaline going and the heat does 
permeate through their equipment to the point where naturally you do get warm. And 
it’s very, very easy to start perspiring. And you’re perspiring inside your turnout gear 
and you get too far into a burning building, the heat will go through the equipment 
and turn that perspiration into steam, and you end up being burned! 
 
Interviewer:  Kind of like an oven? 
 
Firefighter: Yeah. So in that instance the equipment is actually working against you. 
Now the Nomex equipment, it’s supposed to release the water vapor inside but it 
doesn’t do it fast enough in certain conditions. So I feel like now I (sic); I feel lik  
I’ve seen probably more guys get burned on the fire ground because of their turnout 
gear than I did way back when. When we didn’t have gear on, oddly enough. (RCFD 
firefighter) 
 
 Another concern to the firefighters about the new PPE that fully encapsulated 
their bodies was that it actually diminished their sensory skills. Prior to the full 
encapsulation, the amount of heat felt on one’s exposed skin was used as a crude 
method to determine how heated the environment was in which they were fighting 
fire. They claimed that your body would not allow you to go into certain areas that 
had extreme levels of heat. Your body would start to have a burning feeling and 
would reach a point where the firefighter knew s/he would be burned if they 
proceeded any further. In addition to exposed skin not allowing you into 
environments that were too volatile, feeling heat was also important to find fire itself 
(e.g., see the discussion above regarding using attack hoses and moving towards the 
heat). Fire was not always burning in the open for all to see. In some instances it may 
hide within the interior of walls, closets, or even closed rooms. Thus, full 




firefighter stated that he actually purposely did not wear his gear properly so that the 
ability to feel for fire was not removed from him: 
“It’s, it’s also difficult. You could have a little closet fire on the second floor and the 
second floor’s completely charged. There’s a lot of heat. Now I do something that 
will get me a rip in the ass….I take my gloves off. And I don’t raise my hand up, 
because that’s very foolish. You could loose your finger. But I take my glove off and 
I’ll start to peel it back to see how hot it really is. And if it isn’t that hot, now I’m 
doing this. And that’s the only way I can find that small closet fire that’s not abig
deal. Even though it may look like it, it’s not a big deal. So now I know there’s not a 
lot, there’s not that much heat.” 
 
While the gloves were one example of the removal of this sensory ability used 
by firefighters, it was not the traditional one cited by the firefighters. The one which 
many firefighters had found issue with was the hoods now required to be worn as part 
of their turnout gear. It was quickly apparent during the course of my interviews that 
firefighters were weary of these hoods. In fact, one interviewee even suggested to me 
that a research study on the affects of the hood in firefighting could be a “thesisall by 
itself.” This stems from that fact that traditionally firefighters used their ears to tell 
when an environment was too heated and they had to leave. Basically, if they felt 
their ears burning, it was time to get out. However, these new hoods again limited 
their sensory abilities and prevented them from using their ears as heat indic tors: 
“The turnout gear has improved our protection, but it also gives you a false sense of 
security because you don’t feel what you used to. And the thing that I’ve done and 
take a beating over is I won’t wear my hood the whole way. I’ll keep an ear open. 
And the reason being is because I don’t feel the heat in my gear…I know it’s an old 
indicator; it’s probably not the best thing.” (WCFD firefighter) 
 
Again, this example shows how the newer gear can prevent from sensing the heat. It 
is important to note that these two proceeding quotes which show a firefighter 
resorting to these older methods of feeling heat did not appear throughout the course 




recommended. However, what they did emphasize was an extremely interestig 
finding. Not in one single interview was I provided an alternative way to “feel” now 
that the newer PPE was fully encapsulating. 
 Drawing back to the original conceptualization of this study, skill was defined 
along the lines of tasks required in one’s position. Therefore, using the PPE was not 
precisely a skill by this definition. However, due to the constant discussion of the PPE 
and SCBA (see below), it was clear that this was an important supplemental 
consideration that went along with the tasks being performed by firefighters to 
suppress the fire. In addition, this PPE was a new technology that was introduced just 
prior to the New Economy, and had been continuously modified throughout the 
following years. Furthermore, this technology did in fact change certain aspects of 
how other tasks were completed by firefighters, even if there was no ready solution 
for gaining certain aspects of one’s sensory abilities. In sum, while arguably not a 
skill in itself, this particular technology did in fact play a role in skills that were 
completed by firefighters while in the fire related emergency job-context. 
The SCBA and PASS 
Similar to the PPE, it is arguable that using the self-contained breathing 
apparatus (SCBA) itself is not a skill per se, but rather contributes to the skills u ed 
when fighting fire in the toxic environment the fire itself creates. The SCBA was an 
air bottle which was attached to a mask the firefighter wore. This system supplied 
oxygen to the firefighter so that s/he may breathe fresh air in the toxic environment 
created by the fumes caused by the fire. In addition, the SCBA also created a barrier 




changes that occurred to the SCBA over approximately the past 20 years. First, the 
materials had changed that were used to construct the bottles themselves. The 
material went from metallic to composite material. These new materials allowed for 
air to be compressed tighter, subsequently making the bottle smaller and lighter. This 
made it easier for the firefighter to physically wear and carry the bottle while using 
the attack hose, searching for victims, or any other task in which they needed to wear
the SCBA. The second and perhaps most interesting shift was the SCBA moving 
from an “on demand” to a “positive pressure” system. These “on demand” systems 
would only release air from the bottle when a firefighter inhaled. However, when the 
seal around a firefighter’s skin and the mask of the SCBA was broken, contaminated, 
toxic gases could enter through this broken seal into the mask and be inhaled by the 
firefighter. Now with positive pressure masks, the air is released in a slow, constant 
stream. In the case of a broken seal between the firefighter’s skin and the mask of the 
SCBA, the positive pressure helps to prevent any of the contaminated atmospheres 
from entering into the mask and being inhaled by the firefighter. 
 A final change to the SCBA was that now a device called the personal alert 
safety system (PASS) device was now integrated into the SCBA. The PASS device 
was basically a motion sensor that would emit a loud sound if it remained motionless 
after a certain short period of time. The PASS device would work automatically once 
turned on; however, prior to the SCBA/PASS integration, the firefighter had to 
remember to turn this device on. Firefighters obviously have a number of tasks 
needed to be completed to fight fire, and have to complete these various tasks at an 




This integration allowed the PASS device to be powered on whenever the 
firefighter’s SCBA was in use, and in essence removed the need for the firefighters to 
manually turn on the PASS device. 
Once the Fire is “Knocked Down” 
After the firefighters from the engine and truck companies have successfully 
extinguished the obvious fire hazards, there still remain tasks that need to be 
completed in this job-context. At this point, the engine and fire companies come 
together to perform two final tasks: overhaul and salvage. In addition to these tasks, 
in some instances there is also a fire investigation that needs to occur. Investigation 
particularly involves firefighters trained in fire investigation, which only comprise of 
a handful of firefighters. Therefore, while the task of fire investigation was not 
commonplace among the average firefighter, there was evidence this task had 
drastically changed, and there were some instances in which the firefighters not 
trained as investigators would assist the fire investigator with his task. Finally, after 
the firefighters have completed the tasks of overhaul/salvage and assisted the fire 
investigator with whatever is needed, they complete one final task, checking the r 
equipment and apparatus, prior to leaving the fire related emergency job-context. 
Overhaul 
Once the obvious fire was extinguished, or “knocked down,” the firefighters 
then began to perform a task what is known as overhaul: 
“You obviously seek and make sure every ember’s gone. You rip walls apart if 
there’s a fire in a room to make sure there’s nothing hidden so you don’t come back 
here hours later. Once that’s done, and all the overhaul’s over, wetting everything 





As shown here, in its basic form overhaul is simply ensuring not only that the hidden 
fire has been removed, but that there is no manner in which the environment may 
allow for the fire to reignite. As another WCFD firefighter stated, overhaul is a 
physical and “manpower-intensive” task. Traditionally it has involved taking basic
hand tools like axes and pike poles (a long pole with a hook on the end) and tearing 
through walls and ceilings. This ensures that no hidden fires or even embers remain in 
the wall. This also allows for the walls to be properly cooled with water to remove 
any dangerous levels of heat, one of the conditions needed for a fire to exist. 
Overhaul also involves removing any of the damaged material: 
“Uh, that’s where we remove all of the burnt furniture and so on. Remove that from 
the house. If it’s an occupied house we actually, we clean it up a little bit more.” 
(RCFD firefighter) 
 
Thus, the physical components of this task in themselves do not have a high level of 
complexity. However, the task of identifying where hidden fire or even embers may 
be located does require a certain level of knowledge. Therefore, the integration of this 
knowledge of how to find hidden fire with the physical strength needed to perform 
overhaul does create a substantial dimension of complexity needed to complete this 
task. Furthermore, as noted by a RCFD firefighter one must be able to maintain a 
“certain credibility of the scene” so that any fire investigation needed may be able to 
determine the origin and cause of the fire (see below). 
 While fighting a fire, each firefighter understands going into the fire what 
their specific task involves, and in most instances these tasks require a higher level of 
autonomy/control-related and substantive complexity aspects to be successfully 




related skill is more limited for these firefighters. The performance of overhaul 
requires a large amount of persons contributing to be successfully completed. 
Therefore, the person left overseeing the scene, whether it is the battalion chief, 
captain, or lieutenant, is charged with orchestrating the firefighters throug  this task. 
This may not include a huge oversight on part of the firefighter, but rather simply 
assigning certain areas or overhaul components to certain firefighter personn l. This 
does create a lower level of autonomy/control-related skill required by the firefighters 
when performing overhaul on a broader level. However, for those firefighters charged 
with finding hidden fire, there remains a certain level of discretion needed to 
determine whether a particular area of the wall or ceiling should be opened up an
searched for hidden fire or embers. 
 Technology has also played a role in the performance of overhaul, particularly 
in the form of the TIC. Firefighters can now use the TIC to help locate hidden fires 
within walls or ceilings as the TIC can pinpoint the temperatures of particul  areas 
such as walls and ceilings without the need for them to be physically torn down with 
an axe or pike pole: 
Firefighter: But those [TICs]  come in handy, you know, for finding fires hidden in 
walls and stuff where before we’d have to go in there and tear your house apart and 
physically put holes in walls and stuff where now we’re able to use that camera nd 
pinpoint. And an example would be if you had electrical wiring in the wall that was 
faulty. You know, we’d have to, you know, tear. Like I said, tear your wall apart to 
find it. Well now we can just run that camera along the wall, see where it’s at and 
only, you know, maybe damage a small area.  
 
Interviewer: Okay, so minimizing damage. 
 
Firefighter: So I think that’s a major addition to what we; additional tool to what we 





Thus, the TIC does not necessarily affect the firefighter’s broader autonomy/control-
related aspects of completing the task of overhaul as the officer overseeing the scene 
is still orchestrating the overhaul process; however, it does affect the imm diate 
decisions they need to make regarding whether or not to tear down a wall to find a 
hidden fire. It also affects the complexity involved with this task in two ways. First, 
using the TIC during overhaul does remove some of the routinized components of the 
skill needed to find hidden fire (as would be expected by Autor, Levy, and Murnane’s 
[2002, 2003a, 2003b] routinization hypothesis). Firefighters can now rely on the TIC 
to locate these areas, and in turn know that the wall or ceiling at this area needs to b  
ripped open and the hidden fire or remaining embers need to be extinguished. Note 
that although this does minimize the number of times the firefighters have to exert th  
physical component of this task; it does not alter how the performance of this 
overhaul is performed in any manner. The second manner in which the TIC alters the 
complexity dimension involved in performing overhaul is that the use of the TIC 
itself requires training. Therefore, simply understanding how to use the TIC requires a 
certain level of complexity in itself. 
 On a final note regarding using the TIC during overhaul: the differences 
between departments remained. However, the differences in using the TIC for 
overhaul were less pronounced than the differences when using the TIC during search 
and rescue. As mentioned earlier, the RCFD’s TICs were somewhat older versions 
than the WCFD. The TIC used in River City was larger, bulkier, and was not really 
used for search and rescue. The RCFD firefighters did get into the habit of using it for 




Interviewer: Do you guys have thermal imagers? 
 
Firefighter: We do but it’s a very, very old manner quite a piece of equipment. I 
think we got it from others. The City has always been lacking in top-of-the-line stuff. 
Um, we use that thermal imaging camera mostly for finding hidden fire in the walls 
after it’s knocked down. It’s kind of bulky and clumsy…It would be a good idea to 
take it but you got a mask on, you got a hook or an axe. (RCFD firefighter; 
firefighter’s emphasis italicized) 
 
Although the TIC has been used while performing overhaul, it was not used 
all the time, with the dominate reason again being cited as it simply was an outd ted 
version of the TIC which was still awkward and difficult to use. Regardless, it till
did have an impact on the firefighters who were overhauling. On the other hand, the 
WCFD did not cite this issue: 
Firefighter: Things like heat guns, thermal imaging cameras: non-existent when I got 
into the fire service. The thermal imaging camera, the main focus is to be able to take 




Firefighter: But more often than not we use it to detect hidden fire, fire behind a 




Firefighter: Uh, we can use that and a heat gun. I’m a big fan of the small, handheld 
heat guns which detect temperature. It gives us a specific Fahrenheit or Clsius. 
(WCFD firefighter) 
 
The WCFD not only had the TIC, but also a corresponding type of technology called 
a heat gun which could actually pinpoint and provide a specific temperature of a wall 
or ceiling, or in the case of this WCFD, a light ballast. This heat gun was similar to 
the TIC in that it affected the skills of these WCFD firefighters in a similar anner as 
the older TICs in the RCFD. However, the heat gun added a new level of complexity 




it further removed the complexity and autonomy/control-related elements involved in 
locating hidden fire and determining if a particular wall or ceiling areashould be torn 
down. 
Salvage 
 Salvage was the other main task that was required of the firefighters after the 
fire had been knocked down and tended to occur alongside the overhaul process. This 
task was simplistic in regards to both substantive complexity and autonomy/control-
related dimensions, and also had not been affected in the past 20 years by any new 
tools or technologies. Basically, the task of salvaging consisted of trying to prevent 
damage from occurring to any of the property in the structure, whether it is furniture, 
carpet, or even certain areas of the structure itself. If this was a private esidence, 
salvage also included making the home as livable as possible to the extent that 
hopefully individuals could move back into the residence (e.g., taping plastic over 
broken windows). Thus, in regards to complexity, salvage required basic manual 
tasks that were not overly complex. As for the autonomy/control-related dimension, it 
was similar to overhaul in a broader sense where the commanding officer may be 
instructing firefighters to perform specific salvage procedures in a particul  area of 
the structure; however, it differed from overhaul in that once a firefighter was 
assigned these particular procedures there was not a large number of discretion and 
decision-making needing to occur.  
 It is important to note here that the salvage process itself was not only 
performed post-extinguishment of the fire. Rather, it ideally should be occurring 




“And it all depends on, you know, if this house is fully involved, or it’s going to be 
destroyed anyway, but if we can make a difference and not do more damage that they 
could possibly fix what’s wrong and move back into their house, you know. So we 
might even be considering putting salvage covers down, protecting the porches, 
protecting the carpeting, you know, a whole bunch of different things.” (WCFD 
firefighter) 
 
When a fire may be contained to one section of a building or a structure, there is the 
ability to place down salvage covers or tarps in an attempt to prevent property 
damage from occurring. While this damage could be cause by the fire, the procedures 
used to extinguish a fire also created a need to perform salvage: 
“If we have a fire, let’s say on the second floor, and water is running down through 
we’ll put covers, try to protect anything that has not been damaged yet. So that’s a 
continual process.” (WCFD firefighter) 
 
Unfortunately, this ability to salvage prior to an incident was dependent upon the 
number of firefighters available. Obviously, the first and second priorities were to 
rescue any trapped individuals and extinguish the fire, and therefore during instances 
when manpower was short (this was particularly noted in the WCFD) salvage may 
not be able to occur simultaneously with these two high-priority tasks. Furthermore, 
as discussed in a quote above, if the structure was completely engulfed in flames the 
task of salvage was quite minimal. This was simply because of the destruction created 
by the fire may have not left any property that could physically be saved, 
subsequently minimizing the salvage that needed to be performed. 
Fire investigation 
Fire investigation was a task that in most cases the average firefighter had 
only minimal involvement. This task was mainly left in the hands of a firefighter who 




the fire through a series of investigative techniques. The reason I was able to gain his 
insight was that I was fortunate enough to interview an experienced fire investigator 
at River City regarding the task of investigation.24 This provided insight into how 
investigation was completed.  
Although specific to a select number of firefighters, it was still present in the 
fire related emergency job-context. Please note that in regards to the WCFD, I was 
informed that this task was completed by the Fire Marshal’s Office. While I did 
interview one firefighter from this office (the Fire Prevention Officer), the focus of 
the interview was primarily on public education and not fire investigation (although 
he did mention that he was involved to some extent in the fire investigation, the 
information was not enough to provide strong evidence for the WCFD). 
 In the RCFD, a fire investigation (if conducted) follows immediately after a 
fire is extinguished, sometimes even prior to the extinguishment (if the fire is w ll 
under control/contained). Important to note is that investigation proceeds the overhaul 
and salvage of the scene. According to the RCFD fire investigator interview d, the 
reasoning for this is that an investigator needs the scene to be left “as is” without any 
additional disturbance other than the disturbance that is created while actually 
extinguishing a fire. Thus, overhaul can lead to “spoliation of evidence” according to 
the investigator I interviewed, which in turn can make it not only difficult to make a 
final judgment on the origin/cause of a fire, but in certain instances can be used 
                                                
24 I was actually able to interview two fire investigators; however, one only recently began the position 
as a fire investigator shortly prior to the interviw. As this new fire investigator spent the majority of 
his career on the special rescue unit (discussed in Chapter 6), and did not have extensive experience in 
his new position, his interview mainly focused upon the task of special rescue. Therefore, it was only
this one fire investigator who provided me in-depth information regarding the task of fire investigation. 
This situation was rather beneficial, as it provided more insight into both of these tasks which may 




against the state of Maryland in court if prosecuting an arsonist. According to the 
investigator, the amount of time spent investigating the scene averages about one and 
a half to two hours, followed by two to four hours of paperwork. Fire investigation 
cases can go on “weeks at a time,” and in the instance of an intentional fire (i.e., 
arson) from the beginning of the case to the end (i.e., fire investigation to court 
sentencing) cases may be open on average about six months. Throughout the years, 
fire investigators in River City were always responding to any fires that were 
suspected of being intentionally set (according to the investigator, River City had a 
higher number of these than other bordering jurisdictions/counties) and accidental 
fires that were extremely large. However, within the past two decades, invetigators 
also started responding to fires where any civilian suffered burns, either fatal or non-
fatal. 
 An interesting discovery during this interview was the shift in fire 
investigation from something which the investigator referred to as “junk science” to a 
more scientific method-based approach to fire investigation. In these instance , the 
fire investigators were actually formulating and testing hypotheses: 
“So we pretty much what our job is to do then is (sic) we basically have to rule 
everything else out. Say if um, say if we find an electrical outlet there. And that’s; 
we’re developing our hypothesis saying ‘Okay, we got electrical, we got electrical 
cords.’ We got to make sure the extension cord was plugged in. We got to make sure 
the house actually had electric to it, ‘cause we can’t call something electrical if 
there’s no electric to the house. So we have to determine that it does have electric if 
it’s an electrical, for our hypothesis we’re thinking. So then we have to rule out 
everything else. We have to rule out the possibility of cigarettes. You know, a million 
candles, a million other things. So once we develop our hypotheses, we rule 
everything else out and we have to say the only thing we have there, we can 





In addition to this more rigorous and methodological approach, there has also been an 
increase in the amount of knowledge required to be held by these investigators. 
Knowledge has increased in regards to burn and ignition temperatures (i.e., what 
temperature aluminum is able to ignite), burn patterns (i.e., the pattern of an inverted 
letter “V”  and what this implies), and even signs of criminal activity (i.e., gang 
symbols). Thus, overall the investigations appear to have gotten more complex as 
additional knowledge is now needed by the fire investigators in the RCFD. While no 
real broad conclusions can be drawn from a single interview, it should be noted that 
the investigator did mention that this knowledge and method of approach to fire 
investigation followed a publication of standards produced by the NFPA, which is 
sort of the investigators’ “bible of procedures” (to quote the RCFD fire investigator). 
 As part of this shift towards a more scientific and methodological approach, 
the RCFD fire investigator also noted that the emphasis of investigation moved from 
“cause and origin” to “origin and cause.” Investigators now start by first examining 
the entire structure to get a feel for the environment. For example, were there candles 
throughout the building? Did anyone smoke inside the building? Then, the 
investigators start from the least burnt area of the building and work their way to the 
most burnt in an attempt to narrow down where the fire may have originated. Once 
the location of the fire’s origin has been determined through this process, the 
investigator can then search for what may have caused the fire, begin formulating 
his/her hypothesis, and then subsequently rule out other causes to provide support for 
this suspected cause. As noted by the investigator, “you want to know where it sta ted




investigator had an extremely high level of autonomy needed to emphasize the utmost 
discretion during this situation. Thus, normally all other fire department members 
(both firefighters and even the commanding officer of the incident) were not able to 
be within the structure during the investigation. Again, this returns to the point that 
there is a need to prevent from spoiling the evidence which may be used to convict a 
felon in the instance a fire was intentionally set. Although this may be the case, there 
were also instances where the investigator may have requested assistance from a 
firefighter, and in this case the firefighter would fulfill the request. For example, the 
investigator may have requested that a firefighter station him/herself at the front and 
rear entrance of a building and not allow anyone to enter until after the investigation 
of the scene had concluded, or if otherwise allowed by the investigator. While the 
knowledge behind this method had increased, and the autonomy/control-related skills 
used by the firefighter was at a rather high level, the investigator stated th t the task 
of fire investigation had not really been changed by any new technologies. In fact, the 
only technology that had come into play was different types of gas meters which ere 
able to detect different gases and fumes in the case a liquid was expected to play a 
role in the fire and needed to be tested. 
 One final (and interesting) point the investigator made was that in cases where 
the fire was intentionally set, the fire investigators of River City had to beable to 
collaborate with various other state and city government agencies throughout the full
investigation process. For example, the River City Police Department (RCPD)25 
would work to a certain extent with the RCFD investigator during the course of the 
fire investigation. The RCPD also had some resources that the RCFD did not have 
                                                




(such as a laboratory to test evidence for possible indications of the cause of the fire;
e.g., carpet samples). In the case of arson, the RCPD was also the agency responsible 
for obtaining a warrant to arrest the suspect. Following this, both the RCFD and 
RCPD would also work together during a court case with the State’s Attorney’s 
Office26 who was the government agency that would prosecute the suspected 
arsonist(s). This may have included not only providing the proper evidence to the 
State Attorney’s Office, but also testifying during a court case as an expert witness. 
Therefore, not only were the actual skills of fire investigation needed by the RCFD 
fire investigator, but both a healthy knowledge of the criminal and legal systems and 
working professional relationships with various state and city government agencies 
were needed to be developed over time. 
Equipment and apparatus check 
The final task completed during the course of a fire in the fire related 
emergency job-context is to check one’s equipment and apparatus. During the course 
of a fire, the apparatus and the equipment it contains is inevitably thoroughly (or 
perhaps completely) stripped down of many of the tools and components it contains 
in order to fight the fire. Before the firefighters leave the scene and return to the fire 
station, they must check to ensure all equipment has been returned to the apparatus, 
and is in working order (which may involve cleaning off any of the equipment). This 
prevents the firefighters from arriving at their next emergency situation and realizing 
there is equipment missing that is vital to handling the emergency. Equipment and 
apparatus checking after a fire is similar to those conducted while in the fire station 
                                                




job-context, and although not as extensive, they will not be discussed here to prevent 
redundancy. Please refer to Chapter 7 for details. 
Summary 
Among the firefighters I interviewed, successfully completing the tasks 
required in the fire related emergency job-context was viewed as the bread and butter 
of a fire department. Not surprisingly, it was the skills in this particular context that 
the firefighters themselves truly prided themselves upon and identified with in a 
manner that gave them their identity as “firefighter.” The skills used in this particular 
job-context were uniquely situated in that not only did they require a certain level of 
substantive complexity and autonomy/control-related aspects, but they also required a 
certain level of physical strength to be able physically to perform these skill . 
Furthermore, a certain level of urgency was also required for many of these skills as 
every minute equated to a further loss of property, or even human life. Thus, even 
with evidence of skill change occurring, and new technologies being introduced, there 
was a certain fundamental level of skill that in its very nature was at a rather high 
level. While certain specific skills may have required a lower level of skill across 
both skill dimensions (i.e., salvage), the majority of tasks completed in a fire relat d 
emergency context did require high level skills. Even with the relative level of skill 
shifting over the past 20 years, it did so in a manner such that the absolute levels 
remained at levels where firefighters had to be able to rapidly integrate both mental 
and physical actions to successfully combat the fire, and have a heightened level of 
when to execute these specific actions. Furthermore, as a number of the skills did 




limited to the level of skill that they could substitute (per the ALM routinization 
hypothesis). Therefore, there would always be a specific fundamental portion of he 
skills required for firefighters to complete the tasks of their occupations that could not 
have been impacted by technology. 
 With numerous tasks needing to be performed through the course of a fire 
related emergency, and an increasing number of new technologies being introduced, 
it was not surprising that the skills had changed. As for preparing for a fire relat d 
emergency, there was evidence that less substantive complexity was involved, mainly 
due to the introduction of new technologies. In particular, the introduction of newer 
alerting systems (which in the case of the RCFD included printers) and automatic 
transmissions in the fire engines/trucks did remove a certain level of complexity to 
the skills needed in preparing for a fire. In addition, the electronic maps produced by 
the printers in the RCFD also appeared to remove some of autonomy/control-related 
skill dimension involved in navigating to the scene of a fire related emergency. 
 At the scene of a fire, both engine and truck companies completed a series of 
tasks that paralleled one another and required a higher level of absolute substantive 
complexity and autonomy/control-related skill than many of the other tasks in this
particular job-context. While they shared these similarities, interesting enough they 
did not parallel one another when it came to their changing nature over the past 20 
years. In regards to duties assigned to the engine companies, one of the most evident 
changes in both skill dimensions was with the introduction of computerized pumps. 
These pumps decreased both the complexity and discretionary aspects of this skill (to 




Autor and colleagues hypothesis (2002) where a routinized task was able to be 
supplemented by a computerized device. It is also indicative of the diminishing effect 
that Braverman (198/1974) believed would occur with the widespread introduction of 
technologies. However, the engine pumper remained the only technology that 
followed this pattern. The process of attacking and suppressing a fire remained rather 
unchanged in the RCFD; however, with the introduction of the TIC in the WCFD, 
this did appear to increase the skill required to attack the fire. On the other hand, 
while the new engine pumpers themselves clearly had a decreasing effect on these 
particular skills used by firefighters, the skills of the truck companies (i.e., forced 
entry, search and rescue, using ladders, and ventilation) appeared to remain at a level 
consistent with the skill needed prior to the New Economy. Furthermore, there was 
evidence that when these skills did change (which was at the hand of technology), it 
appeared to occur due to the need for the new skills required to use the technology 
itself. For example, forced entry now required firefighters to possess the knowledge 
of how to use hydraulic rescue tools, and (in the case of the WCFD), the Knox Box. 
Newer style building construction created potentially more dangerous situations for 
firefighters performing ventilation and subsequently increased the autonomy/control-
related skill involved when completing this task. Finally, the use of the aerial ladder 
did remove some complexity involved in setting up the mechanism for use; however, 
newer computerized sensors also created the need to understand how these sensors 
work in regards to the outriggers on the apparatus, and how to override them (if 




PPE and SCBA/PASS device was not particularly a skill per se, it also had been 
altered by technology. 
 Finally, after a fire had been knocked down, there were three skills that were 
discussed in which the firefighters were directly responsible: overhaul, salvage, and 
equipment/apparatus checks (fire investigation was a task not routinely performed by 
the average firefighter).Overall, the complexity and autonomy/control-related skill 
dimensions remained relatively similar to those 20 years ago, and at lower absolute 
level than many of the other tasks required at the scene of a fire. However, the biggest 
change occurred with the introduction of the TICs. With this new technology, 
firefighters now needed to be trained on how to use this new technology to find 
hidden fire, which increased the amount of complexity involved in completing this 
task. However, this simultaneously removed some of the discretion required by the 
firefighter when performing this task. Although overhaul had changed, and new skills 
were required to use the TIC, the skills required to complete salvage and 
equipment/apparatus checks (see Chapter 7) remained somewhat similar to those in 
the past. 
 Examining the fire related emergency job-context, there is an extremely high 
level of skill required to successfully complete the tasks needed to extinguish a fire. 
This high level of skill is evident not only while at the scene of a fire, but even during 
the tasks required while preparing for a fire and (although at an arguably lower level 
than other tasks in this particular job-context) after a fire has been knocked down. 
There is also evidence this level of skill has changed in the New Economy, and in 




emergency job-context. The effects of technology have been two sided, both 
removing certain aspects of skill, but yet at the same time creating new aspects. First, 
these new technologies have caused the removal of certain aspects of the skills used 
by firefighters to fight fire. This removal was evidenced through applying the 
conceptual model of my study to systematically analyze the data resulting from my 
interviews. In these instances the removal of these skills was rather clear and even 
acknowledged by the firefighters themselves. As mentioned above, a prime exampl 
of this was the introduction of new computerized pumps in the fire engines 
themselves. However, this diminishing of skill was not commonplace across the 
entire fire related emergency job-context. Many new technologies did increase certain 
levels of the skill dimension for the firefighters by actually requiring increased levels 
of complexity and/or autonomy to use these new technologies themselves. For 
example, the introduction of TICs and hydraulic rescue tools now required that the 
firefighters understand how to use these technologies that had only limited (if any) 
use in the fire departments prior to the past 20 years. Because the real changes in skill 
can be contributed to these new technologies, many of the aspects of the skills 
required by firefighters to fight fire could not be shifted by these technologies. Th re 
was a certain level of non-routinization present in the tasks completed by firefighters 
in this job-context, and according to the theoretical model, as would be expected 
these new technologies could not replace these particular aspects. Therefore, while 
technology had a clear impact on the firefighters’ skills in the fire related emergency 




constant. Thus, even with new technology, it was (to re-quote a firefighter) still 




Chapter 6: “They Call for Everything” – Non-fire Re lated 
Emergencies 
 
The skills and knowledge needed in addressing fire related emergencies 
consisted of numerous tasks occurring simultaneously with a variety of firefighters 
completing these various individual tasks according to what precise position they 
were serving during that particular shift, and the environmental factors involved in 
the structure where the fire was occurring. It was obvious that these procedures 
required an absolute high level of complexity and autonomy/control-related aspects. 
However, in regards to the volume of these types of emergency calls, they were not 
the most dominant. Throughout the course of my interviews I quickly realized that the 
majority of calls to which the firefighters responded did not actually involve fire. In 
fact, the proportion of fire versus non-fire related emergency calls had shifted over 
the course of the past 20 years where the number of non-fire related emergencies is 
much higher than the fire related emergencies. Although the premier mission of the 
Waterville City Fire Department (WCFD) and River City Fire Department (RCFD) 
involved rescuing victims safely from fire and extinguishing the fire, th re were many 
other emergencies that firefighters faced at all times during their shift. 
 It should be noted here that the term “non-fire related emergency” is used to 
distinguish these types of call responses from an actual call involving a structure fire. 
In the eyes of the firefighters, not all of the tasks that need to be completed that I refer 
to here are actual emergencies, but simply calls that needed to be responded to in 




the same high speed and urgency that a fully involved house fire required, they still 
needed to be responded to by the firefighters in a timely fashion. For example, 
dealing with flooding conditions may have not always been a real “emergency.” 
However, other calls such as multiple vehicle automobile accidents were in fact 
treated as such. Regardless of whether or not these particular calls were consid red a 
real “emergency” by the firefighters, in this present research these call  will be 
referred to as non-fire related emergencies, simply to distinguish them from other 
non-emergencies (e.g., public education programs at schools). Of the non-fire related 
emergency calls, there were a number of them that will be discussed here, including 
automobile accidents, first aid and medical emergencies, conducting CPR and using 
automatic external defibrillators (AEDs), responding to false fire alarms, 
mechanical/maintenance tasks, and finally specialty rescues.  
Receiving an Emergency Call/Navigating and Driving to the Scene 
Obviously, the reception and processing of a call and navigating/driving to the 
scene of an emergency were involved in any of the following tasks in the non-fire 
related emergency job-context. Both the reception of a call and navigating/driving to 
the scene involved very similar procedures as were needed when the call was for a 
fire related emergency. However, one brief difference should be noted. As the 
personal protective equipment (PPE) were specific to handling fire related 
emergencies, they did not always have to be donned by the firefighters when 




were not needed.27 Therefore, based on the definition of skill used in this research, 
these preparation-oriented tasks preceding any emergency may have a lower level of 
substantive complexity involved when responding to non-fire related emergencies 
than compared to fire related emergencies. Regardless, as the tasks of receiving an 
emergency call and navigating/driving to the scene were discussed in detail in the 
previous chapter (Chapter 5), as to not be redundant they will not be repeated in this 
current chapter. 
Automobile Accidents 
  The task of dealing with automobile accidents was a task needed to be 
completed by firefighters on a somewhat regular basis. Not only did these type of
non-fire emergencies involve the firefighters needing to deal with the actual 
automobile itself, but at least one individual (i.e., the vehicle’s driver), if not more, 
was inherently involved in the accident. Thus, not only did this task require skills 
involved with successfully creating a safe scene and successfully removing the victim 
from the crashed automobile, but it may often times also involve first aid/medical 
care that needed to be administered (described below in the following sub-section). 
 The first portion of the task of addressing an automobile accident did not 
involve the vehicle, or any potential victims, but rather ensuring the scene of the 
accident was safe so that the firefighters could begin to handle the aforementioned 
components. This portion of the task could involve a few items. First was to ensure 
                                                
27 It should be noted that when responding to false alarms – listed here as a task in the non-fire related 
emergency job-context – there may be still be a need to don the PPE as this task may initially be 




that the physical location of the incident was secure. This began with positioning the 
fire apparatus to block off traffic: 
“You know, they teach drivers to position the fire engine to block traffic, to protect us 
from traffic. They [fire engines] can take a hit, not me. That big wagon can take a car 
or two, I can’t.” (RCFD firefighter; author’s notation in brackets) 
 
Second, while not necessarily the norm, there were instances in which the vehicle
may have caught fire, and thus the flames had to be extinguished.28 While fire itself 
may have not needed to be addressed in all automobile accidents, the possibility of 
fire did need to be considered. Here, one concern was that any fluids that had leaked 
or spilled from the vehicle could potentially ignite and quickly create a fire putting 
either any victim(s) or firefighters in danger. Another concern was that the 
automobile’s battery itself could also send electrical currents through the vehicle and 
shock any individuals in the scene, again whether it was the victim(s) or firefighters. 
In order to prevent this, firefighters often discussed needing to disconnect the 
vehicle’s battery so that electricity was not actively running through the ve icle. This 
would help diminish both of these potential hazards. However, while this task has 
remained constant over the course of the New Economy, technology itself has created
a more complex situation than in the past, and subsequently a need for more 
knowledge than may have once been possessed by firefighters. Interestingly, th s shift 
was not initially caused by any technology introduced by the WCFD or RCFD 
                                                
28 Although extinguishing fire was sometimes involved with an automobile accident, I have still 
considered it here as a component of this particular task of addressing automobile accidents in the non-
fire related emergency job-context. This was for two specific reasons. First, the processes and steps 
involved in fighting a fire to a residence or business structure were unique and different than dealing 
with a car fire. This occurs not only through how the fire itself is suppressed, but (in the instances of 
automobile accidents) the primary task involves rescuing any potential victims and removing all 
hazards from the scene. Second, throughout my interv ews, it was clear that the firefighters viewed 




themselves, but rather due to the technological changes in newer model cars, 
particularly hybrid vehicles: 
“Well, the way cars are built now. We got to have better ways to deal with them. 
Like, you got these hybrid cars now. A lot of people don’t know it but they get into an 
accident it’s the same amount of voltage as if you touch the [hybrid] car as sticking 
your finger in a light socket. They tell you when you buy ‘em [hybrid vehicles] that 
you don’t touch the orange wires. That’s because there is so much voltage in theret’s 
enough to kill you. So, we can’t go up and just touch the car to see if someone’s 
okay.” (WCFD firefighter; author’s notation in brackets) 
 
As the WCFD firefighter discussed here, hybrid vehicles now have a much greater 
amount of electrical current present to allow the hybrid battery to run. In turn, 
instances where these vehicles are involved in accidents creates a much more 
dangerous (and deadly) environment for all the individuals involved. The firefighters 
now need to be familiar with this newer type of vehicle in order to safely handle the 
situation and prevent injury or death of themselves or the victims. As an example of 
the increasing danger of the situation, a firefighter from the RCFD noted that being 
shocked by a regular car’s battery would “tickle,” where a hybrid vehicle’s shock is 
deadly. Thus, these newer types of vehicles have clearly increased the knowledge and 
complexity needed to secure the scene of an automobile accident. This gain in skill 
was particularly important as not possessing this knowledge could in turn be a fatal 
mistake. 
 Once any immediate dangers have been established, the next portions of 
properly handling automobile accidents are to stabilize the vehicle and any victims. 
As mentioned previously, there has been a major concern over the safety of the 
firefighters and others involved in the incident. This concern is seen here with the 




are required to use car cribbing in certain situations in an effort to stabilize the 
wrecked vehicle prior to extracting any victims. This car cribbing equipment 
consisted of various types of wedges and other materials that could be inserted around 
the car to prevent it from rolling and potentially injuring a firefighter or (fu ther) 
injuring any of the victim(s). This was a skill that has long been in place; however, 
we again see a change here occurring by the invasion of technology. The materials 
used to stabilize vehicles has now become lighter and easier for firefighters to use. It 
does not necessarily change the amount of skill involved in the integration of 
manipulative and mental components, but rather it simply lessens the amount of 
physical force required to insert and adjust the cribbing to a position where the 
vehicle would be stabilized. Thus, in this instance while the technology used had 
changed, the process and skill of stabilizing a vehicle with automobile cribbing has 
not changed. 
 After a vehicle is stabilized, another component of addressing automobile 
accidents is to stabilize the victim. This involves both extracting the victim fro  the 
automobile, but also providing them with any immediate first aid or medical care (see 
below). Depending on the specific accident, this may not be extremely involved. It 
could simply consist of assisting the victim in exiting the vehicle without the 
firefighter truly having to do much. However, although not commonplace in most 
automobile accidents, extraction can also be quite involved. Car-related technology 
itself has again played a role in this instance; however, the hydraulic tools have also 




surprising, as they were originally used in stock car [i.e., NASCAR] racing). In 
addition, other “gadgets” are also used: 
“We got a lot of newer gadgets to break in places. Rabbit tools, things like that where 
you have a door that won’t open so you get this tool and you get between the door 
and the jam and you got a hydraulic pump… [To]  open the door before that, you John 
Wayne’d it with your foot or an ax or a sledgehammer. The tools they’ve come out 
with to get in cars, they’re amazing to me. Um, you get the cars with the window 
glass that goes up to the seal so you got a plastic thing you wedge down and then you 
got a little airbag you put in there, that opens it up and holds it, and you get this rod 
down – ‘click’ [sound of an automobile’s lock popping]. You don’t have to shim 
down in the doors with Slim Jims and all that stuff anymore. They’ve come up with 
new tools for that.” (WCFD firefighter; author’s notation in brackets) 
 
 The above quote provides a clear example of how the use of technology by the 
fire departments has changed the manner of extracting victims out of an automobile 
accident. As the WCFD firefighter stated, before the introduction of new tools used in 
car extraction, it was basic hand tools and brute strength used to bust open a vehicle 
to remove someone – you “John Wayne’d it.” Now, the introduction of tools allows 
for less physical strength to be required while at the same time you can still have the 
same effect. Simultaneously, each one of these new technologies did require that a 
firefighter understand how to use them. This was particularly evident for the 
hydraulic tools. As mentioned in the prior chapter, the introduction of these tools 
themselves required an increase in complexity to the task of forcible entry as 
firefighters now needed the knowledge of how to properly and effectively use the 
devices. In regards to automobile accidents, this complexity was also present. The 
basic skill of using these tools was required; however, they also needed to be used in 
a certain manner to gain access to a wrecked vehicle. Thus, the use of hydraulic tools 
affected the substantive complexity not only in the fire related emergency job- ontext 




automobile accidents). While these hydraulic tools were discussed by almostevery 
single firefighter that mentioned vehicle crashes, the above quote also shows that 
these were not the only technologies introduced to this task, but that in some 
instances other tools were also used, and as with any other tools introduced to the fire 
departments added a further level of complexity (even if small) to the task at hand. 
 While the fire department’s tools themselves increased the level of skill – 
particularly substantive complexity – that was involved with removing victim(s) from 
a wrecked vehicle, the technology involved in newer automobiles also has played a 
role. Obviously, the electrical lines and wiring discussed above was one thing, but 
there are also others: 
“Another technology that’s just come out, that (sic) just been real big lately is the 
side-turned airbags. And one of the cuts that you can make with a tool to say like take 
the roof off, uh and the pillars. And there’s, um, compressed…cylinder that holds the 
compressed gas to inflate that airbag is located within those pillars. In different 
vehicles it’s in different places. It may not be there in one vehicle, it may be in 
another. Um, but if you were to cut through that with a tool, it’s bad. It’s very 
bad...It’s almost like a gunshot. Um, but that’s something you got to kind of keep 
educated with, with (sic) auto industry changing the way they manufacture certain 
vehicles, have fluid lines. Um, there are fuel lines running on the inside of the vehicle 
actually through the passenger compartment is something to be aware of. Um, 
different relief cuts to roll the dash are made where that fuel line may very well 
be…you have to look behind the plastic to see what’s actually behind there before 
you make the cut, but you do have to be more aware of there could be a canister; 
there could be a canister of compressed gas anywhere within the vehicle for an 
airbag. (WCFD firefighter) 
 
Features that may originally increase the safety of a driver/passenger of a vehicle 
during an automobile crash may actually have an adverse impact while an individual 
is being extracted from an automobile. For example, airbags that did not activate 
during a vehicle accident could potentially become hazards to a firefighter in this 




could also have an impact on the tool being used to cut or pry open a vehicle, causing 
the tool itself to harm someone. While these technologies themselves have changed 
over the past 20 years and increased the knowledge needed by firefighters, the 
constant evolution of personal vehicles appears to continually have been perpetuating 
this increase in knowledge. Not only are these new features such as side airbags, gas 
line placement, and electric wiring needed to be considered, but the firefighter also 
needs to have some knowledge about the make and model of cars to determine where 
these items may be located. As discussed above, one manner to handle this situation 
is to pull away the outer plastic shell covering areas where these features might be, 
where before this level of complexity was not involved and firefighters may have 
been able to simply saw, cut, or pry apart a vehicle without even considering the 
possibility that a compressed canister of air may be hiding in the column next to a car 
door. 
 Thus, with the victim removed from the vehicle, the next step involves 
medical assistance/first aid being given to the victims, and then (if needed) taking 
them to the hospital for further medical treatment. Following this, the final portion of 
this task is for firefighters to secure the scene itself. One item this involves is 
containing and removing any fluid spills. Gasoline, oil, anti-freeze, and brake fluid 
are all liquids that can easily have leaked out of the vehicles and been left at th  
scene. This involves throwing down absorbent material, which one RCFD firefighter 
noted is similar to “shredded paper.” This paper is then cleaned up and removed from 
the scene. This manner of handling fluid spills is another aspect of automobile 




to simply use their fire hoses to push these hazardous materials down a storm drain. 
While the use of absorbent may not be overly complex in itself its introduction has 
never-the-less increased the complexity to this task. Another aspect of stabilizing the 
scene is simply to clean up any debris that has resulted from the crash, and gaining 
assistance in having the wrecked vehicle itself removed (a portion of this task that has 
been around for quite some time). 
 While above I have detailed the impact of technology in dealing with 
automobile accidents, and have discussed the increase in substantive complexity in 
this task (almost totally related to these new technologies), discussing the 
autonomy/control-related dimension of automobile accidents is somewhat difficult. 
Throughout the course of my interviews at both WCFD and RCFD, no clear picture 
emerged of exactly how the autonomy/control-related skill dimension exists in the
case of automobile accidents, or how it has possibly changed. However, there were a 
few indications as why this might have been the case. During the course of one 
interview, the firefighter interviewee noted that when responding to an automobile 
accident, it is a very “situational” task, and the firefighters are gettin  pushed in “20 
different directions.” The number of vehicles involved, the number of victims 
involved, whether or not there’s a fire, how badly the victims are injured, etc., all 
make these types of emergencies extremely unique. Thus, although there is a general 
sense of what needs to be done, the situational aspect of the accident truly plays a 
large hand at exactly how this task is completed. In addition, there is obviously a 
commanding officer at the scene who does oversee how the task is completed. 




individual firefighters to make decisions on what precisely needs to be done, which 
vehicle or victim should a firefighter be addressing, etc. Thus, internal to the 
department, it does appear that there is in fact more room for a higher level of 
autonomy/control-related aspects to occur here in this skill. 
At the same time, automobile accidents also involve other parties besides the 
firefighters themselves. For example, the local police agency will inevitably be there 
to assist with legal aspects of the situation. Furthermore, in the case of the WCFD, the 
local rescue/ambulance service will also be there assisting with the vic ims. 
Therefore, in these situations, the firefighters must be able to work along side these 
other parties involved with the incident to ensure that all legal (and in the case of the 
WCFD, medical) procedures are successfully completed. Thus, in these instances it 
appears that some of the autonomy/control-related skills are shared between these 
parties. In this case, while handling the immediate danger of the scene, and stabilizing 
the vehicle and the victim, it may be that the firefighters exert more 
autonomy/control-related aspects than these other parties. However, once the danger 
has passed, police officers and other professionals may have a higher level of 
autonomy. Thus, while no concrete evidence surfaced of the autonomy/control-
related skill dimension, it could be assumed that to successfully complete the task of 
addressing an automobile accident, there is arguably a high level of 
autonomy/control-related aspects involved. At the same time, it is not clear as what 
level these aspects are exerted by firefighters, and how they may have changed over 




First Aid/Medical Care 
 Over the course of my interviews at both the WCFD and RCFD, the data 
collected clearly showed that the most drastic change that occurred to firefighters’ 
skills over the past 20 years was in regards to the first aid and medical care incidents 
to which they responded. Perhaps this is not a drastic surprise, as beginning in the 
1970s, and particularly into the 1980s, there was a steady integration of emergency 
medical services (EMS) into fire departments in the U.S. Although the volume of fir
related emergency calls has been decreasing in recent years, th g volume of EMS 
related calls (an increase noticed even in the early 1980s; see St. John and Sheppard, 
Jr. 1983) has actually increased the overall number of emergency responses that 
firefighters must address (a pattern noticed even in the early 1980s; see St. John and 
Sheppard, Jr. 1983). Traditionally, the medical care involved at the fire service has 
existed at a very basic level where only limited EMS training may be needed (i.e., 
first responder certification) (see Smith 2001). However, in more recent years th re 
has been an increase in the level of medical training required by firefighters, and not 
surprising this has had a major impact on the skills of firefighters. At the sam time, 
the data collected in the present study show that this change is not uniform, and has 
been experienced quite differently by both the Waterville City and River City Fire 
Departments. 
First aid/medical care by the WCFD 
In lieu of the large integration of the EMS into fire departments across the 
U.S., the WCFD remains somewhat unique compared to this national trend. 




WCFD. During my initial visit and observation at the WCFD, I was able to discuss 
this matter a bit with some of the commanding officers in the department, and the 
basic impression I received was that that the collaboration of the WCFD with this 
ambulance rescue service was an extremely positive experience, and since it has 
worked well in the past, there was no real desire to change this system. Obviously, 
there are mostly likely a variety of logistics behind this longstanding partnership; 
however, there did not appear any sign that this collaboration would be changing in 
the near future. What is quite important here is that this working arrangement did 
impact the EMS knowledge and training required by the firefighters in the 
department. As advanced medical services were not directly incorporated into the 
WCFD, the firefighters did not need to be certified at an advanced level. Therefore, 
the firefighters in the WCFD only had basic emergency medical technician (EMT-B) 
training, or for those who were senior firefighters in the WCFD, first responder 
training.  
 With this specific departmental structure (i.e., no internal EMS vehicles), the 
effects felt by the firefighters were clearly different than those in the RCFD. In 
particular, the types of medical calls that the firefighters at the WCFD responded to 
were only instances that were life-threatening medical emergencies: heart attacks, 
stroke, respiratory distress, excessive bleeding, etc. As one WCFD firefighter noted: 
“You got to know your basic EMT skills: first aid, you know, how to control 
bleeding, things like that. How to splint fractures. The good thing about us is we may 
be the first one on the scene, but five minutes later there’s an ambulance crew there, a
medic, and they pretty much take over, and then really all we’re used for if we are not 





Thus, the firefighters know exactly how to handle these clearly life-threatening 
emergencies. In addition, geographically the fire stations themselves are in an ideal 
location to address these calls. The WCFD firefighters are stationed in locations 
throughout the City that allows them to respond to an emergency call in a matter of 
minutes, and in many instances this response occurs prior to the ambulance. In these 
life-threatening situations, seconds can make a difference to the life or death of a 
civilian, and therefore the ability for firefighters to potentially arrive at the scene prior 
to the ambulance service places them in a position where they can make an initial 
intervention into the medical issues being faced by an individual, and hopefully this 
may be the difference in increasing the chances of a person’s survival. 
 Interestingly, while all firefighters were trained and had the ability to perform 
these basic first aid/medical care tasks, they were more often used by firefighters on 
the engines as opposed to those on fire trucks. The reason was quite simple. As there 
was a larger number of engines present in the WCFD, each was responsible for a 
smaller geographical area of Waterville City, and they could more rapidly arrive at 
the location of the incident. In the case of the fire trucks in the WCFD, they wer  
responsible for much geographically larger response areas in the City compared to the 
WCFD engines, and they simply may not be able to arrive at a scene as quickly as an 
engine. Therefore, not only would it take longer for a truck to arrive at a medical 
scene, but there was a greater likelihood that a truck would not be able available (i.e., 
in service) to response to the emergency call. 
 When discussing the two skill dimensions outlined in the conceptual model, 




firefighters initially arrive at the scene of a medical emergency, they need to perform 
basic life support services to a patient. Controlling bleeding, performing rescue 
breathing, and splinting a fracture all have a specific level of substantive complexity. 
Yet, when the ambulance service arrives, these dynamic shifts: 
“If it’s kind of what we would consider a routine emergency, we’ll get in, we’ll 
respond accordingly of course. When we get there we’ll just do an assessment of the 
patient, take vital signs. If there’s some kind of care we can give them, if they’re 
having respiratory stress, watch over them until the ambulance gets there and help 
them get loaded up and sent to the hospital. We’re the muscle, basically.” (WCFD 
firefighter) 
 
The task of administering proper first aid/medical care shifts at the point when the 
ambulance service arrives. The firefighters are no longer responsible for th se basic 
life support medical services, as the ambulance service workers now begin to perform 
this task. At this point, the firefighters may then stop performing the lead role, and 
enter a more supporting role. They are now charged with lifting and moving the 
injured person, providing any tools the ambulance service may need (i.e., rope, 
ladders, etc.), and even in some instances driving the ambulance itself to a hospitl.29 
It should be noted that in some instances the firefighters may continue to administer 
this initial basic medical care (one example discussed in the interviews was providing 
CPR); however, as noted above in most instances they become the “muscle.” Thus, 
                                                
29 While a number of firefighters in the WCFD discussed the potential for a firefighter to drive an 
ambulance to the hospital, one interviewee provided more insight than others. During his interviewee 
he discussed that in some instances in may be best for a worker from the ambulance rescue service to 
remain by the patient’s side to continue administering any needed care. In these instances, the 
ambulance service may be short staffed, and therefor  a WCFD firefighter may drive the ambulance so 
that the ambulance service worker could continue to administer care to the patient on the drive to the 
hospital. Due to the increase in personnel at the WCFD (i.e., now two firefighters are assigned each 
shift to a fire apparatus), this was not a problem as one firefighter could drive the ambulance while on  
could drive the fire apparatus. One thing to note here is that I am not certain if being able to drive an 
ambulance is dependent on the certification of the firefighters. For example, it was unclear from these 
interviews if only those WCFD firefighters who were fire apparatus operators (FAOs) trained to drive 
a fire engine or truck could also drive an ambulance, or if any firefighter from the WCFD could drive 




performing these actions with the task of administering first aid/medical care to a 
patient contain a lower level of complexity than the initial actions needed to be 
performed. Thus, the complexity involved in the task of responding to medical calls 
shifts over the duration of the task, moving from an initially higher level, to a lower 
level when the ambulance arrives. Although the higher level of complexity decreases 
over the time period of this task, this does not imply that it is completely removed 
from the task. Instead it is only needed until the ambulance arrives at the scene, and 
not for the entire duration of the task. 
 The autonomy/control-related skill dimension was affected in a manner 
somewhat similar to the substantive complexity dimension throughout the course of a 
first aid/medical care emergency incident. Upon the initial arrival at the scene, the 
responding firefighters were unassisted and therefore had complete discretion over 
the situation: how to proceed, what care to administer, when to administer the care, 
when to start/stop specific types of care, etc. However, when the ambulance servi  
arrived, the firefighters from the WCFD at the scene would then experience a shift in
their autonomy/control-related skills. They would no longer have the foremost 
discretion over the task, but rather the ambulance workers themselves who had a 
higher and more comprehensive EMS training background were the ones who would 
make these decisions. Thus, similar to the complexity involved, the initial level of 
autonomy/control-related skill was very high, yet when the ambulance service a rived 
it drastically decreased. Again, this did not imply that this skill dimension had been 
completely removed from the task. Instead this autonomy/control is only needed until 




 A final note about these shifting levels of skill dimensions involved with 
medical emergencies – it was not always the case that firefighters would arrive at a 
medical incident prior to the ambulance rescue service. This could potentially be due 
to the geographic location and/or traffic patterns at any specific point in time (i.e., an 
ambulance may be only one minute away from an incident while a fire engine may be 
located three minutes away and located off a road with heavy traffic), or simply the 
nature of the call. For example, perhaps the initial first aid/medical care needed was 
able to be provided by the ambulance service without the assistance of the WCFD. 
However, the WCFD may still eventually be needed to assist in lifting and 
transporting the patient into the ambulance so they can be transported to the hospital. 
Therefore, there are also certain instances where the specific medial care tasks 
needed to be performed by a firefighter may not need a high level of skill. However, 
this is not imply that acting in a supporting role is unimportant – it is a vital 
component in removing a victim from the scene to a location where the appropriate 
care can be received.  
 Thus, although the collaborative relationship between the WCFD and the 
ambulance service was rather interesting, it did not overall change the basic medical 
life support skills that were needed by the WCFD firefighters; however, it did have an 
effect on the duration of the higher levels of complexity and autonomy/control-related 
dimensions involved in the task of medical emergencies. While these changes are 
important to recognize, it was actually a number of new technologies that had the 
biggest impact on these skill dimensions: 
“You know, we didn’t have the capabilities that we have now…We do blood 




we didn’t have when I first started. They were carried by the medic unit but we can 
actually use that in situations where you have medic emergencies where you know, 
you think it might be a stroke or something, you can rule that out by doing a quick 
finger stick to see if a person might just have low blood sugar, it might be a diabetic 
and we can give them sugar which with our glucose which we now carry that would 
enable them basically possibly not even need transported (sic) to the hospital if it’s 
caught early enough, so. And then also we carry drugs now that we didn’t carry 
before, primarily epinephrine which is called ‘epi’ by, you know, like the slang nme. 
But, you know, someone is bit by a bee and goes into anaphylactic reaction, prior to a 
couple years ago that was a drug that was only enabled to be given by a paramedic 
with an intravenous [IV] drug or a line that had to be started and it was a lot of time 
involved. Now they have auto-injector pens and they basically auto-inject the 
epinephrine into a person’s system without having that set up that enables us to be 
able to provide that and basically save someone’s life if they’re having severe 
reaction where they can’t breathe. So some of those things…we didn’t have those 
capabilities because of the technology a couple years ago that now the technology’s 
affordable and it’s available and we now all carry those devices on our apparatus.” 
(WCFD firefighter; author’s notation in brackets) 
 
 The quote above by a WCFD firefighter discusses two specific technologies 
that were consistently found throughout the interviews at both the RCFD and WCFD: 
the glucometer and the epinephrine auto-injector (commonly referred to as an 
EpiPen® after a particular company brand name). Both the glucometer and EpiPen® 
had only been introduced within the past few years (less than five years was the time 
estimate I received), and while both were used to address a specific medical 
condition, they did have some similarities. As the WCFD firefighter mentioned 
above, the glucometer was used to test specific blood sugar levels of a patient to 
prevent them from entering shock. This device consisted of a needle that was able to 
puncture an individual’s skin and draw an extremely small amount of blood. This 
blood was then collected on a strip of paper that was inserted into the glucometer. The 
meter would then automatically diagnose the blood sugar level based upon the sample 
provided and provide an electronic reading to the firefighter could then use this 




EpiPen®, its use was somewhat more simplified. The EpiPen® was simply a device 
shaped roughly like a pen (writing instrument). It could be placed against a patient’s 
skin. A button on the EpiPen® could then be pressed which automatically injects a 
needle containing the drug (epinephrine) into a patient. 
 Both of these technologies have inevitably added further skills that firefight rs 
at the WCFD can now utilize when responding to medical emergencies. The skills 
provided by this technology were not previously available to the firefighters, and in 
essence has increased the abilities of firefighters when completing first aid/medical 
emergency tasks. Therefore, it is rather clear that these technologies have played a 
large role in the increase of the skill of firefighters regarding medical emergencies. 
Not only do the firefighters now need to posses the mental and manipulative 
integration needed to use these technologies, they also need the discretionary aspects 
as to when these tools are to be implemented. According to the argument posed by 
Autor and colleagues (2002, 2003a, 2003b), it would appear that it was an 
organizational decision which allowed these technologies to be introduced to the fire 
department and allowed the firefighters to increase the skill involved in responding to 
and successfully addressing these types of emergencies. In the case of the WCFD 
firefighters, this is not an instance in which there was a previously routinized task 
form which skill was able to be removed. 
Interestingly, taking a broader picture it becomes clear that while thes
technologies have allowed the firefighters to gain additional skill when addressing 
medical emergencies, it never-the-less has done so via a decrease in skills used 




needed to be used in order to administer epinephrine. This skill is not possessed by a 
firefighter in the WCFD who is trained at an EMT-B or first responder level, but 
rather is a skill possessed by individuals trained as full-fledged paramedics. However, 
with the introduction of the EpiPen®, the skill involved with administering an IV is 
no longer needed. Thus, applying the conceptual model in a broader sense, 
routinization is able to remove skill involved in administering these medical 
treatments; however, it is not removed from the firefighters, but rather EMS 
personnel who have been trained as full-fledged paramedics. In the instances of 
firefighters, this routinization has decreased the skill involved to a level where it can 
be managed by the firefighters who are only trained at a basic level. Further drawing 
from the conceptual model, bringing the conceptualization of skill dimension into the 
conversation, it could be argued that these new technologies have also alternatively 
affected these two dimensions differently. In regards to substantive complexity, the 
mental and manipulative integration involved in the task prior to the new technology 
(e.g., establishing a working IV line) was at a higher level than is required by these 
devices. Therefore, the technology itself has clearly decreased the amount of 
complexity involved. However, as for the autonomy/control-related dimension, this 
decrease is less clear. With the technological innovation, there is still a need to make 
decisions as to (a) whether or not to administer these treatments, and (b) when to 
administer these treatments using the new technology. Thus, regardless of whether an 
IV or EpiPen® is used to treat anaphylactic shock, an individual still must possess the 




dimensions have been affected by these new technologies, they have not been 
affected uniformly. 
First aid/medical care by the RCFD 
It was rather clear that the first aid/medical care skills used by the firefighters 
in the WCFD had drastically increased in the New Economy. As mentioned earlier, 
this was not unique to this particular fire department, but rather part of the general 
trend at the national level. Therefore, it is not surprising that the RCFD firefighters 
also had their first aid/medical skills increase over the past few decades as well. 
However, while the overall pattern here may have been similar, there were a few stark 
differences within this pattern when comparing the RCFD to the WCFD. Due to these 
differences, the skills of firefighters in River City were at a higher level than those 
firefighters at the WCFD, and have subsequently created both new skills and allowed 
new tools/technologies to enter the picture. The most noticeable difference was that 
there was now a fully integrated EMS system within the RCFD, including a fleet o  
ambulances: 
When I came in there was no such thing…When I came in it was 13 ambulances and 
a million people in the City. The busiest ambulance was probably about 1,500 runs 
when you only had 13 ambulances. Now you got 22 first line ambulances plus a 
bunch of reserve ambulances. Six hundred and fifty thousand people living in the City 
and the slowest ambulances probably gets about 6,000 runs a year. So it’s protocol if 
any difficulty breathing, chest pain, seizures, uh anything of that nature, or if the f rst 
due ambulance is not available and another one’s coming from a distance they’ll send 
a suppression company [fire engine company].” (RCFD firefighter; author’s 
notation in brackets) 
 
The firefighters at the RCFD that I interviewed clearly recognized this dynamic shift 
in the services provided by the RCFD. As one RCFD firefighter bluntly stated it, the 




I’ve been here.” Thus, even in the eyes of these firefighters, it was clear that this 
aspect had brought many new skills. In addition, these skills were no longer a 
secondary set of skills. Simply from the call volume and increase in ambulances 
(which was continuing to occur as I interviewed) discussed by the RCFD firefighters, 
it was clear that these skills were used very frequently by the RCFD. 
 As with the WCFD, the RCFD did see an increase in skill over the past 20 
years in that their firefighters had begun to possess at least a basic EMT-B training, 
which brought with it an increased set of medical and first aid skills that could be 
used by the firefighters. However, organizational decisions made by the RCFD
administrative officials in the early 1990s also further increased these skills. With the 
introduction of the EMS service and ambulances to the RCFD, the EMS paramedics 
and firefighters worked as separate entities. The EMS would be charged with the 
medical emergencies, and the firefighters remained responsible for the task of
fighting fire. However, in this time period (early 1990s), a decision was made to 
begin training persons as both firefighters and paramedics through a program referred 
to by the firefighters I interviewed as a firefighter-paramedic apprentice program. 
Therefore, when an individual is now hired by the RCFD, they first must spend a 
number of hours riding and serving as a paramedic on the ambulance. After this 
individual serves on the ambulance for the required amount of time, they are then 
assigned with a fire company (it appeared as though most often an engine company) 
where they can begin to gain experience fighting fire. The firefighters from the RCFD 
I interviewed were almost all senior firefighters, and definitely had mixed views on 




there was clearly a rather negative opinion of this current program. The rationale here 
was that these new firefighters were not getting as much experience as th y should in 
the fire related emergency job-context as they may often be moving back to 
ambulances when needed. As a result, they were not getting the proper experience 
and training they needed to fight fire which subsequently could create less-than-ideal 
situations at the scene of a fire. A particular issue was raised that these situations may 
potentially place these new firefighter-paramedic “hybrids” in danger du  to lack of 
training, or even potentially place their fellow firefighters in danger. 
 It is important to note that the firefighters who discussed this situation did not 
direct these comments at the firefighter-paramedic him/herself. In other words, it was 
not seen as a personal issue, but rather an organizational issue that could affect not 
only the safety of the firefighters at the RCFD, but also of civilians at the scene of a 
fire. Furthermore, the EMS skills themselves possessed by the paramedics were not 
being attacked. In regards to the medical skills, it was clearly recognized by the 
firefighters that there had been a drastic increase in the skills and procedures able to 
be conducted by these dual-trained firefighters compared to the more senior 
firefighters who were trained at an EMT-B or first responder level. Medical 
procedures that were once unable to be performed at the scene and needed to be 
performed at a hospital could now be performed upon the fire apparatus’s arrival. 
And there was clearly a respect present for this increasing ability to perform EMS 
tasks using these more complex skills. As shown by a lieutenant in the RCFD: 
“I’m looking at the new guys now where five years ago in the Fire Department and I 
see ‘em out on the street in any kind of medical situation and I watch ‘em operate and 
basically all I do is I assist them. They have the training, I don’t. And I’m trying to 




they have to do is reach behind ‘em and get what they need. You know, I can help 
‘em lift, I can help ‘em get equipment. I can help ‘em establish communications and 
maintain the communications. I’m just; I’m amazed. I observe ‘em and in some cases 
wonder in some cases ‘Why are you fighting fires for a living? You could be so much 
more.’ But if one of those individuals left, then we’d be less of a department. So God 
bless ‘em. It’s an amazing thing to see.” 
 
A captain in the RCFD who I interviewed perhaps put it in even simpler terms by 
stating that because he had a firefighter on his fire company that was trained as a 
paramedic, he has been to incidents were a civilian would have died if it was not for 
this paramedic training. 
 Through this organizational change implemented by the RCFD during the 
New Economy, it was rather clear that new skills had been introduced to the 
firefighters who have begun working for the RCFD within the past two decades. 
While it had not affected the training of those senior firefighters (which consisted of 
most of those persons in the RCFD who I interviewed), there was still the overall 
affect that these skills were increasingly present within the department and a 
requirement of all new personnel. Drawing from the conceptual model and the skill 
dimensions that stem from Braverman’s work (1998/1974), the increasing of skill is
not as simple as may initially appear. In regards to the substantive complexity 
involved in the first aid/medical calls, this organizational change implemented in the
RCFD has inevitably brought about a greater level of mental and manipulative 
integration needed by the firefighters. Thus, the substantive complexity involved in 
these types of non-fire emergencies has drastically increased among these firefighters 
trained as paramedics. In addition, it has also increased the autonomy/control-related 
aspects involved during these types of emergencies in a particularly interesting 




had similar levels of training. Thus, during instances where firefighters were at a 
medical emergency, there was no marked difference in training, and the 
autonomy/control-related skills fell more evenly throughout the firefighters at the 
scene. Furthermore, during instances when a paramedic was at the scene, the 
firefighters would assist the paramedic with what was needed and the firefighters 
exerted less decision-making aspects than would be needed if only the firefighters 
themselves were at the scene. However, the change in departmental protocols now 
has integrated these two sets of skills to a point where the firefighters are also being 
trained with paramedic skills. Therefore, these autonomy/control-related skills are 
remaining within the firefighters; in the large majority of instances th re are no longer 
non-firefighters in the department who are also responding to the scene. This 
autonomy/control-related aspect of medical emergencies now remains almostsolely 
with the RCFD firefighters. Furthermore, as more complex procedures (and the shear 
volume of procedures) are now able to be performed by RCFD firefighters, there is a 
more involved decision-making and discretionary ability that is needed by the 
firefighters. 
 It is also interesting to acknowledge that among the firefighters themselves in 
the department there is also a difference in the autonomy/control-related skill aspects 
during medical an emergency that is somewhat unique. It is now the younger 
firefighters who have more advanced EMS training and can successfully perform 
more complex tasks at a medical emergency when compared to the more senior 
firefighters. Therefore, this increasing level of autonomy/control-related skills has not 




involved level among the junior firefighters as they are in possession of a higherlevel 
of EMS training than the more senior firefighters. This is different from many other 
tasks (e.g., fire suppression using an attack line) where the commanding officer has a 
greater level of autonomy/control-related skill during certain situations. The 
preceding quote by a RCFD lieutenant provides a great example of this. This 
lieutenant had a very basic level of medical training and during situations where there 
was a medical emergency, a secondary role was assumed by this lieutenant to 
younger firefighter-paramedics. Thus, the firefighter-paramedic had the main 
responsibility of the patient, and with that all the autonomy/control-related skills that 
were needed. However, at the same time this does not imply that a firefighter train d 
as a paramedic had full discretionary abilities over the entire scene. While the patient 
was the responsibility of the firefighter with paramedic training, talking with family 
members, arranging placement of the vehicles, and deciding which tasks other fire 
companies should perform fell back onto the plate of a officer. The decision-making 
and discretion involved with this more overall supervisory aspect of a medical 
emergency fell under the more senior firefighters. In sum, the organizatio al change 
that occurred in the RCFD regarding first aid/medical care tasks increased skill along 
the lines of both substantive complexity and autonomy/control-related skill 
dimensions. While the increase in complexity during medical emergencies clearly fell 
on the shoulders of the firefighters trained as paramedics, the increase in the 
autonomy/control-related dimension was less uniform. Regarding the patient an 
increase was experienced by the firefighter-paramedics, yet the overall sc ne fell 




increased in the RCFD along both of these lines, yet through examining different 
dimensions it appeared that (a) it did not do so uniformly among all the firefighters 
within the department, and (b) the change in both dimensions occurred differently. 
 Although the reception of paramedic training by RCFD firefighters as directly 
affected the skills used by firefighters during first aid/medical emergency calls, it has 
also had an indirect effect on the skills of firefighters. Paramedic training has also 
introduced new tools to the firefighter-paramedics which can be used during medical 
calls. These new tools follow the same pattern as most of the medical technologies 
that have been introduced to both fire departments: their existence adds a new series 
of skills that was not before needed. One example that was consistently discusse by 
firefighters I interviewed in the RCFD was the introduction of drugs and medications 
that were now carried on a number of the apparatuses throughout the department. Of 
the paramedics in the RCFD I interviewed, they discussed that there was currently 
between 20-25 drugs carried by certain apparatuses. Some of these “drugs” can be 
administered by all firefighters trained as EMT-Bs (e.g., oxygen), yet many of them 
were used only by firefighters trained as paramedics. Administering these drugs may 
be somewhat complicated, and for some this even involved the use of an IV. Thus, 
there was an initial complexity involved in this specific procedure. However, this 
increase in complexity did not remain consistent over the years: technology in the 
medical field occurs quite rapidly and because of these tasks such as administering 
medication through an IV have themselves changed over the past few decades: 
“To give an IV is to give an IV, but the needles have changed probably 20 times since 
1980. They’ve gotten not necessarily easier to use because the needles I used in 1980 
to give an IV was (sic) much more simpler and easier for me to use than the IV ne dle 




the cap off. The catheter needle and then insert. Well, again because of injury. 
Paramedics were putting the cap back on and getting stuck, or taking the needle and 
laying it down and sitting on it, whatever. Take a needle, sticking it into the seat of 
the medic unit until you got done, you know?” (RCFD firefighter) 
 
The needle now was not just a straight needle, but rather a more involved device that 
had a protective sheath which acted as a safety measure for those firefighters 
administering the needle. At the same time, this safety feature also made 
administering an IV a more involved task than it had been previously. Furthermore, 
as mentioned by the firefighter above, there were constant changes over the previous 
few decades. Thus, with all new technology has come more training and a need for 
the knowledge of how to use it. While this may not be a drastic shift in the 
complexity involved in the administration of IVs, it never-the-less has created a n ed 
to learn new skills corresponding to this technology, and the ability to perhaps 
disregard some of the complexity involved with administrating an older type of 
needle. 
The autonomy/control-related skill dimension involved with administering 
drugs has been affected in a less consistent manner: 
“But before you do that [administer drugs/medications] then you have to have 
some; the doctor’s authority and that’s done via consult with the doctor, okay? 
There’s (sic) some jurisdictions that have a standard protocol. A paramedic can give 
one dosage at 0.4mg one time, but to go beyond that, okay, protocol says I can give 
you four dosages but I can only give you one prior to consult. If I deem, if five 
minutes later you’re still…maybe entrapped and I know five minutes later you are 
going to need, or ten minutes later you’re going to need another dosage of morphine, 
okay? But before I can give that, I have to have a consultation to the hospital with the 
doctor to have this authority to give that.” (RCFD firefighter; author’s notation in 
brackets) 
 
Thus, only certain medications and certain dosages can be given by the firefightes 




discretion of a doctor. The firefighter must call a physician and receive vrbal 
permission to administer a specific medication/dosage combination. Thus, the 
autonomy/control-related components of this skill are rather situational, and not 
always at a high level for a firefighter. 
 Interestingly, one of the RCFD firefighters that I interviewed who was also 
trained as a paramedic had an interesting take on this physician/firefighter interaction 
and discussed how this phone consultation itself also could add another level of 
complexity to the task at hand: 
Firefighter (FF): For some drugs we have to call before we can give, because it 
needs a doctor’s on-site approval. We have our protocols which says if you have this, 
this, and this you can give this, this, and this. If you have this, this, and this, if you 
consult you can give this, this, and this. That’s just when we, as being a paramedic, 
whether I’m on the engine, whether I’m on the medic, when you consult you have to, 
you pretty much; they’re [doctors/physicians] in a controlled environment with 
security, bright lights. You know, their friends around all the time laughing and 
joking and treating people. You know when we pull to a scene I got life-threatening 
emergencies, I need a physician on the line, there’s still guns (sic) on-site. It’  a big 
difference! 
 
Interviewer (I): Oh yeah! I could imagine! 
 
FF: So as a paramedic you have to paint a picture in the shortest, fewest amounts of 
words as possible to that doctor who’s sitting behind a nice kosher desk so he can say 
‘Okay, he does need to give this patient these drugs. He does need to perform this 
procedure. Go ahead and do it.’ That’s the hard part. Because you can be a complete 
idiot and if you talk good over the radio, they’ll give you whatever you want. You 
paint the picture to the doctor, now you can be the best paramedic in the world and 
can’t talk and you are not going to get anything from the doctor. 
 
Thus, in this conversation by the firefighter, he makes clear that the communication 
between the firefighter and the physician is a component to the administration of 
medication with its own level of complexity, aside from the substantive complexity 




diagnose the patient and determine what medication may be precisely needed at the 
beginning. 
 Clearly, the reception of paramedic training by all newly recruited fr fighters 
in the RCFD was a major factor in the change of first aid/medical emergency skills 
that were possessed by the firefighters. It was also the dominant difference b tween 
the WCFD and RCFD in regards to the skills used for this task in the non-fire 
emergency job-context. However, within the interviews I conducted with the RCFD, 
another aspect of the task of handling first aid/medical emergency calls was also 
discovered throughout the course of my interviews, and one with which almost all 
RCFD firefighters that I interviewed took issue. This was the difference between 
“true” medical emergencies and other types of medical emergencies that were not 
really emergencies at all. As one firefighter noted about the local resident , “they call 
for everything.” Throughout the course of my interviews I received a number of 
stories that discussed instances where the firefighters would respond to a location for 
a medical emergency, and once they arrived at the scene, the situation for which they 
were called was not a true emergency: 
“It’s every shift, throughout the whole City. The murder, the assaults, and the 
violence, and stabbings. Overdoses have tripled then they were 20 years ago. Go on a 
lot of overdoses, ODs. You know, so yeah. And then we get a lot of wasted calls. We 
go to the same house time after time and it’s the same thing. They use it as an 
ambulance to go get their medications at the hospital, or they use the ambulance as  
bus or something. And soon as the address comes out you know where you’re going, 
you know what you’re going for. It’s the same people over and over but the City’s go  
to send for ‘em because of liability.” (RCFD firefighter) 
 
 Thus, the firefighters of the RCFD often do get “true” medical emergencies 
with a life-threatening situation that needs to be addressed and their medical skills 




situations where the emergency they were called for was not an emergency at all.30 
Throughout the interviews I heard stories about a number of situations that 
firefighters responded to that were not even close to emergencies, everything from 
headaches to jammed fingers, from regular colds to constipation. As one could 
imagine, these instances were viewed in a very negative light by the firefighters. Due 
to the nature of their occupation alone, it was apparent that the firefighters would put 
themselves in harm’s way to help someone in a real emergency situation. Thus, those 
I interviewed were not at all happy to rush to the scene of an incident only to have the 
caller state that they needed medication for their headache. Furthermore, the increase 
in these types of emergency calls was also problematic (in the eyes of a number of the 
firefighters I interviewed), as these sorts of calls were taking their apparatus 
temporarily out of service. If a true emergency was in need of a response in the 
immediate area surrounding their fire station, they would be unable to respond as they 
were tied up dealing with these other type of “medical” situations. As the firefighters 
deal with situations that need immediate response, and a matter of minutes can 
determine the outcome of a life-and-death situation, this is very problematic when a 
fire company is tied up dealing with a bogus medical call and must rely on another 
company to arrive from another area further away to handle a situation.  
As firefighters are required to respond to these truly non-emergency medical 
calls due to liability issues, the task is created for firefighters of distinguishing true 
medical emergencies from bogus ones. It is quite difficult to discern the amount of 
                                                
30 This notion of “true” medical emergency calls versus medical calls that were not emergencies also 
was discussed in some of the interviews I conducted with firefighters in the WCFD, but not enough to 
make any true generalizations about the findings for this fire department. It was only in the interviews 





complexity and discretionary and related skill aspects involved when responding to 
these calls; however, by definition there is a certain level of these dimensions present. 
The firefighters in essence need to be able to distinguish between these types of 
emergency medical calls, and being able to interact with callers themselves, requiring 
a certain level of autonomy/control-related aspects. At the same time, these non-
emergency medical do have a certain level of complexity to them (albeit not 
extremely high). 
Conducting CPR and Using AEDs 
Modern versions of CPR (known by its full name of cardiopulmonary 
resuscitation) can be dated to the 1950s/1960s (Paraskos 1993). Very quickly after 
modern versions of CPR began to be implemented, this technique also began to be 
integrated into the fire service (Jude 2003). While it is a skill that may oftenbe used 
in medical emergencies faced by firefighters, because of its unique role as a method 
of treatment for cardiac arrest that can be used by all firefighters (CPR requires its 
own medical training certification), it was a specific medical procedure that almost 
every single individual firefighter mentioned during their interviews. Thus, as this 
task was one that was so clearly identified by firefighters as an important and distinct 
medical procedure, I have decided to discuss it separately from the other types of first 
aid/medical care.  
 As it is often glorified in popular movies and television programs, the average 
person in the U.S. understands that CPR involves a series of chest compressions and 
breaths administered to an unconscious victim. The breaths are performed in a 




depending on if the distressed person is an adult (performed using two hands), child 
(performed using one hand), or infant (performed using two fingers). There is also an 
alternating pattern that occurs repeatedly. Thus, once the initial diagnosis is 
performed by a firefighter, the type of person is identified (i.e., adult, child, or infant), 
and the decision is made that CPR is needed to be administered, the actual complexity 
is not at an extremely high level as it follows a basic and routine pattern. While this 
breathing/compression pattern has existed for sometime, it has changed repeatedly 
over the past 20 years based on recommendations made by national and international 
bodies of medical professionals. Over this time period the recommendations have 
many times affected the ratio of breaths to compressions given by the individual 
administering CPR. This ratio has repeatedly been changed, as was noted by a 
number of WCFD firefighters who constantly joked about this during the interviews 
stating that CPR changes “every year,” “every six months,” or even “every other 
week.” 
However, while the breath/compression ratio has been changed, it has not 
changed the substantive complexity and autonomy/control-related skill dimensions: 
Firefighter (FF): Yeah, CPR’s used…the American Medical Association, the 
American heart Association, for years they’ve; they’ve gone back and forth. They’ve 
bounced it, the procedure. Um, meaning that two breathes/15 ventilations, one 
breath/15 [ventilations], two breaths/30 [ventilations], you know. And it’s right now 
at two breaths and compressions initially. Um, that’s changed a little bit. The 
procedure has changed. Well, the procedure has not changed, but its requirements 
have changed, you know? 
 
Interviewer: Okay. Yeah, I got… 
 
FF: So doing two and 15, now you’re doing two and 30. But how you do that two and 





Thus, the manipulation involved with chest compressions and breathing remains 
unchanged, rather just performed at a different ratio. In addition, the initial diagnosis 
of whether or not CPR should be administered still remains; however, once this 
diagnosis is completed by the firefighter, there is no discretion as to how many 
breaths/compressions to provide – the number performed is simply the current ratio 
(i.e., 2 breaths to 30 compressions) stated by those national organizations. 
 Using the conceptual model outlined here in this research, the skill dimensions 
remain unchanged throughout the changes in the breaths/compression ratio. However, 
over the past twenty years there have been two technologies that have altered the 
performance of CPR when handling cardiac arrest patients. One of these technologies 
that began to be used in the 1990s in the two fire departments where I interviewed 
was a protective face mask. These masks were part of a larger acknowledgement of 
the importance of safety throughout the medical profession in the increasing concern 
over transmission of infections such as human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) among 
persons. Other items such as face protection, gloves, and gowns were also starting to 
be worn to protect the firefighters and injured civilians from passing any type of 
infections/diseases. In regards to CPR, a special face mask was used to help with the
assisted breathing aspect of the procedure. Instead of breathing directly into he 
person suffering from cardiac arrest via mouth-to-mouth, a face mask was used o 
that mouth-to-mouth contact did not have to be made. It could be argued whether or 
not this face mask affected the skill of firefighters in the WCFD and RCFD. As far as 
determining whether or not to administer CPR to a victim (i.e., autonomy/control-




the integration of mental and manipulative tasks (i.e., substantive complexity) are 
concerned, one could argue that having to learn how to use this mask did increase the 
complexity involved in performing the breathing component of CPR (not the 
compression component). However, if any shift in the complexity of performing CPR 
did occur, it was very slight. 
 The second technology that was discussed by the firefighters throughout the 
course of my interviews was in regards to the automated external defibrillator, or 
AED.  AEDs have the ability to analyze cardiac rhythms and (if appropriate) 
administer an electronic shock to the patient in an effort to revive them from their 
current condition (Kerber et al. 1997). While AEDs have been around since 1979 
(Kerber et al. 1997), through my interviews I discovered it was not until sometime 
within the past ten years that they were introduced in a widespread fashion and placed 
on a variety of apparatuses within the WCFD and RCFD. It was not that they were 
necessarily absent from the fire department at this time, as specific vehicles in a 
department may have had AEDs in their possession. However, cost prevented them 
from being placed on the apparatuses throughout the departments until recently: 
“I mean some of the first automatic external defibrillators, which is whatthe AED 
stands for, were very large and very expensive and not all units carried ‘em ‘cause of 
that cost. Now the cost is about $2,000 a piece. There’s grants available and they’re 
encouraging more people to have them so they’ve become much more affordable and 
cost-effective and they don’t require as much maintenance before with the lithium 
batteries. You could have an AED where you don’t have to charge the battery for 
maybe two years, or maybe a year and a half depending on the usage where before 
you had to swap batteries out almost every shift, put them on a charger. They didn’t 
last and you would always have to carry extra batteries in case of, you know. So I 
mean the technology from that point has really improved and making us more 





As mentioned in the above quote, cost was no longer prohibitive for the use of AEDs. 
In addition, this particular firefighter noted that the technology itself had becom  
more reliable and user-friendly. With this new technology, even firefighters trained at 
the most basic level of EMS could use this mechanism to administer an electronic 
shock to a person experiencing cardiac arrest, a task that was not able to be completed 
by firefighters throughout the department prior to the introduction of the AED. From 
the interviews I conducted, it was quite apparent that the firefighters clearly 
acknowledged and appreciated this particular technology. It was spoken as a definite
asset to their EMS skills, and a handful of firefighters discussed situations in which 
they have seen a victim revived through the use of this technology. 
While the firefighters I interviewed were now responsible for being able to 
use the AED, the actual use of the equipment itself did not appear that difficult. In 
fact, one firefighter even stated he could train a monkey to use it. The AED itself 
consists of a couple of pads which are placed on the victim’s chest and a 
computerized monitor that reads cardiac rhythms to determine if a shock should be 
administered, and if so, how large of a shock. The computerized monitor that was 
connected to the pads actually verbally instructs the firefighter how to use the devic
during the course of its use 
“You know, you find a patient down, you go in and assess. Yep, they’re coded. You 
start compressions, start oxygen, someone hook up the AED, put the pad, put pad, 
hook up, turn it on, it tells you what to do.” (WCFD firefighter) 
 
Thus, in regards to the substantive complexity involved with using the AED and 
administering the electronic shock, it is rather simple. It only involves physically 




voice directions that may inform you to press a button (to administer the shock) or 
begin performing CPR (a skill already in possession of the firefighters). Thus, the 
amount of complexity involved with using this technology is not extreme. In addition, 
as the AED is now used in conjunction with CPR, it requires the same initial 
diagnosis of whether or not a victim is in cardiac distress and if this type of tr atment 
is needed. However, the machine is programmed to dictate to the user the decision of 
whether or not to proceed with using the AED or to revert to performing CPR. Thus, 
although this has been an invaluable technology to the interviewees, and was perhaps 
the one technology introduced in the past 20 that was recognized by the firefightes as 
the most valuable, it did not drastically change the skill used by the firefighters. 
However, this is not to say that it had no effect on their skill – when accounting for 
both the complexity and autonomy/control-related dimensions involved, the AED did 
create a higher level of skill needed by all firefighters in both departments. 
 Referring back to the conceptual model, the routinization hypothesis (Autor et 
al. 2002, 2003a, 2003b) does apply to the procedures here. Previously, the 
administration of shock to an individual experiencing cardiac distress, and the 
diagnosis as to whether or not it should be administered, was completed by 
paramedics. However, as one’s cardiac rhythms follows a routinized pattern, th  AED 
was able to be programmed to read and identify certain patterns and administer the 
shock. Thus, the elements of this task follow a routinized pattern and in essence were 
able to be captured by computerized technology. At this point, this device was able to 
be implemented widely and used by persons with a lower level of EMS training. 




and subsequently capture a certain element of skill,31 the same device was able to 
perform the routinized components of this skill. Furthermore, with a modest increase 
in training the AED could allow persons not certified as a paramedic the ability to 
perform the task of administering a shock to a victim. While the skill of administer g 
shock was new to the WCFD and RCFD firefighters, and subsequently increased the 
skills needed in their job, it did so by removing a large component of skill once 
possessed by paramedics. 
Responding to False Alarms 
 Both firefighters at the WCFD and RCFD discussed having to deal with bogus 
medical calls. However, throughout the course of my interviews, another type of 
“false alarm” was discussed by firefighters: those involving suspected fire. 
Interestingly, these were only mentioned by one firefighter from the RCFD, but in the 
WCFD roughly half of the firefighters explicitly discussed these alarms, while a 
number of others mentioned them in passing. Through these interviews, the 
firefighters discussed two different manners to which they responded to such alarms. 
In the first instance, the firefighters were aware that the alarm was activated not due 
to a fire, but for some other reason: 
Firefighter (FF): Uh, responsible for any situation; let’s say we receive from 
communications. Already this morning we had a situation where people were fogging 
in a building and they set off the smoke detectors. Fogging for bugs. 
 
Interviewer:  Oh. 
 
                                                
31 It should be noted that AEDs are not the only devic s used to administer a shock to persons suffering 
from cardiac distress. As noted by a RCFD trained as a paramedic, the paramedics themselves have 
other equipment that is used to administer shock to a patient. Therefore, while the AED was able to 
capture this skill, it was done so at a very basic level and does not imply that paramedics no longer ar  




FF: They set off the smoke detectors. Didn’t require an engine response but they 
wanted our response to help ‘em reset the alarm. Typically we don’t reset the alarm, 
but we can give them advice as to what they need to do to correct their problem. 
(WCFD firefighter) 
 
In this first instance, the firefighters were aware that the instance was not a true life or 
death emergency, and did not view these situations as an emergency, yet they still 
needed to respond in a timely manner to the location and handle the situation. Here 
the cause of the false alarm was known, and thus the task was more a public relations 
issue (see Chapter 8). The firefighters needed to discuss with the civilians 
responsible for the alarms how to reset/adjust the alarm back to proper working order. 
In this situation, there was a fair level of autonomy/control-related skill exerted in 
dealing with the public, as the firefighters simply needed to on their own discuss with 
the civilians how to adjust the alarm. At the same time, there was also a fair level of 
complexity involved. The firefighters needed to not only understand how to place the 
responsible party in contact with someone who can adjust the alarm system, 
potentially even adjust the alarm system themselves, and finally how to effectiv ly 
communicate these instructions to the civilian. 
 In the second situation, the root of the false fire alarm was unknown. In these 
instances, the firefighters would treat the response as a true fire related emergency 
response as if they did not necessarily know what the cause of the alarm was: 
Firefighter (FF): And the thing is that they’re [smoke alarms] sensitive, you know, 
a spider could get into it and set ‘em off, you know. And you know, that happens in 
businesses if there’s a lot of dust, they’ll set ‘em off. 
 
Interviewee (I): Okay. 
 
FF: But, I mean that happens a lot more, but we’ve also had calls where we’ve had 
fires where the alarm systems went off and that was, that was it. We had one about, 




Eastern engine ran an automatic alarm by themselves during a storm. And what it was 




FF: That there was a fire. The smoke was setting off the alarm where they wer  
going. They pulled up and they had a fire. That’s what caused it! [FF chuckles] 
 
I: There’s like no alarm or anything in that building on fire? 
 
FF: There were people working in it that didn’t even know it was on fire. The attic 
was on fire. There was a lightning strike, caught the attic on fire, people were still 
working, they didn’t know. So the smoke set off the alarm from across the street. 
That’s how we found it. (WCFD firefighter; author’s notation in brackets) 
 
Thus, this quote is a prime example of how a “false alarm” could potentially 
be a true emergency, and why they must be treated by the firefighters as a real 
emergency. In these instances, the responding WCFD firefighters are treating the 
situation as a fire, and thus the same levels of complexity and autonomy/control-
related dimensions are present as in the task needed to be performed when preparing 
for a fire related emergency. However, during the instances where the issue is simply 
a false alarm, the firefighters may assist in resetting the alarm. However, in other 
instances (although not commonplace) these alarms may develop into a full working 
fire. At this point, the task of false fire alarm turns into an actual fire related 
emergency, and we see a shift in the job-contexts (i.e., from non-fire to fire relat d 
emergency). Thus, the firefighters responding to these alarms do have to initiate a 
certain level of autonomy/control-related skill in determining whether the alarm is in 
fact a false alarm, or if instead it is a fire that needs to be handled.  
 Technology also played an important role in the task of firefighters 
responding to the calls, and definitely was particularly a situational factor in 




past 20 years there had been a drastic push in the WCFD to emphasize fire prevention 
among the residents in the City. A major part of this was the increasing presence of a 
smoke detector program where residents were provided free smoke detectors. 
Therefore, this had both positive and negative effects on the WCFD: 
“It’s [smoke alarms] a good and adverse effect of technology I think with us. I think 
it’s increased the amount of places that have automatic fire alarm system . You know, 
it’s definitely I think a bonus to the occupancier (sic) to wherever the structure is that 
if we can get notified of something in its incipient phase and we can get there and do 
something about it…But at the same time the number of calls I think that we handle 
every year where it’s an actual something compared to number of false alarms is you 
know, there’s a big difference. You know, that; and with the false alarms comes (sic) 
wear and tear on the machinery, alarm machinery. And you know, and the possibility 
that our guys are handling a false alarm when they could be on another call. Closer or 
back in their first due area.” (WCFD firefighter; author’s notation in brackets) 
 
Thus, in regards to the responsibilities of a firefighter, alarms can provide earlier
warning of a fire allowing the firefighters to respond quicker, and subsequently 
suppress it quicker minimizing any injury to civilians or property damage. At the 
same time, any instance that a fire company in the WCFD responds to an alarm and is 
no longer in service (i.e., readily available to respond to an emergency call), they are 
not available if a true fire or non-fire related emergency occurs in their first due area. 
Instead, they are handling a false fire alarm that poses no real harm. As noted by 
another firefighter, this by-product of the smoke alarm/detector technology is really a 
catch 22. 
Finally, it is also important to note how exactly this technology has had an 
effect on the skills of the WCFD firefighters. It is obvious that their tasks are altered 
by the increased presence of these alarms; however, it is not in a manner that truly 
affects the skills needed to perform their tasks. In regards to the substantive 




smoke alarms in both residential and business structures has not had any large 
altercation in the manner these firefighters respond and complete the task. Potentially 
newer smoke alarms and fire detection systems installed in newer model busin sse  
may have an ability to increase the knowledge needed by firefighters for reetting 
them. However, this is not typically part of the task for firefighters: in most instances 
the firefighters simply inform the responsible parties which company/organization to 
contact to reset the alarms, and not reset the alarm devices themselves. Ther fore, it 
does not appear that these new alarm systems have altered either skill dimension 
involved in addressing the task of false fire alarms. Furthermore, the increase in the 
number of these false fire alarms that the WCFD responds to also does not appear to 
have affected the skill used to complete this task. Although the volume increase is 
interesting to note, even with a greater number of calls being responded to, the 
firefighters still complete this task in a similar fashion. Now it is simply completed 
more often per shift. 
Mechanical/Maintenance Tasks 
A series of non-fire emergency calls that firefighters both departments must 
address on a fairly regular basis fall under the category of what I would call 
mechanical/maintenance tasks. Except in certain instances, the majority of the 
firefighters I interviewed appeared not to view these types of tasks as “emerg ncies,” 
yet when a call was received they had to respond. Therefore, based on the 
categorization of emergency versus non-emergency used in the present research, 
these mechanical/maintenance tasks fall within the non-fire related em rg ncy job-




firefighters needed to respond to, they also may have occurred simultaneously with 
some other type of non-fire related (or even fire related) emergency. Throughout the 
interviews I conducted at both the WCFD and RCFD, four types of 
mechanical/maintenance tasks were discussed to at least some extent by th  
firefighters I interviewed. 
Flooding 
 The first task, and the one discussed most at length, was flooding. The 
majority of these calls occurred when the water pipe of a residence burst and was 
overflowing into a residence or building.32 These instances occurred throughout the 
year and in different types of structures, but the firefighters I interviewed claimed that 
certain conditions could perpetuate these types of incidents: 
“Most of the time, uh, again it’s a lack of maintenance in the house. Most people 
don’t really pay attention what’s going on in their homes. A lot of times it’s the pipes 
just because it’s frozen or something and they have no idea how to turn the water 
off…A lot of it’s maintenance on it, on these problems. Again, in the City a lot of 
people are renting, the landlords don’t do a whole lot and the renters itself don’t pay 
attention ‘till they have a problem.” (RCFD firefighter) 
 
Thus, many of the firefighters saw flooding in residences as simply non-emergencies, 
but rather as a product of the lack of everyday knowledge by civilians. In addition, a 
change in method of response to flooding had also occurred throughout both the 
WCFD and RCFD within the past ten to 15 years which helped reify this view: 
                                                
32 Busted water pipes overflowing into the house were not the only cause of flooding incidents. For 
example, one WCFD firefighter discussed a incident in which he was involved where a sprinkler 
system in a building had malfunctioned and had to be “plugged” so that was would stop from entering 
the building. Furthermore, during the course of conducting my interviews at the RCFD, there was a 
major water main that broke in the downtown area of River City which created massive flooding and 
forced a series of road closures. While the firefighters played a role in this particular emergency call,
other City government departments were also involved in maintaining and ameliorating the incident. 
However, while these two examples are interesting, it was the instances in which pipes busted that 
were routinely addressed throughout my interviews at both the WCFD and RCFD, and therefore it was 




“We used to go in there, turn the water off, get our vacuum cleaners, and suck the 
water down until you couldn’t get another drop out of the carpet. Now, over the past 
ten years we’ve realized these people are calling [a professional clean-up service], 
so we are eliminating the hazard and we are leaving. Because that’s our job…We 
know there are companies coming in that specialize in that and that’s okay for us to 
leave now which puts us back in service quicker to help someone else. I think that’s a 
good thing.” (WCFD firefighter; author’s notation in brackets) 
 
The procedures of the departments themselves had changed so that firefighters were 
no longer cleaning up all the water created by flooding. Rather, they were simply 
turning off the water and making sure that hazards such as the water reaching 
electrical outlets, or (cited only by RCFD firefighters) the water rising to a level that 
extinguishes the pilot light on a hot water heater (this would allow for a continuous 
flow of gas to enter the building). The ability to spend less time on a routine call for 
flooding may have perhaps been needed due to the increase in the volume of calls 
being received by the firefighters during each shift.  
 In regards to the skill involved when responding to a flooding call, it appeared 
to not be at an overly high level of complexity, particularly for a handful of 
firefighters I interviewed that had received some form of vocational training  areas 
such as plumbing or electricity while in school or prior to joining the fire department. 
Furthermore, even with a rather low level of complexity involved, the shift in 
departmental procedures over the past ten to 15 years removed the portion of this task
where a vacuum/pump (or even basic hand tools such as mops and squeegees) was 
being used. The removal of this component of the task further simplified the 
manipulation involved in the task. In regards to the autonomy/control-related skill 
dimension, these sorts of calls did not generally require a large number of companies 




with a large amount of autonomy. However, as far as the autonomy/control-related 
elements are concerned, there was not a large amount of discretion involved during 
routine flooding calls. The firefighters knew when they arrived that they had to turn 
off the water and contain any potential hazards. As in most instances this involved a 
similar and fairly standard series of manual procedures, autonomy/control-related 
aspects were also not an extremely high level. 
Fluid spills 
 The second form of mechanical/maintenance task that was performed by 
firefighters at both the WCFD and RCFD was fluid spills. These types of tasks simply 
entail the firefighters safely clearing away any potentially harmful fluids or liquids. 
These fluids can range from a variety of substances: oil, anti-freeze, automobile brake 
fluid, blood, or any type of identified or unidentified liquid that may jeopardize the 
safety of civilians, the firefighters themselves, or even the environment. In certain 
instances, fluid spills may actually coincide with another type of non-fire related 
emergency. For example, during incidents where an automobile accident has 
occurred, the result may often not only include a wrecked vehicle and injured 
civilians, but also fluids that need to be addressed. However, there are some instancs 
where a fluid spill may not need to be handled by the firefighters on the engine/truck 
companies as a large amount of liquid may result in the need to call a specialized 
hazmat unit to handle the situation. 
 Similar to handling incidents where flooding has occurred, the absolute 
complexity and autonomy/control-related dimensional aspects of skills are not at an 




when addressing a call for a flood, there has been a change in properly addressing 
fluid spills which has slightly increased the complexity involved: 
“You know, fluid spills. Back then you could actually just take the fire hose and wash 
it down the street. That’s a big ‘no-no’ now. You can’t do that! You got to have 
absorbent down, you got to sweep it all up, you got to collect it. So now it takes more 
time for that. Even if somebody’s hurt, has blood on the sidewalk. We used to be able 
just to wash it off with a fire hose. Now we got to pour bleach on it before we wash it 
down. So yeah, you know a lot more safety factors go into it now.” (WCFD 
firefighter) 
 
Although this change has occurred within the past two decades, and it does involve a 
few more manipulative tasks, it does not drastically change the complexity involved 
but rather it perhaps only creates a slight increasing effect. Even with adding a new 
tool (absorbent, a substance similar to shredded paper), and the need to successfully 
clean up fluids to maintain the safety of others, there is still not an extremely high 
level of mental and manipulative integration or decision-making and discretion being 
implemented. 
Electrical problems 
 Incidents involving power lines or electrical problems were the third type of 
mechanical/maintenance task that firefighters at the WCFD and RCFD would
address. As with the above mentioned mechanical/maintenance issues, the level of 
skill involved during most electrical problems was again not at an extremely high 
absolute level: 
“You turn on a light and all of sudden you see a puff of smoke come out of the 
ceiling, from the wall. Many people have no idea what to do about that, and in most 
cases we’ll investigate and make sure its contained and the metal safety box in the 
wall and turn off the circuit breaker and just to call a professional to come out. And 






Thus, at its basic level the procedures involved with this task are simply identifying 
where the problem is, cutting the power (which as stated above may simply involve 
flipping a circuit breaker switch), and calling an electrician. As evidence by the 
RCFD firefighter quoted above, it is a “simple fix,” is “pretty routine,” and does not 
require an extraordinary amount of complexity and discretion. While this may in f ct 
be the case, it is still an issue civilians are faced with and do not understand how to 
handle.  
Although this low level of skill is present, both fire departments had gained a 
new tool called a hot stick over the course of the past five to ten years. This tool could 
now be used in this situation to more accurately pinpoint where exactly the electrica  
problem was occurring. This tool could sense the amount of electricity passing 
through a wire, light ballast, etc. and caused the firefighters at both departments o 
possess the amount of manipulation and mental integration required to use this tool. 
However, the discretion involved with the task of handling electrical problems was 
also increased. Firefighters needed to make decisions when it was safe to use this
technology. As one WCFD firefighter stated, it was not always readily apparent: 
“You know, if it is out here where the main power lines that carry thousands of 
voltage, you know, if it’s dangling, am I going to walk up with a hot stick? No, I’m 
not going to be nowhere near it. So yeah, you got to know when to use them, the 
limitations of them. If not, that’s when you’re going to get into trouble.” 
 
It is important to note that while the decision needed to be made during all incidents 
where firefighters addressed an electrical problem, this was potentially more 
dangerous during instances where power lines had fallen. These specific type of 
electrical problems (i.e., power lines fallen down) were only discussed by the 




power outages, a procedure similar to dealing with a residential electrical p oblem 
appeared to be used (minus turning off the circuit breaker). In these instances, the 
WCFD firefighters would arrive at the scene to prevent persons from going near the 
fallen (and potentially deadly) power line, and ensure that the electric/power cmpany 
was alerted so that the incident could be addressed. Again, the level of skill did not 
appear to be extremely involved (even though the danger of this situation versus a 
residential electric problem was much greater). 
Testing gases or odors 
 The fourth and final mechanical/maintenance issue that was frequently 
discussed throughout the course of my interviews by firefighters at the WCFD and 
RCFD was testing gases or odors. This type of issues was one that was directly 
impacted by new technologies that have entered the fire department over the previous 
few years. Initially, very rudimentary procedures were used by firefight rs when they 
were called for a suspicious gas/odor, simply because they did not have the abiliy to 
always detect if a harmful or potentially dangerous gas was present. As one firefighter 
mentioned, they would simply smell with their nose to determine if a suspicious odor 
was present and then call the gas and/or power company to come and further 
investigate this smell. Furthermore, even if a gas/odor was able to be identifie , this 
did not necessarily imply that the firefighters could determine what type of gas/odor 
was being detected. Thus, it appeared that although the firefighters were called to 
respond to these incidents, it was not apparent that much skill was involved simply 
due to the fact that the firefighters needed to rely on basic sensory skills that were not 




they would simply respond to the scene and “just babysit it ‘till the gas company gets 
there.” 
 More rudimentary meters first began to be carried by certain apparatuses (e.g., 
in the WCFD these meters were carried by the utility and battalion chiefs; in the 
RCFD they were carried by the fire truck companies). These could only detect a v ry 
limited number of gases (such as carbon monoxide). However, over the past few 
years the firefighters in both departments have had available to them gas meter  that 
could detect and identify a much larger number of gases (four or five) then before. 
Thus, instead of just carbon monoxide, other types of gases could be detected by the 
firefighters themselves without needing to initially call for a power company or 
hazmat unit to respond to the scene.33 In regards to skill levels, these new meters have 
clearly increased the complexity involved during the response to a gas meter as th  
firefighters now must train and familiarize themselves with how to properly use thi  
tool. 
Interviewer (I): What did you use before it, before this meter? 
 
Firefighter (FF): Actually, we didn’t hardly didn’t go out much on ‘em ‘cause a lot 
of people didn’t have a carbon monoxide [ tector]. And it really wasn’t that 
common and when we did have one, we really had a bad situation so you would call a 
hazmat. Because they were the only ones that had it! 
 
I: So it sort of like added these…? 
 
FF: Right. A lot of training, equipment, things like that. (RCFD firefighter; author’s 
notation in brackets) 
 
                                                
33 During the course of my interviews, while the use of four-gas and five-gas meters was frequently 
discussed, the specific types of additional gases that could be measured were not clear. Upon 
reviewing the literature, it appeared that these four/ ive gas meters may detect such gases/odors as 





Training with these new meters was now required for all firefighters. With each new 
meter purchased by the department, the knowledge needed to operate it also 
increased. Thus, the substantive complexity used to perform this task subsequently 
increased. On a side note, also discussed here by this RCFD firefighter was that as 
residences were also installing carbon monoxide meters into their home, this also 
increased the number of calls. This occurred through two instances – legitimate calls, 
but also through false alarms. As with other instances, it appears that although the 
frequency of these calls had increased due to the introduction of technology, the 
actual skill involved when completing this task was not affected. 
Specialty Rescues 
 It is worth noting that over the course of my interviews a few firefighters did 
discuss how on certain occasions, and during certain incidents, they or other 
firefighters may have been involved in specialty rescues. These types of rescues had a 
wide range, and included everything from swift water rescue (e.g., fast moving 
water/rapids), deep water rescue, high angle rescue (e.g., involving tall 
buildings/skyscrapers), confined space rescues (e.g., trapped in a ditch or collapsed 
building), entrapment (e.g., stuck in an elevator), hazardous materials (i.e., hazmat) 
incidents, and even severe medical emergencies (e.g., instances where a victim may 
be mangled with industrial machinery or is in a situation where s/he is not able to be 
transported to a hospital). These situations were quite rare relative to the fire and non-
fire related emergencies that the firefighters faced on a regular basis; however, they 





 Only a handful of firefighters from both departments discussed these types of 
rescues, and it was difficult to make broad sweeping generalizations from these 
interview data about these types of tasks to the either the WCFD or RCFD. However, 
it was apparent that the level of mental and manipulative complexity involved in 
these instances was rather high. For example, when discussing an incident where an 
individual is trapped in an elevator: 
Interviewer: What are you actually doing when you go on these calls? 
 
Firefighter: Well, just like any of it, it all depends on the situation, but mainly we try 
to; we locate where the car is. Uh, try to make contact with the people. And then we 
open the doors. We have keys that we can open the doors to the elevator shaft and 
then that way, then once we can get in its either the people are right there, or like I
said they could be halfway between where then we’re going to have to get a ladder 
and there’s safety things that are supposed to take place as far as killing the power of 
the elevator, blocking it off, especially if its not, you know. You get it where right 
here [uses hands to signify an elevator not being flush with the floor] and then all 
of a sudden you’re bringing the people out and the thing decides to move and the 
thing comes down. (WCFD firefighter; author’s notation in brackets) 
 
Thus, there are a number of procedures that need to be followed to successfully 
rescue a person from a trapped elevator, even when the individual is inches away 
from the firefighter. Other types of specialty rescues may not be as life-threatening, 
but still require a certain level of skill to meet the complexity of the task, and certain 
types of tools that are only carried by individuals with this type of specialty rescue 
training: 
“For instance, like women just used to walk in off the street, or the medics would call 
us. We had like a little Dremel® tool, you know, a little hobby tool. And like we 
carried them…And like somebody would have a ring and she was pregnant. And her 
wedding ring, you know, would be imbedded in her skin. Her finger’s this big. And 
there wasn’t no way. We used to have to cut the ring off. And what you used to do is 
of course metal heats up as you’re cutting it. So we would take a nail file. You slide 
the nail file under the ring and hen you had to take the Dremel® tool, and then you 




you’re doing it you had the syringe filled with water and you had to keep water on it, 
you know.” (RCFD firefighter) 
 
Thus, even in situations that were not life-threatening, a rather high level of 
complexity remained. 
 While the above examples clearly show a high level of substantive complexity 
is involved, the prevalence of the autonomy/control-related skill dimension is less 
apparent. One factor here was that not all firefighters had experienced training in 
these types of rescues. One firefighter in the WCFD stated that while all WCFD 
firefighters were trained to handle confined space rescues, only a few were trained in 
dealing with a large number of hazardous materials. Among the RCFD, one 
firefighter I interviewed had long served as a captain on the RCFD’s specialty rescue 
apparatus. Here, the individuals riding on this apparatus may have themselves gained 
the knowledge and required training to handle a number of these specialty rescues 
compared to other firefighters, but this did not mean that they could handle all 
specialty rescues, or were effective during each of these particular inst nces. This also 
should not be taken to imply that other firefighters who did not serve on the rescue 
apparatus were not trained for these types of tasks. For example, not all firefighters 
who worked on the rescue were trained as scuba divers for deep water rescue, yet 
while I was conducting my interviews in River City I also met a firefighter who did 
not serve on the rescue unit yet was trained as a scuba diver and could assist with 
these deep water rescues if the situation arose. Thus, as far as the autonomy/c trol-
related dimension of specialty rescues was concerned, it did appear rather situational. 




situation, the particular firefighters involved, and the precise specialty rescue training 
they possessed. As one RCFD firefighter discussed regarding a trench collapse: 
Firefighter (FF): With that, the rescue is like the main focus, okay? The SRO 
[Special Rescue Operations] teams are like the main focus but everybody around 
‘em, all the engine and truck companies, they’re the grunts. And you got to have the 
grunts because it’s carrying a lot of lumber, heavy lumber, you use to shore the streets 
up and all. It’s not two-by-fours, it’s big lumber. 
 
Interviewer (I): Yeah. 
 




FF: And so it takes all these people just to assist and help you get the job done. So 
it’s not rescue’s so great, or the dive team’s so great. They get a lot of supprt from 
the whole Department. They get all the credit, but the whole Department, you can’t 
do it without everybody, you know? So ‘Joe Blow’ from the engine that carried ten 
pieces of cribbing, he was just as much help as the guy in the hole [trench] . (RCFD 
firefighter; author’s notation in brackets) 
 
 While most firefighters I spoke to were able to be involved in these specialty rescue 
incidents, and had gained at least some basic specialty rescue training (i.e., increased 
the substantive complexity involved in this skill dimension), this did not exactly 
equate to an increase in autonomy/control-related aspects of these tasks as not all 
individuals possessed the knowledge and training for particular skills that was needed 
to establish a higher level of this skill dimension. 
 Specialty rescue tools also played a large hand in increasing the skill 
possessed by firefighters, particularly affecting the complexity. Different sets of tools 
were available in each department for certain rescues. A number of tools were 
discussed and included everything from elevator keys to specialized hydraulic rescue 
tools, to scuba diving equipment to specialized ropes and harnesses. The use of these 




properly use these tools. Furthermore, these tools had constantly been modified 
throughout the duration of the New Economy, and therefore required firefighters to 
increase their skills in order to use them. However, there were also instances wher  
firefighters may have taken existing tools/technologies and created new uses: 
“People will come up with ideas to use like a simple fire hose. Instead of fillingit 
with water you fill it with air, and now you got if someone’s stuck in the ice, you 
shove the hose out to ‘em and they can grab onto the hose and pull ‘em in. Uh, you 
can use it for hazardous materials. Set up a dike, or if depending on the kind of 
material that might be in the water, the stream, it may be, it might be the kind that 
floats on water. You stick a fire hose out there and that prevents it from flowing 
downstream, and you angle it and it’ll pull right where you want it. And it’s just 
simple stuff that we already had on there that guys will come up with.” (WCFD 
firefighter) 
 
Even existing tools had the potential to be used in a different manner during specialty 
rescues, subsequently increasing the complexity involved while performing the task. 
Summary 
After seeing the numerous and varied tasks that need to be performed by 
firefighters in the non-fire related emergency job-context, it is not surpri ing to hear a 
firefighter state that residents in the area “call for everything.” From life-threatening 
situations such as major automobile accidents to administering CPR and using an 
AED, to other matters that are arguably not true” emergencies such as responding to 
an alarm that has malfunctioned, or turning water off to prevent flooding, the 
firefighters at the WCFD and RCFD faced a plethora of widely assorted tasks within 
this particular job-context. The dominant general pattern regarding skill that was 
found within this context was that with one small exception (handling flooded 
residences), there was no evidence that the skills used by firefighters in he non-fire 




both skill dimensions, and the impact of technology, it appears that in most tasks the 
level of skill required had actually been raised. The skill requirements to succes fully 
complete all the required tasks within this job-context is clearly at a relatively high 
level and shows no real sign of being removed or even diminished. 
 Providing first aid/medical care, handling automobile accidents, and 
performing specialty rescues clearly involved a rather high level of substantive 
complexity, and this particular dimension among all three of these skills appeared to 
show signs of increasing. Even when performing first aid/medical care to a victim
where both the WCFD and RCFD differed in absolute level of skill, there was clearly 
still evidence that showed that more complexity was needed by the firefighters to 
successfully perform their tasks. As for other tasks such as conducting CPR and using 
an AED and performing mechanical/maintenance tasks, the absolute levels of 
substantive complexity involved may have not been as high, and in almost all of these 
instances (with the exception of responding to floods) there was evidence that the 
amount of complexity involved was continuing to climb. In fact, it was only one task 
– responding to false fire alarms – that the complexity involved appeared somewhat 
stagnant throughout the New Economy. 
While the complexity had clearly increased among these various tasks in the 
non-fire emergency related job-context, the shift in the autonomy/control-related skill 
dimension was less pronounced. For certain tasks it was difficult to determine the 
precise autonomy/control-related skill that was involved. This appeared due to one of 
two reasons. First, it could be that a specific situation of a particular task facilitated 




specifically during the task of addressing automobile accidents or a specific type of 
specialty rescue. Second, the actual training possessed by a firefighter also had a hand 
in determining the autonomy/control-related skill that was involved. This was 
extremely evident in first aid/medical emergencies. For example, this dimension was 
much more prevalent in the RCFD where certain firefighters had paramedic train ng, 
where as in the WCFD the firefighters had only EMT-B training and work in 
cooperation with a rescue/ambulance service to provide the needed care. Furthermore, 
even within the RCFD there were differences in the level of autonomy/control-related 
skill available to the firefighter during medical emergencies, again depen ing on 
whether or not the firefighter was trained as an EMT-B or paramedic. As for 
responding to false fire alarms, and the level of discretion had remained relatively 
stable throughout the course of the New Economy, yet during other tasks the levels 
appeared to have increased (even if this increase was only slight). This does not imply 
that there was an abundance of decision-making that needed to occur within these 
certain situations, yet there was a need for a larger amount of discretion than 20 or 
more years ago. 
Clearly the picture of the non-fire related emergency job-context does involve more 
skill than was needed 20 years ago prior to the shift to the New Economy. What is 
also relatively easy to see is that new technologies have played a major role in this 
shift. A number of these technologies have been introduced by the fire departments 
themselves. Items such as the AED, Hurst® tool, car cribbing, hot sticks, four/five-
gas meters, and a variety of medical equipment have all been added to the 




trained on and understand how to use to perform the tasks required in this job-
context. Furthermore, new tasks such as administering an electric shock via AED nd 
determining precisely what gas is causing a certain odor are also now available to 
firefighters where they have previously not been able to perform such tasks without 
the assistance and knowledge of how to use these technologies. Furthermore, 
technologies external to the WCFD and RCFD themselves have also played a role. 
For example, newer types and models of cars and increased use of smoke or carbon 
monoxide detectors also have played a unique role in the shift of the skills of 
firefighters. Thus, even with instances where the skill used by firefighters in the non-
fire related emergency context is increasing on both the substantive complexity and 
autonomy/control-related dimensions, new tools and technologies are still playing a 
role in further facilitating the change of skill among firefighters. In fact, it can be 
argued that these tools and technologies have played a larger role in this change for 
the non-fire related emergency job-context than in the fire station, fire related 











Chapter 7:  “My Other House” – The Fire Station 
 
In this chapter, the tasks and skills required at the fire station job-context will 
be detailed. It is clear the skills used by firefighters to complete tasks during fire 
related and non-fire related emergencies happen in a fluid manner, and often require a 
higher absolute level of complexity and autonomy. However, at the fire station this is 
not the case. Here, the various skills need to be completed are performed somewhat 
independently from one another, and have the potential to be frequently interrupted 
due a need to respond to a fire or non-fire emergency. Thus, unlike both emergency 
job-contexts where the skills needed may sometimes overlap or occur simultaneously, 
the skills used at a fire station are compartmentalized, and rarely a performed in a 
situation where they overlap with one another. In addition, there is also a sense of 
predictability to these skills, as during each shift a firefighter knows whatskills s/he 
will have to use at the fire station. This aspect of the fire station job-context is qui e 
different from that of the fire emergency and non-fire emergency context where the 
number and types of calls, and the skills needed to be used during these calls, can be 
unpredictable from shift to shift. Each firefighter knows that their shift begins at the 
fire station and will inevitably end at the fire station. 
The fire station is also the job-context at which firefighters at both Waterville 
City and River City spent most of their time (those at the Waterville City Fire 
Department [WCFD] spent more time at this station simply due to the shear volume 
of emergency calls was less than at the River City Fire Department [RCFD]). 




for 24 hours,” and often took pride in the history and appearance of their fire station. 
This was also the job-context in which firefighters often had downtime from constant 
(sometimes seemingly endless) work. It is where they sleep, where they at, and 
where socialization with other firefighters takes place. Ideally it was a context where 
they could recharge after physically and mentally exerting themselves at an extreme 
level while handling an emergency. As was stated in numerous RCFD interviews, th  
amount of energy exerted by a firefighter during a standard room-and-contents fire 
was more than the average person exerts at an entire 40 hour work week. Thus, this 
downtime would initially appear as an important component to produce optimal 
results when navigating emergencies that occur within the fire related and non-fire 
related emergency job-contexts. 
During a number of my interviews, however, when discussing the fire station 
firefighters at both departments quickly became defensive over what goes on at the 
station. While the station did involve time for them to relax, there were also a number 
of tasks that need to be completed on a regular basis at the fire station. Through my 
preparation for interviews and pre-testing, I did expect somewhat of a defensiv  
reaction when discussing daily activities around the fire station as I knew that certain 
tasks needed to be completed. However, after only interviewing a few of the 
firefighters from the WCFD, I was amazed at the shear number of tasks that needed to 
be completed at the fire station, and how time intensive these tasks could be. By 
listening to the firefighters’ discussions of daily life at the fire station, and 




quickly came to understand why the firefighters were so defensive about the public’s 
misperception of what actions truly occur behind closed doors at the fire station. 
There were four main tasks that needed to be completed at the fire station. 
While these tasks did not need to be completed with the urgency of those tasks in the 
fire and non-fire emergency job-contexts, or arguably carried the complexity and 
autonomy/control-related aspects as the two emergency job-contexts discussed in 
earlier chapters, they still remained a mandatory component to the firefighters’ 
occupation. The tasks that firefighters performed on a regular basis in the fire station
job-context included having to check/assess their personal equipment and respectiv  
apparatus, complete daily housecleaning and general maintenance, fulfill incident and 
activity reports, and participate in various types of training. In the following pages, 
each of these tasks will be discussed at length in greater detail.  
Checking/Assessing Personal Equipment and the Apparatus 
The first task that firefighters are responsible for at the fire station is checking 
and assessing the equipment used when responding to emergency calls. This included 
all tools and equipment (including the apparatus, or the fire engine/fire truck) that 
were used by firefighters while responding to fire or non-fire related emergencies. At 
both WCFD and RCFD, their respective department’s formal operating guidelines 
stated that these equipment checks should be completed at the beginning of every 
shift. Thus, upon the surface this was not an issue in which potential existed for 
firefighters to make decisions and insert their agency. In fact, it was looked at by 
many as quite simple – when you begin your shift, the first thing you do is check all 




However, as with all other tasks that fall into the fire station and non-fire non-
emergency contexts, some flexibility needs to exist when completing these particular 
tasks. As firefighters noted, fire and non-fire emergencies obviously take priority over 
all other non-emergency tasks (such as checking equipment), and therefore this task 
may not be accomplished immediately upon the start of one’s shift. As one RCFD 
firefighter stated about the equipment check/assessment process: 
“They give us according to the rules and regs [regulations], there’s a three hour 
window that you know you have. It doesn’t take anywhere near three hours, but you 
know we could get interrupted at any time so that’s why I think they have that time 
limit; that time frame set up.” (Author’s notation in brackets) 
 
Thus, there was the possibility for the firefighter to complete the actions involved in 
this task, control the manner and speed in which this task was completed, and not 
identically follow the respective fire department’s formal operating guidelines. 
However, this possibility was not a decision made by the firefighter him/herself, but 
rather dictated by tasks outside the fire station job-context. Thus, this control present 
in the actions was not indicative of specific decision-making and problem-solving 
actions on the firefighters’ part. Rather the control set over this task by the official 
guidelines was able to be substituted with another: an emergency call response. 
Therefore, a low level of autonomy/control-related skill dimension remains over this 
task, regardless of which source – the operating guidelines or an emergency call – is
establishing autonomy/control.  
This instance provides a good example of the difference between Braverman’s 
autonomy/control skill dimension (Braverman 1998/1974; Spenner 1985), and the 
autonomy/control-related skill dimension used in this present research. As mentioned 




particular occupation, and (per Marx) the effects that they have on human nature, the 
autonomy/control dimension at face value is not indicative of skill, but rather related 
to skill. Discretion does not equate to a set of tasks which need to be completed, and 
having a certain level of discretion present does not translate to having more/less 
tasks, but rather the influence of other circumstances outside of skill. However, 
having more or less discretion does affect a worker’s decision making, problem-
solving, self-control, and other discretion-related action needed to perform a 
particular task. Therefore, these are the particular autonomy/control-related skills 
which are present in this dimension. 
 To the large majority of firefighters, the view was shared that the process of 
checking equipment and the apparatus was a fairly simple and routine process, yet a 
vital component to their jobs. Firefighters at both Waterville City and River City 
realized that if their equipment was not working properly, they would not be able to 
respond to emergency calls. The process began by simply showing up to the station. 
Each firefighter would come to the station to relieve another firefighter from the 
proceeding shift. Thus, the first and last few minutes of a firefighter’s shift involved a 
conversation and exchange of information with the individual from the previous shift 
for whom they were relieving (or replacing). While this might entail friendly 
conversation, each firefighter would get a “run down” from the previous shift: if any 
equipment was missing, if any part of the apparatus or piece of equipment was 
damaged or not working, and if there was any piece of equipment that the incoming 




 After the information exchange, one’s own personal protective equipment 
(PPE) equipment would be checked, including the self-contained breathing apparatus 
(SCBA), to ensure that all is working properly and ready to go. In addition, all 
equipment located on the apparatus (i.e., basic hand tools, AED, hydraulic rescue 
tools, etc.) is checked to ensure it is in proper working order. Each driver is also 
responsible for ensuring their respective fire engine or truck is up and running and in 
working order. While firefighters not certified as drivers may assist in the process, it 
was the sole responsibility of the drivers to ensure their apparatus and the equipment 
it contained was in working order. All equipment and apparatus assessment involved 
the firefighters manually ensuring that all equipment was working, and could be used 
at a moment’s notice if one needed to respond to an emergency. A firefighter from the 
WCFD summed this up nicely: 
“We pretty much have a routine. We come in [during]  the mornings. We do our daily 
check-off to our apparatus that we’re assigned to, where here’s Engine Two. And 
that’s pretty much; we go over the equipment top to bottom, making sure everything 
is in working functional (sic), nothing missing, nothing broken. That usually takes 
about an hour, an hour and a half with two of us working on it. And that’s everything. 
We check all, make sure all the lights are working. It’s all inclusive, literally put your 
hands on everything.” (Author’s notation in brackets) 
 
Both the WCFD and RCFD had checklists that could be used in completing this 
equipment check-off/assessment. However, as the WCFD firefighter discussed above, 
the task itself involved manual labor, but became quite routine, and this checklist was 
not relied upon to guide the firefighters throughout the task’s completion. This was 
mainly the case for older and experienced firefighters – not those who were newly 




 Over the course of the past 20 years, the task itself that needed to be 
completed remained the same, and therefore the same process was used by 
firefighters to check their equipment. However, the introduction of new tools and 
technologies did somewhat increase the complexity of the task: 
“Even if you go back a century ago, they did the exact same stuff that we’re doing 
nowadays, but instead of taking care of the engines, they took care of horses, or they 
took care of the steamer…Um, I may have higher priced toys to take care of, or 
maintenance. They didn’t have battery operated stuff. I’ve got a whole host of 
batteries to check everyday, between the thermal imager, the PASS alarms,the 
flashlights. They didn’t have any of that kind of stuff. So, you know, nothing’s really 
changes, just a little bit of the technology’s changed.” (WCFD firefighter) 
 
Tools such as the thermal imager and personal alert safety system (PASS) device that 
have been introduced to firefighting during the New Economy simply increased the 
types and amount of items needed to be accounted during this task. In addition, as 
existing technology becomes more advanced, there are more pieces to check. For 
example, the SCBA not only needed to be checked that their air bottles are full and 
they are properly flowing air from the bottle to the mask, but newer models now have 
electronic gauges in the visors that have to be checked, in addition to the PASS 
device that is now integrated into the SCBA. In addition to this increase in the amount 
of equipment needed to be checked, the amount of time required to complete this task 
subsequently increased. As noted by one firefighter, this task used to take about only 
15 to 20 minutes to complete, but now consumes approximately an hour of his shift. 
Housecleaning 
Basic housecleaning 
Although the checking and assessment of equipment and apparatuses may be 




maintenance tend to be the next task for firefighters. As would be expected, this task 
generally involved basic, everyday cleaning duties that contributed to the 
maintenance and upkeep of the fire station. On a daily basis, firefighters were 
expected to clean the toilets and bathrooms, sweep, vacuum, and mop the floors of 
the fire station, cook meals, wash and put away dishes, and make their beds. This 
form of housecleaning involved the use of very basic housecleaning tools (i.e., 
brooms, mops, buckets, vacuum cleaners, and cleaning chemicals) which had 
remained consistent over the past 20 years and longer. Many of these basic 
housecleaning tasks were expected to be completed throughout one’s shift on an “as 
needed” basis. However, the abilities to make decisions regarding when to clean and 
how to proceed were left up to the firefighters. Thus, these daily cleaning tasks did 
not necessarily involve large amounts of complexity, but a firefighter’s autonomy and 
control over them was rather high. 
 In addition to this daily cleaning, both the WCFD and RCFD operating 
guidelines had established a weekly schedule for individual housecleaning duties that 
needed to be completed during each shift depending on the day of the week.34 This 
weekly schedule was not a newly created portion of the housecleaning task – it had 
been in existence as long as most firefighters could remember. For example, the shift 
that worked on Tuesdays at the WCFD had the assigned duty of cleaning the kitchen; 
those Waterville City firefighters who worked on Wednesday were responsible for 
doing laundry (and so on). This continued throughout the week and included duties 
                                                
34 As the RCFD had both day and night shifts, it is important to distinguish when the weekly scheduled 
housecleaning duties had to be completed. These weekly housecleaning duties scheduled at the RCFD 
were scheduled for their day shift, and not the evening shift. For example, if the RCFD’s B shift 
worked during the day on Monday, and the C shift worked during the night, the weekly housecleaning 




such as cleaning equipment used to fight fire and handle other non-fire emergencies 
and the apparatus itself (done within the fire station as part of basic housecleaning 
duties), washing windows, and polishing the brass within the station (including the 
poles used by firefighters when responding to a fire).  
As with the daily housecleaning duties, these weekly scheduled duties did not 
involve complex actions, but were viewed by the firefighters, their commanding 
officers, and the department itself as essential for the fire station and apparatuses to 
maintain proper working order. Although each respective firefighter department’s 
guidelines set precedent as to what days these tasks needed to be completed, there 
still existed the discretion for the firefighters to decide when they wereto complete 
them. In addition, the firefighters also had some discretion to adjust this weekly 
rotating schedule if there was a need to do so. If something was recognized as 
needing to be cleaned, or even if there was a “slow” day (i.e., not a large number of 
emergencies to which the firefighters were responding), additional housecleaning 
may be completed just to help maintain the fire station. For example, one RCFD I had 
interviewed discussed how the day prior to his interview they were all “bored” and 
decided to empty and clean out a storage closet, and strip and wax its floor. 
Throughout the discussions of housecleaning at the RCFD, the reoccurring 
theme of romanticizing the past again surfaced. A number of the senior firefighters 
discussed that a number of the newly recruited firefighters had tendencies to us this 
autonomy to simply not complete the tasks required. While this was supposedly not 
the norm around the fire station, in some instances these experiences led to a removal 




officers when to clean, and subsequently their decision-making abilities wer 
removed. This was not necessarily an absolute decrease in autonomy, but only a 
short-term, temporary instance that this autonomy/control-related dimension skill 
dimension was revoked. Unlike the RCFD, the firefighters at Waterville City’s 
department gave no indication of this being the case. In fact, a reoccurring theme
during interviews with these Waterville City firefighters was the statement that 
because their battalion chief and captain worked at the main headquarters and did not 
physically work in the fire station(s) (unlike the captains and lieutenants at the
RCFD), there was no constant direct supervision over these firefighters aside from a 
daily visit to the station by the battalion chief and/or captain. Thus, the opportunity 
for this removal of the autonomy-related skill dimension was not readily available for 
these firefighters. 
Station maintenance 
 In addition to the basic housecleaning, firefighters were many times 
charged with the task of needing to complete building and equipment maintenance at 
the fire station: 
“Well you know; that’s funny too because I talk to pedestrians or the ordinary citizen 
and they find it hard to believe all the things we have to do in the firehouse. And 
basically we’re maintaining the firehouse. The City provides us with a building and 
basically that’s it. Everything else we’re responsible for from the cleaning to the, you 
know, upkeep; the maintenance, you know. I’ve been here a long time. I’ve actually 
helped construct quite a few things, actually had to fix quite a few things, so you 
know, it’s an ongoing thing. When we’re not out fighting fire, there’s always 
something to do even in here at the firehouse. We’re always, you know, updating and 
always cleaning and maintaining. And this firehouse is a hundred years old, so it 





General maintenance duties such as replacing doors and windows, painting, 
completing basic plumbing and electrical work, automotive maintenance, and even 
helping to maintain the emergency power generator were all tasks that were 
completed by those firefighters at their respective stations. However, unlike basic 
housecleaning duties which remained relatively stagnant and arguably were not 
impacted by technology, there were two important variables that influenced this 
general maintenance. 
 The first variable that played a direct impact in this task fell along the lines of 
shifting social class backgrounds of firefighters. Many firefighters whom I 
interviewed had 15 to 20 years of experience working in their respective departmnts. 
Many came from working class backgrounds, and had learned various trade skills, 
from either their fathers or public vocational training in high school. In addition, prior 
to becoming a firefighter, a number of those interviewed served a handful of years in 
traditional blue-collar occupations as plumbers, electricians, or factory workers. Two 
interviewees even mentioned serving in the military. This may not be very surprising. 
These blue-collar jobs were part of the nature of the economy at the time when many 
of the older firefighters I interviewed were in childhood and adolescence, when their 
fathers were working, and characteristic of both Waterville City and River City 
during that time period. Therefore, a healthy knowledge of various trade labor skills 
existed among many of the senior firefighters, and it was these skills that were drawn 





 However, there was also evidence that this knowledge used to maintain the 
fire station and apparatus was beginning to decrease. As many of the newer (and 
younger) firefighters were raised in the New Economy, less emphasis appeared to be 
placed on this type of trade labor in lieu of more “professional” skills, such as 
knowledge of computers, that were more readily used in many of the service-type 
occupations available in the New Economy. Therefore, with less of this (trade labor) 
knowledge in existence, the level of general maintenance that was needed could no 
longer be completed in-house by these firefighters. Rather, outside contractrs or 
other persons were hired by the fire departments to complete the required 
maintenance, and less of this general maintenance may have been completed by the 
firefighters themselves. With both the WCFD and RCFD experiencing (or recently 
experienced) a number of new firefighters entering their departments, this was 
characteristic of both fire departments.  
 The second variable impacting the general maintenance firefighters perform in 
the fire station job-context are the station and apparatus themselves. As both fire 
departments were stationed in historic cities, the WCFD and RCFD both had fire 
stations that were quite dated. The fire service is steeped with tradition, and many 
firefighters stationed in these historic buildings were enamored with the long history 
many of these stations contained. In fact, while walking to various fire stations the 
thought often crossed my mind of how these buildings were reminiscent of many 
black-and-white photographs I had seen of the fire service. The interior was just the 
same. Tin ceilings, linoleum floors, and flimsy wood paneling were standard fare in 




older stations, as this was an important feature in previous decades of the fire service 
as it prevented the horses from entering the firefighter’s quarters. Old black-and-
white photographs hung throughout these stations – mostly in the kitchen and 
common areas – which stood as a testament to the physical consistency these sta ions 
had maintained over the years.  
As these structures continually wear down over time, this tended to increase 
the amount of maintenance that was required. In some instances, it appeared that 
completing this general maintenance was quite frequent. As stated by one RCFD 
firefighter: 
“You know this [fire station] was built in 1888… Rebuilt in 1902. Last major 
renovation was in the ‘50s, interior. Last major exterior renovation was in 1902. I 
think it’s pretty good. And we don’t have people come in and do most of our stuff. 
You know if we have a major electrical issue, yes, we have to get an electrician out 
here. If we have a major water issue we have to go get a company in. But other than 
that, you maintain it. We paint walls, we fix holes in stuff, we replace doors, we mak  
it work!” (Author’s notation in brackets.) 
 
Therefore, the particular fire station at which a firefighter was assigned played a role 
in determining how prevalent this task was for a firefighter while in the fire station 
job-context. For some assigned to newer stations, the station itself required less 
maintenance on a consistent basis. 
 In addition to the fire station itself, the fire apparatus also required general 
maintenance. General maintenance on the vehicle was performed in-house by the 
drivers of the apparatus. Drivers at both the WCFD and RCFD were formally trained 
to perform standard vehicle maintenance on the apparatus, and it was their 
responsibility. Here, a similar pattern to the station was also followed, and as the




played a role, and the more a fire engine or truck was used the more it may require
general maintenance. 
 While the first variable influencing the task of general maintenance was due 
primarily to a broad shift in the firefighters’ social class backgrounds, this second 
variable was a factor due to technology. As new technology was introduced to the 
station and apparatus, it was not able to remove completely these routine maintenance 
tasks of firefighters, but did slightly decrease some of them. For example, one of 
these new technologies was the ventilation system. These systems were an important 
component of the fire station as they minimized the amount of hazardous exhaust 
fumes that were produced by a fire apparatus running inside the fire station. As the 
national initiative of the fire service over the past 10 to 15 years was to increase the 
occupational safety among firefighters, these types of technologies appeared to be 
updated and discussed more frequently. A few months prior to the interviews I 
conducted at the WCFD, all of their fire stations recently had new ventilation systems 
installed. This new system replaced an older system that had to be more frequently 
cleaned by the firefighters. These systems were constructed in a manner such that less 
routine maintenance of these systems was needed. 
 Technology introduced to fire engines and trucks functioned in a similar 
manner. It was clear that the firefighters who drove these engines still needed to 
perform general maintenance on them, but some components of the apparatuses were 
now self-maintained. For example, one firefighter spoke of the previous engine that 
he drove. It had various cup valves that needed to constantly be oiled so that they 




vehicle he no longer had to perform this maintenance task. This newer fire engine 
now had a system built into it that self-oiled these cup valves, and there was no need 
for this task to be performed. Thus, in this example the Autor, Levy, and Murnane 
(ALM) hypothesis (Autor et al. 2002; 2003a; 2003b) explains how new technology 
has replaced a routinized task that was once needed to be completed by the driver of a 
fire engine. 
Giving consideration to both trade labor skills and backgrounds of firefighters, 
the fire stations, apparatuses, and related technologies, distinctions exist along both 
the lines of substantive complexity and autonomy/control-related dimensions. The 
general maintenance performed at a fire station may contain slightly less complexity 
due to both the decrease in the informal knowledge possessed by firefighters to 
perform these tasks, and at the same time the introduction of new fire stations, 
apparatuses, and related technologies. However, even with some of these routine 
maintenance tasks able to be replaced, there are still many that are performed by 
firefighters at both Waterville City and River City. On the other hand, it appe rs the 
autonomy/control-related dimension of general maintenance tasks remains quite 
strong. It is expected that the firefighters maintain these stations, but rather the 
amount of maintenance they are able to complete is discretionary. Each individual has 
their own level of knowledge of various skills required to perform general 
maintenance tasks, it is left up to them and their company officer as to whether or not 
these tasks can be completed in-house or externally. 
A final issue that affects both basic housecleaning and routine maintenance 




ultimately are stopped for any incoming emergency response, as these responses take 
priority. Thus, during shifts which these responses are more numerous, these tasks are 
often not completed until later in the day (the majority of firefighters stated that while 
not written in stone, they attempt to complete these tasks by mid-morning/early 
afternoon), or even occasionally not at all. 
Incident and Activity Reporting 
At both the WCFD and RCFD there were mandated reporting procedures that 
needed to be completed after every fire related or non-fire related emergency to 
which a company responded. Often firefighters at both stations attempted to complete 
this task as soon as they returned from a call,35 but as with other tasks firefighters 
completed in the fire station job-context, the completion of this task revolved around 
the need to respond to other emergency calls. While this task was mandated at both 
departments, there were clear differences as to the process needed to complete them.  
At the WCFD, the task of incident reporting required that standardize reporting forms 
be manually completed (in duplicate) by the responding firefighter. One copy was 
then filed away for that firefighter’s respective station, while the other copy was 
received by the main administration office at the WCFD. While on the surface this 
appears as a rather rudimentary process, the steps it took to complete and submit each 
incident form was surprisingly involved, and as jokingly stated by one WCFD 
firefighter, “Sometimes the paperwork takes longer than the call itself.” 
                                                
35 It is important to note that incident reporting was not always a task that WCFD firefighters who 
responded to an incident were required to complete. For certain incidents to which a battalion chief or 
captain responded, it was one of these commanding officers that would complete the incident report. In 




 Each incident was reported using a standardized form to which the firefighters 
had access. These incident report forms were similar to that of the RCFD in that it 
asked for similar information such as various times that events occurred surrounding 
the incident (i.e., time the emergency call was received, time the fire company 
responded to the scene, etc.), what personnel were involved with the scene, 
information about injuries/fatalities, and also a narrative of the incident. The first step 
in completing these forms was that the firefighters often had to phone the 911 call 
center to receive their times. However, on a few occasions this was not the case and 
this information would be faxed over to the fire station. Once this information was 
received, the firefighters could continue to fill in the remaining incident information. 
After the forms were completed, one copy was filed internally at the station, while the 
other copy was placed in an outgoing mailbox and physically retrieved by a WCFD 
battalion chief or captain during their daily “rounds” (or visits) to each indiv dual fire 
station in Waterville City. The final step in the process was that the commanding 
officer then delivered the hard copy of these reports to an administrative assistant at 
the main WCFD headquarters. This assistant would then enter the information from 
these incident reports into the computer using a type of software called Firehouse. 
This software is designed for the emergency incident reporting by fire departments, 
and is readily advertised in widely circulated firefighter trade journals. 
 According to the ALM hypothesis (Autor et al. 2002; 2003a; 2003b), the 
process of incident reporting is a routinized task that uses a standardized report for 
each incident. Alone this logic would argue that the introduction of computers would 




firefighters’ daily routines. However, as also noted by Author and colleagues, the 
manner in which computers are introduced and implemented plays a vital role in the 
ability for computers and computerized technologies to remove skill from one’s jb. 
In other words, in the case of these firefighters not only is the issue whether or not 
computers were introduced to the task of incident reporting, but also h w they were 
introduced to be used with this task. 
 At the WCFD, most fire stations did have a desktop computer, printer, and 
access to a wireless Internet connection. In addition, a digital template of th  report 
was also made available to the firefighters that could be accessed using acomputer, 
and completed on the computer. However, this electronic form then had to be printed 
out in duplicate from this computer and physically placed in the station’s records and 
the outgoing mailbox to be retrieved by the commanding officer. As detailed by one 
WCFD firefighter: 
“There is (sic) a couple of stations, the one I’m at today, we can do reports on the 
computer, which may seem archaic. We can type it up on the computer and print it 
out. Which, that to us is high-tech. Everybody else [referring to other fire 
departments] gets online and types it up and emails it, or whatever. So the thing that 
has changed is reports have gone from handwritten – some stations still have it – 
carbon copies to putting them on the computer and doing them that way.” (Author’s 
notation in bold brackets) 
 
Thus, although computers were readily available at each fire station, and incident 
reporting was mainly a routine task, there was no removal of this skill from the 
firefighters’ jobs. In fact, this was readily recognized by some firefighters. Comments 
were even made that although computers had been introduced, incident reporting was 
still completed via “snail mail.” A handful of WCFD firefighters I interview d even 




completing the forms. This was completed by using a blank incident reporting form 
on top, a sheet of carbon paper (kept under “lock and key” as it was a dated 
technology that was difficult to obtain) underneath, and finally another hardcopy of 
the incident reporting form on the bottom underneath the carbon paper. 
 While reporting was routinized and recently computerized, and Firehouse 
incident reporting software was being used, the lack of impact of computers on 
Waterville City firefighter’s skills was referenced by the fire ghters themselves as 
stemming from a lack of IT support provided by the local Waterville City 
government. There was a disjuncture between the firefighters initially entering this 
information at their respective fire stations, and the administrative assistant  entering 
this information into the computerized reporting system. A lack of email use and a 
functioning intranet had not been made available which may have allowed for this 
task of reporting to be eliminated or drastically reduced as a responsibility falling 
upon the firefighters. Although the firefighters at Waterville City had been informed 
that improved computer support that would decrease the amount of time and effort in 
completing this task was being implemented in the near future, it had not yet 
occurred. Thus, drawing back from the ALM hypothesis, although the task is 
routinized, and the computerized technology had been implemented, the method of its 
implementation was an overriding factor that did not lead to any dramatic skill 
change in incident reporting among WCFD firefighters. However, the introduction of 
computers did show some increase in skill among the firefighters. In addition, it 




used during incident reporting, it did create the potential of a greater change in skill 
(specifically decreasing the routinized aspects of this task) in the future. 
 In the case of the RCFD, this task was performed a bit differently. First, as 
each engine and truck company had a commanding officer assigned, it was the 
responsibility of the commanding officer to complete the incident reporting for each 
shift. The firefighters and even the drivers did not have to perform this task with the 
exception of more sporadic occasions that a captain or lieutenant was not working a 
specific shift. It then became the job of the firefighter filling in this position (referred 
to as the “first acting man”). Another difference between the completion of this task 
at the RCFD and WCFD was that as the RCFD responded to many more calls than 
the WCFD, they ultimately had to complete more incident reports. While this did not 
directly affect the substantive complexity or autonomy/control-related dimensions of 
this particular skill for firefighters, it did increase the shear prevalence of this task 
within the fire station job-context. 
 Unlike the WCFD, the use of computers was an essential component to the 
successful completion of reporting at the RCFD and affected the manner in which this 
task was complete. With the introduction of computers to the fire station in 2002, all 
incident reports were completed on the computer. Now, instead of completing the 
incident reports in hard copy, these could be completed directly on the computer via 
software similar to Firehouse. A personal login was required by all individuals 
completing incidents on this software, and allowed anyone with access to the system 
to login and view the various incident reports from around the department. This 




this task at River City to differ from Waterville City in two distinct manners. First, 
because these incident reports were connected via a secure city-wide network, it 
removed the need for a firefighter to drive around the city to each individual fire 
station and physically retrieve these reports. Subsequently, this also prevented th  
need for an administrative assist or other support staff to transfer the informati n 
contained in these incident reports to some electronic record keeping system. Thus, 
while this manner did prevent some routinized aspects of this task from being 
completed, the removal of these steps in the task had relatively minimal impacton the 
skills of firefighters in the job-context of the fire station. 
 Secondly, some portion of this routinized task was able to be removed from 
firefighters. With this electronic incident reporting system, and the ability for others 
to access these incident reports, firefighters in River City could now be provided 
certain information fields contained in these reports via this network or other 
computerized communication systems. Thus, the need to call the 911 call center was 
now removed from the task of reporting. For incidents to which a fire company 
responded, they now would receive some information regarding the incident (i.e. 
location and times) through this electronic equipment. In most cases this information 
could be retrieved directly from the sheet of paper that was printed as an incoming 
emergency call was received at the fire station. 
 Thus, on the surface it appears that routinization had simplified the task of 
incident reporting for firefighters in the RCFD, but these computers and electronic 
reporting also had a variety of issues that countered this decrease in skill involved in 




to be completed. The first issue was that during the same time computers were plac d 
in the fire stations, the then-mayor of River City established a city-wide program to 
electronically report all activities performed by city government employees. This was 
an effort to establish greater accountability and (ideally) increase productivity.36 
Thus, while reporting had always been completed by the RCFD, with the 
establishment of this electronic reporting system the firefighters stated a number of 
additional reports were now required to be completed. These reports did not focus on 
emergency incidents per se, but rather involved more detailed record keeping of fire 
company activities such as smoke detector installation and training activities. As one 
captain in the RCFD stated: 
“To be honest with you, since we’ve received computers I’m finding myself spending 
more time in the office than I should. It’s become a job where I became a data entry 
operator, with so many different programs. Before I would; (sic) an officer or a 
lieutenant or a captain would go upstairs and an hour he would be done. Now I’m 
spending two, three, three hours a day up there. So it really to me, the ‘upgrade,’ so-
called, computers have not helped my job.” 
 
Thus, while computers were able to change some of the skills needed to complete 
incident reports, at the same time these computers allowed for the new city-wide 
reporting system to be implemented and subsequently create additional procedures 
involved with reporting. In addition, many firefighters at the RCFD who performed 
this task on a regular basis did not view the implementation of these computers and 
software in a very positive light. 
                                                
36 Although national incident fire incident reporting systems exist, this city-wide reporting system was
independent of any national system. In addition, while t e state of Maryland is a participant in this 
National Fire Incident Reporting System (NFIRS) (USFA 1997), it was not mentioned by any 
firefighter interviewed. Therefore, it is unknown if this information contained in these incident reports 
was eventually included in the NFIRS. However, the issue may also exist that as the firefighters 
themselves do not directly use the NFIRS data as part of their daily activities, and (if these incident 
reports are eventually included in this national system) therefore do not relate this inclusion of their 




 The second aspect of how these computers were implemented involved an 
inadequate amount of training. As discussed above when detailing the task of 
checking/assessing equipment and apparatuses, many of the experienced firfighters 
(such as those commanding officers involved with completing the task of reporting) 
were products of working class families and collectively have a rather extensive 
knowledge of trade skills. However, their ability to use computers is rather limited. 
Thus, while some basic training is available to many of these firefighters, a number of 
firefighters I interviewed expressed the views that this training was inadequate. This 
was due not only to the limited training they received on this computer software, but 
also the fact that the training did not account for the fact that many of these 
individuals had minimal experience with computers. Thus, in these particular 
instances firefighters would often view the computers as extending the amount of 
time required to complete this task and also creating a general frustration with 
completing reports. 
 Another issue that arose with the implementation of these computers and 
reporting software was that since their installation in the early 2000’s, they have not 
been updated. During my first visit to a RCFD fire station, I was able to see fir thand 
how frustrating using this system can be. I was able to sit down with a captain of that
station’s fire engine and was shown the outdated version of Microsoft Windows® 
operating platform and simply how long it took to save reports, switch between 
various reports within the system, and even log onto the reporting software itself. 





 A final note here regarding the reporting procedures at the RCFD was that 
even though each station electronically reported incidents using computer software, 
paper incident reports were also kept in-house by the commanding officers of each 
apparatus. These incidents/activities were reported in hardcover, bound journals. 
These paper journals were similar to the computers in that there were specific 
locations on each page that specified information regarding the incident was recorded. 
While these journals were not mirror images of the electronic computer software, 
they did allow for the same information to be reported. These paper journals had been 
historically completed at each fire station (dating back numbers of decades), nd 
although the information was sent electronically to the central RCFD offices, the 
same task was duplicated in hardcopy form within these journals. Therefore, each 
incident was reported twice: once on the computer and once in these journals. 
 In sum, the implementation of computers in the past ten years did affect the 
mostly routinized task of incident and activity reporting, and there appears to have 
been an overall increase in the substantive complexity involved with the skills used to 
complete this task. The RCFD firefighters who completed the task of incident 
reporting had now developed a new set of (computer) skills that were needed to 
properly complete this incident reporting. In both the WCFD, the same actions 
needed to complete incident reports remains. As for the RCFD, while some aspects 
have been simplified, the introduction of a new electronic record keeping system has 
added an assortment of additional activity reports needed to be completed which 




Ironically, although the addition of computers created a new set of skills that 
the firefighters gained, when interviewing the firefighters themselves saw this 
introduction of computers in a rather negative light and creating additional and 
unneeded tasks. Perhaps this is not surprising: as shown in a study by Moon (2002) 
many of the expected so-called benefits (in the eyes of government workers such as 
the firefighters) such as cost savings have not (yet) been obtained by these types of e-
government implementations (Moon 2002). 
 In addition to the substantive complexity dimension, there also appeared to be 
little impact of computers among the autonomy/control-related dimension involved 
with reporting. While the firefighters at both departments were free to complete these 
reports at their own leisure, they had relatively little ability to decide what 
information was contained in these reports. All incident and activity reports were 
completed via standardized forms that dictated the information needed to be entered. 
Thus, the dimension of autonomy/control-related remained relatively minimal to each 
of these firefighters even though there was some freedom to decide when they could 
be completed, how they were actually completed was dictated to them.  
 There was one aspect of these reports that was not completely close-ended and 
where the firefighters did have some ability to decide what exact details from the 
incident should be placed in the report. For each incident, there existed a “narrative” 
data field where the reporting individual was required to enter a description of the 
events that transpired during the incident. While this was required, firefighters 




“Some guys will still do that. They’ll go and you know: ‘car fire.’ Period. And I’ll put 
down what I saw, what kinds of vehicle, the tag number, what we did, what we used, 
everything. ‘Cause later on, who knows.” (WCFD firefighter) 
 
Thus, although relatively minimal in this situation, the autonomy/control-related 
aspects of this task were not completely constrained – there was some small space for 
firefighters who were writing a report to exert some decision-making and discretion 
during this portion of completing incident reports. However, this ability to exert these 
skills was still rather minimal in the larger task of reporting, and had changed little 
over the past 20 years. 
Within-Station Training 
 Compared to the three skills noted above that were regularly completed in the 
fire station job-context, training had a greater amount of flexibility not just in regards 
to the firefighters’ autonomy/related aspects of the skill, but also in regards to the 
complexity of the situation. At both the WCFD and RCFD, training tended to occur 
during the day. While training was common at both departments, at the RCFD it was 
completed on a daily basis. At both River City and Waterville City, the training was 
led by a commanding officer. While the firefighters themselves did not explicitly 
define different types of training, the interviews revealed that four different m thods 
existed in which a firefighter’s training occurred: (1) recertification, (2) “as needed,” 
(3) new recruit, and (4) evolution. However, not all of these training procedures were 
done “within-station.” Evolution was a training that was completed in the non-fire 
non-emergency context, while new recruit training tended to fall across both the fire 
station and non-fire non-emergency job-context. Thus, as this chapter focuses on the 




be discussed. Evolution and (again) new recruit training will be discussed in the next 
chapter focusing upon the non-fire non-emergency job-context. 
Recertification 
The first type of training that was completed within the fire station involved 
mandatory recertification. In order to continually serve as a firefighter, th e was 
formal required training that firefighters needed in order to maintain specific 
professional certifications. The most commonly discussed example that surfaced 
during the interviews with firefighters at both departments was CPR recertification. 
Regardless of an individual’s rank, all firefighters had to be recertified in CPR on a 
bi-annual basis. This recertification was needed regardless of one’s official title or 
level of certification (i.e. whether a firefighter was an emergency medical technician-
basic [EMT-B] or a full fledged paramedic): 
“I mean there’s certain training we have to do every year to recertification. Your CPR 
needs recertify every two years. Those kinds of things that it’s our department’s 
responsibility to see that we get them done. The EMT, they have to re-cert that very 
three years, and there’s several classes you have to do yearly.” (WCFD firefighter) 
 
Although recertification-type training may simply serve as a refresher for 
many of the skills firefighters needed when responding to emergencies, the 
recertifications themselves were not stagnant. In some instances the recertification 
involved changes in the manner that a certain skill was performed. For example, the 
method of performing CPR over the past 20 years has always involved alternating 
chest compressions and administering breaths in some routine fashion. However, over 
the years the routine of alternating breaths and compressions has changed; to a 




WCFD firefighter even commenting that it appears CPR changes “every six weeks.” 
In other instances, recertifications may become more involved. Furthermore, the 
introduction of new tools and technologies has impacted these certifications: in the 
past firefighters did not have to be trained on these new tools and technologies. For 
example, the introduction of the AED has spawned a new skill, and subsequently 
added another certification to firefighters’ continual recertifications. As can be 
gathered by the evidence, this device was not widely used until roughly the past tn 
years, and subsequently before its availability, training was not required. 
In regards to recertification training, the firefighters themselves did not exert 
any type of decision-making ability regarding what recertifications had to be met, and 
by when they were to be completed. Therefore, this autonomy/control-related skill 
dimension remained relatively unchanged for firefighters throughout the past few 
decades. However, with the introduction of new tools and technologies, the 
substantive complexity aspect of recertification training has increased. This change is 
particularly being driven by the new technologies used during medical emerg ncies 
such as AEDs, glucometers, epinephrine auto-injectors (or epi pens), and other tools 
that firefighters now must be trained upon. As the number of these tools and 
procedures increases, so does the complexity of the training that is required to 
maintain the various certifications firefighters are required to hold. 
“As needed” 
The second manner of training appeared to be the most common type of 
training that occurred within the fire station. This type of training was spawned in a 




“Nowadays they give us time to do it [training] , but we train every day. And it could 
just be little things. Pull out a piece of equipment, go over it, or do something big out 
front, throw ladders. We do company training which is done every day. We do 
battalion training which is done one day out of your two days with other companies in 
the battalion. And a lot of times that is subject to Chief will call up and say ‘Hey, I 
want you guys to go over this.’” (Author’s notation in bold brackets) 
 
 As detailed by this firefighter, the “as needed” training can be rather simple. 
For example, pulling out a tool like the thermal imaging camera and reviewing how it 
is used. Perhaps a more involved skill needed when addressing an emergency call is 
reviewed; here throwing ladders was discussed. In some instances, this “asneeded” 
training may include watching videos or even discussing organizational issues such as 
payroll. In fact, during one visit to Waterville City I was able to sit in on a training 
that involved watching a video regarding how to assist in an emergency medical 
airlift by a helicopter.  
 This form of training was also influenced by the occurrence of certain fire 
related emergencies. As a portion of their training, firefighters may come together as 
a company (or a battalion) and discuss certain fire incidents that had occurred, and the 
manner in which the responding firefighters handled the situation. This review-styl  
of training may have occurred simply due to the shear size and involvement of a fire, 
the particular difficulty of an incident, the involvement of fire-related fatalities, or it 
even could be spawned due to some portion of the firefighters’ response not being 
performed to the best of their ability. 
 Similar to recertification training, this “as needed” training was again 
influenced by new tools and technologies that were introduced to the firefighters’ 
repertoire. Simply put, as new tools and technologies were introduced, this created 




keep their abilities up to par. In sum – new tools/technologies created new skills, each 
new skill creates another task the firefighters can perform, and each new task brings 
with it some new level of complexity (even if these skills are somewhat simplitic, 
following the logic of my conceptual model the overall substantive complexity of 
training is increased). However, unlike recertification that was mandated, th re was 
somewhat greater ability for firefighters to implement autonomy/control-related 
dimensions of skill during the non-mandated “as needed” training. Here firefight rs – 
particularly the immediate commanding officers – were able to decide what types of 
training would be beneficial for their company/companies to engage. As they wer  
often the ones overseeing the immediate incident, they were the individuals who were 
able to make this immediate decision. However, while some levels of the 
autonomy/control-related skill dimension appeared to exist among firefighters during 
the task of “as needed” training, this was not always the case. As noted by the RCFD 
above, in some instances a superior commanding officer such as a fire chief was able 
to determine the precise training that was to be enacted. 
New recruit 
The training of newly recruited firefighters was a type of training that
straddled the fire station and non-fire non-emergency contexts and appeared to be 
handled differently in both the WCFD and RCFD. In the WCFD, the training of new 
recruits was in part a function of the current structural change caused by hiring a new 
wave of firefighters and increasing their personnel by approximately 50 percent. 




the same time, a standardized training program was established by the department to 
help familiarize these new recruits: 
“Because I’m new, I actually have a probationary manual that I have to work on. And 
what it does is it familiarizes me with Waterville City, how the department operates. 
There’s several different sections in it. Um, like one section I have to do self-study on 
like the department’s standard operating guidelines. So there’s a question and answer 
I have to do research and that sort of thing. Then there’s another section with being 
familiar with major landmarks in Waterville City, like specific buildings that we may 
respond to a lot like the hospital, or like…the high-rise senior living centers. You 
know, we have to memorize our addresses, what our job is as an engine company 
when we respond there. Where the closest hydrants are, different things like that. 
What the box alarm is. And then there’s another section that I have to do that 
familiarizes me with the major streets in Waterville City. What they do is they start at 
the very beginning with like the major thoroughfares through Waterville City…and as 
the months go on they branch off of those so the whole goal is at the end of a year, 
after doing this self-study with the maps we should be pretty familiar with the entire 
City of Waterville.” (WCFD firefighter) 
 
 This discussion by a WCFD newly recruited firefighter displays a few things 
that are worth noting. First, this training of newly recruited firefighters follows a 
standardized manual (which was of a “workbook-style,” similar to one might have 
during their schooling) that all new firefighters are required to complete. Not only is 
this training standardized, but the firefighters are simultaneously working through the 
manual together such that all are required to complete certain components of this 
manual on a monthly basis. Furthermore, this training was supervised by their 
commanding officer, and this manual dictated precisely what was needed to be 
trained upon. Also important to note about this new recruit training in the WCFD is 
that while it did involve discussion of issues that any firefighter would encounter in 
this task, there was a large emphasis on local knowledge surrounding Waterville City, 
the same local knowledge that adds an element of complexity to the fire related and 




being able to perform a task such as establishing a water supply and suppressing a 
fire, but also included knowing the environment and issues specific to areas of 
Waterville City (i.e., precise hydrant locations, locations and positions of certain 
buildings, etc.).37 
 In addition to this formal training occurring in synchronization among the 
rookie firefighters at Waterville City, informal training of these greenhorns also 
occurred in part at the fire station among both departments, more prominently in the 
RCFD. This tended to involve more informal conversations and discussions with 
veteran firefighters who had experience in dealing with different tasks.38 For 
example, one seasoned pump operator at the RCFD occasionally met with firefighte s 
to discuss different techniques used when operating a fire engine to supply water to 
attack lines. In most instances, he stated that this informal training would be initiat d 
by these firefighters themselves, perhaps due to a problem that arose at an incident
such a partial malfunction of the apparatus and a need to manually override the 
malfunctioning computerized operating system. Thus, this type of informal training 
was not driven by department requirements, but rather instigated by newer firefighters 
themselves. Furthermore, the senior firefighters were also able to use their own 
autonomy/control-related decisions to determine the best method and manner to 
proceed with this type of training. In fact, many of the senior firefighters at the RCFD 
                                                
37 Although the interviews unearthed the details of this formal training process at the WCFD, only one 
firefighter (a captain) in the RCFD mentioned that there was a formal training program for new 
recruits. However, it was unclear as to how structured this new recruit training program was in the 
RCFD. It was speculated that because of the shear number of emergency response calls taken by fire 
companies in River City, and the daily training that w s implemented by the RCFD, a standardized 
training program for new recruits similar in size and magnitude of that in the WCFD. 
38 Although this type of informal training is listed here as “new recruit” training, it should also be noted 
that even firefighters who are no longer rookies may h ve informally collaborated with their fellow 





appeared to enjoy when these younger men and women firefighters took it upon 
themselves to gain knowledge used to perform different skills and corresponding 
tasks. This initiation and autonomy/control-related dimension was viewed by the 
senior firefighters as a sign that the new recruits were not just here “for a paycheck,” 
but rather they truly desired to be a firefighter. 
Receiving an Emergency Call 
 The preparation to respond to an emergency call was a skill that blurred the 
lines of the fire related emergency, non-fire related emergency, and fire station job-
contexts. However, although it occurred in the fire station, this task directly per ained 
to handling fire and non-fire related emergencies. Due to this direct link to emerg ncy 
situations, this skill was discussed in-depth during the chapter regarding fire related 
emergency job-context (Chapter 5), and will not be reiterated here in any detail. 
Summary 
 Although the fire station job-context was where the men and women of the 
Waterville City and River City fire departments were able to recover from the 
demanding tasks of fire related and non-fire related emergency job-contexts, th re 
was a constant barrage of tasks that needed to be completed with each of these tasks 
requiring numerous skills from the firefighters. While some of these skills and tasks
may have blurred the lines of multiple job-contexts (i.e., new recruit training), others 
were enacted specifically within the fire station context. While these skills were 
needed to be completed by firefighters at the fire station, in some instances heir 




station (e.g., properly checking one’s PPE and SCBA ensured that s/he could enter an 
ignited house to fight fire). 
 Problem solving, decision-making, and discretionary components skills at the 
fire station remained relatively unchanged. When performing equipment 
checks/assessments, housecleaning duties and general maintenance, incident 
reporting, and recertification and “as needed” training there was little evid nce that 
the use of these skill aspects had changed in any real manner in the New Economy. 
Furthermore, as the components involved in completing these tasks were dictated by 
either department guidelines, their superior officers, or even national mandates, there 
was little room for firefighters to have autonomy/control-related aspects of skills. 
Although the completion of these tasks may have to be interrupted by emergency 
responses, and some extent of flexibility existed as to when they were actually 
completed, this still did not evoke any real change to the autonomy/control-related 
skill aspects used by firefighters. In fact, the only instance where evidence existed 
which showed problem solving and discretionary based decisions were able to be 
made was during the informal, one-on-one style of new recruitment training. Here 
firefighters took initiative upon themselves to work with each other to refresh and 
improve one another’s knowledge. 
 Unlike the autonomy/control-related skill dimension that existed in the fire 
station job-context, the dimension of substantive complex did appear to show some 
change during the New Economy. In regards to the tasks of checking/assessing 
equipment and within-station training, the introduction of new tools and technologies 




subsequently adding a new level of complexity to these tasks. However, this increase 
in complex was not direct, but rather a bleed over from other fire related and non-fire 
related emergency job contexts. Because these tools and technologies existed in these 
emergency contexts, they also now had to be checked over and trained for while 
firefighters were in the fire station job-context. On the other hand, the introducti n of 
computers directly increased the skills needed at the fire station when filling out 
incident reports. However, it should  be noted that this increase was only present for 
certain firefighters: in the WCFD, those who chose to use computers, while in the 
RCFD, those who were commanding officers and were required to complete incident  
and other reports. While these tasks within the fire station showed some signs of 
increasing, there was also evidence that the level of complexity for certain tasks 
decreased, as with the instances of housecleaning and general station maintenance. 
 Perhaps most interesting about the fire station job-context was the role 
technology played. To put it bluntly, overall it had less impact then might be 
expected. This is perhaps most surprising in regards to the introduction of computers 
and how they were utilized to complete incident and other reports. According the 
routinization logic used in the conceptual model presented in this research, it was 
expected that routinized tasks such as the completion of incident reports could be 
eliminated from the firefighter’s duties at the fire station. However, in both the 
WCFD and RCFD these computers and accompanying technology had not yet been 
implemented in a manner which would allow for the removal of reporting and its 
accompanying skills. In addition, as not all aspects of this task were completely 




routinization removing skills was not applicable to the entire process of incident 
reporting. Arguably, the introduction of computers on the WCFD did increase the 
skills of the department’s firefighters to a limited extent. At River City, while 
computers were able to remove certain routinized portions of the incident report, 
there was still a general increase in the skills used by the commanding officers to 
complete the reports. This included the River City government’s implementation of 
additional reporting that needed to be completed. Thus, while according to the ALM 
hypothesis there was potential to eventually decrease the overall skills needed to 
perform incident reporting, this had not yet been realized. Instead, the use of 
computers was unfamiliar to these firefighters, and in turn actually had only a slight 
increasing effect on their skills.  
Thus, taken collectively it appeared that in the New Economy no drastic 
change in firefighters’ skills occurred within the fire station job-context. While there 
were some signs of increase in skill during specific tasks, both the skill dimensions of 
substantive complexity and autonomy/control-related remained at a relatively similar 
level as in the past. In addition, the only task where technology had the ability to 
make a direct impact upon the skills firefighters used in this job-context appeared to 
be the movement towards computerization of incident reporting. Even without using 
three tiered conceptual model, the acknowledgement of the relatively static naure of 
fire stations tasks was noted, and numerous firefighters viewed the day-to-day tasks 
required within the fire station job-context the same as they ever were. Even prior to 
the New Economy, they saw themselves as still filling out incident reports, still 









Responding to fire and non-fire related emergencies and handling the tasks 
that these job-contexts entail is obviously the most important duties that firefighters in 
both the Waterville City Fire Department (WCFD) and River City Fire Department 
(RCFD) must face. In addition, there is also a wide assortment of tasks that need to be 
completed at the fire station by the firefighters between emergency calls. However, 
this does not comprehensively account for all the tasks that these firefighters need to 
complete on a regular, sometimes day-to-day basis. There still remains the non-fire 
non-emergency job-context which includes the final series of responsibilities that 
these firefighters must perform, including in-service and fire hydrant inspections, 
smoke detector installation and maintenance, public education, public relations tasks, 
and outside-of-station training. As with the other job-contexts, each of these tasks has 
its own substantive complexity and autonomy/control-related skill dimension, and is 
affected by different technologies in unique manners.  
 Although these tasks appear rather unique, there were a few common threads 
they each shared that placed them into this particular job-context. First, each of these 
tasks occurred away from the fire station; however, they were not emergencies (as 
categorized by the present research). Thus, while these tasks did need to be 
completed, they did not have the manner of urgency present in other tasks falling in 
the non-fire non-emergency category. True, they may have taken priority over the 




important as to trump those that occurred in the fire and non-fire related emergency 
contexts. Second, unlike the tasks falling in the fire and non-fire related emergency 
job-contexts, this series of tasks were attempted to be scheduled. True, they did not 
always occur precisely when scheduled; however, they never-the-less were routinely 
scheduled such that the firefighters would have an ideal time and place to complete 
them. The third and final commonality that transcended each of these aforementioned 
tasks in the non-fire non-emergency job-context was that each was considered a typ  
of public service. True, there was inevitably some benefit to the firefighters in 
completing each of these tasks (some more than others). Yet the main purpose of 
them was to provide some non-emergency or fire prevention service to the citizens 
residing in either Waterville City or River City. Thus, although the urgency of this 
task was lacking, they were still important duties that the firefighters had to fulfill on 
a regular basis. 
Inspections 
In-service inspections 
Firefighters in both departments I interviewed were all required to regularly 
conduct in-service inspections. What was needed to be accomplished during this task 
was quite simple. A particular fire company would go to a business or public 
structure to examine the building and its contents in an effort to ensure that all fire 
safety codes were followed and the business owner was not in violation of any of 
these codes. For example: 
“Is the address physically posted on the front? Um, are all the hazards that tha 
company [business being inspected] might have well established and properly taken 




in an area it shouldn’t be with gasoline? If they use some sort of cutting material, gas, 
setaline torches, are they properly secured where they’re supposed to be? Is there
lighting issues where if the power’d go out people can’t escape from a fire? We’re 
checking off all these things to make sure these records are there, who owns the 
building, who to contact in the middle of the night if we got to get in there.” (WCFD 
firefighter; author’s notations in brackets) 
 
When walking through buildings and performing an inspection, the 
firefighters have a paper form (similar to a checklist) that contains he various items 
that must be examined by the firefighter to ensure that each item is being properly 
followed and not in violation of the fire safety code. If a code is in violation, the 
firefighters then must notify their department’s fire marshal(s) who will then take the 
necessary sanctions against the building owner to ensure that the safety code is met 
and brought up to regulation. Thus, to successfully complete these in-service 
inspections, a basic level of complexity is involved. Firefighters do need to 
understand what the safety codes are, what aspects of the structure they need to 
examine to ensure that the codes are being followed, and how to report any violations 
to the appropriate person within their department. At the same time, these firefighters 
do not need to memorize these safety violations as they are printed in ink on the 
forms used to perform these in-service inspections. Thus, the forms themselves help 
limit the amount of complexity involved in this specific task.39 However, even with 
these forms, it appears that the amount of complexity involved in the task of in-
service inspections has been increasing during the New Economy.  
                                                
39 It should be noted that one firefighter at the RCFD I interviewed had worked at the Fire Marshal’s 
Office and stated that although these in-service inspections are performed; they may not be performed 
by the firefighters in a truly adequate manner. This was due to the fact that although the firefighters are 
instructed what fire codes to check, precisely how to check them is not strongly discussed and trained 
upon. It was mentioned that although these inspections were performed, they may not have necessarily 
always been performed in a proper manner. Therefore, according to this interviewee there is actually a 
“false sense” of the level of substantive complexity involved during these building inspections. While 
this one interviewee’s claims cannot be taken to be representative of how this task is performed at the 




As stated by another WCFD, both an increasing number of safety codes and 
new fire prevention technologies have increased the number of items needed to be 
inspected, subsequently increasing the substantive complexity involved: 
Interviewer (I): Um, have those sorts of duties…changed since you’ve been here? 
 
Firefighter (FF): Oh, yes! A lot more regulations, a lot more laws have been 
implemented. Just an example, this year we come up with a new form for our 
building inspections because we (sic) don’t have the fire hoses in the hallways 
anymore. That’s been out of place for three years. 
 
I: You really don’t see them now that I think about it. 
 
FF: But, we’re still finding them in places. So that’s a big thing. You can’t have them 
anymore. The hoses weren’t safe, they were hurting people. So you don’t see them 
anymore. But the connections are still there because we use them; our fire hoses 
connect to them. We look for that. Uh, businesses, apartment buildings, houses that 
have been converted into businesses; so we got to make sure they’re safe to hold the 
occupancy of how many people’s going to be in there and what’s going to be in there. 
Fire alarm systems are getting bigger and more complex and integrated. Um, a lot 
more standards and laws for us, not only for the safety for firefighters but safety for 
the occupants. So they’re [business inspections] much more in-depth. (Firefighter’s 
emphasis italicized; author’s notations in brackets) 
 
One final note about the substantive complexity dimension of in-service inspections 
should be made here. That is, even with the increased quantity of codes and new 
technologies present in the structures, this did not change the physical procedures that 
occurred when the firefighters performed their tasks. The firefighters at both he 
WCFD and RCFD still physically had to enter the structure with their fire company 
and visually (or physically) check that the codes were not being violated. 
 These in-service inspections occur more as a “behind the scenes” event. 
Initially the public benefit provided by these inspections is quite apparent: they are 
occurring so that the businesses inspected are operating with the proper safety 




are multiple benefactors of this task’s completion. In addition to the public, the 
building owners themselves also benefit. Properly following all the fire safety codes 
may prevent any legal actions occurring when a fire occurs. However, the most 
interesting benefactors are the firefighters themselves. Almost all those I interviewed 
noted that these inspections were a great benefit to them. As one interviewee put it, 
they are “for our safety and for the public’s safety” (RCFD firefighter). By entering 
these structures, the firefighters used this task to help familiarize themselves with the 
interior of the structure and its contents. This familiarization was uniformly 
recognized throughout the interviews, as all those firefighters I talked to rcognized 
that this familiarization, even if not completely retained, could be used to their 
advantage if a fire related emergency ever occurred within this particul structure: 
“The big benefit, you end up getting some of these places you would [not] otherwise 
be. You’d be surprised even after a year or two you’ll remember things you saw if 
you have to go back in the fire conditions.” (WCFD firefighter) 
 
 While the interviews provided some evidence that the substantive complexity 
skill dimension of in-service inspections has shifted over the past 20 years – even 
within the past few years for that matter – this effect has not been felt in the
autonomy/control-related dimension. An analysis of the data from the interviewes 
shows that the discretion and decision-making aspects of this skill which the 
firefighters possess have not been tempered with any time over the past few decades. 
For the large majority of firefighters, the discretion involved during in-servic  
inspections is rather limited. This is because the majority of the decision-maki g and 
planning is completed by the fire marshal(s) at each department. Each year, these fire 




department is to inspect during the upcoming year. This list is then distributed to a 
small number of firefighters who are charged with the task of assigning to individual 
fire companies a series of buildings that need to be inspected. This assignment is 
completed slightly differently at each of the two fire departments. At the WCFD, a 
firefighter on each shift is provided a list of buildings needed to be inspected. This 
firefighter (who may or may not be the battalion chief or captain) is then charged with 
assigning individual fire companies with a number of structures that need to be 
inspected.40 Over a one to two month period in the spring/summer, these fire 
companies would then go out and perform these in-service inspections over the 
course of a few shifts. While this task occurred during a once-a-year periodfor the 
WCFD firefighters, at the RCFD it was an ongoing process. At the RCFD, the 
captains have a list of which buildings need to be inspected by the fire companies 
under their command. These captains then make a schedule for each of the companies 
under their command. These companies would then have an assigned weekday in 
which they would go and perform these in-service inspections. These inspections 
were not conducted once a year during a specific time period as with the WCFD, but 
rather were completed on a continual basis throughout the entire year. 
Thus, as is obvious from this description, there is a relatively low level of the 
autonomy/control-related dimension present in the task of in-service inspections. 
Although the scheduling of these in-service inspections is slightly different at each 
department, it does not overall have any apparent impact in changing the 
autonomy/control-related dimension. However, it is important to note that there are 
                                                
40 A small number of the firefighters I interviewed stated that each company was assigned roughly ten 
to 11 inspections that needed to be completed; however, the remainder of the WCFD firefighters 




two specific issues that can affect the timing that these tasks are completed. One of 
these concerns, which affects both departments, is that although non-fire non-
emergency tasks such as in-service inspections are assigned on certain days, both fire 
and non-fire related emergency tasks take priority and have the ability of shifting the 
timing that this task is completed. The second concern, which is specific to the 
RCFD, was that in 1999 the River City government installed a computerized 
management program that monitors various activities of the different agencies a d 
departments within the River City government. This had an effect on a number of 
different tasks that RCFD firefighters completed in the non-emergency job-context, 
including the creation of a biweekly (i.e., per pay period) quota that required a 
specific number of in-service inspections to be completed per specific fire company. 
Thus, in both of these instances, while the timing and sheer volume of in-service 
inspections were affected, this had no effect on the levels of autonomy/control-related 
skill dimensions involved. The same level of discretion and decision-making was 
present during an in-service inspection, regardless of the number of inspections 
performed, or when exactly they were performed. 
Hydrant inspections 
In addition to in-service inspections, firefighters at the RCFD also had to 
complete fire hydrant inspections in the areas surrounding their fire stations. This is 
an extremely important task: simply put, fire cannot be suppressed without the 
availability of water. Therefore, the process of performing the task of hydrant 
inspections begins when specific fire hydrants are detailed by the RCFD 




companies what specific hydrants to check. The citywide computerized government 
management program has also affected these hydrant checks in that (similarto the in-
service inspections) it has placed a specific number of hydrants that need to be 
checked throughout the biweekly pay period. Again, this has no bearing on the skill 
involved, but rather simply the volume of hydrants inspected. 
In regards to the skill dimensions involved with the hydrant inspections, the 
accomplishment of this task requires a relatively simple series of manipulative tasks: 
“We do hydrant inspections once a week. We go out and we check them and make 
sure they’re not busted or broken and we turn ‘em on and make sure the water flows 
and they drain properly and shut off. And if there is something wrong with it then we 
have a system of sending in reports and all. The City Water Department owns ‘em. 
We do the inspections and then we send the reports in to the Water Safety Officer. 
And they notify the Water Department and they come in and make the repairs. And if 
its out of service, if its dry or whatever, we have collars that we put on ‘em, tighten it 
down and this way the engine company coming in knows that hydrant’s dead and 
look for the next hydrant.” (RCFD firefighter) 
 
Thus, overall the substantive complexity and autonomy/control-related skill 
dimensions present in this particular task are (again, similar to in-service inspections) 
not at an extremely high level. However, unlike the in-service inspections, the 
substantive complexity involved in this task was not reported as changing in any 
manner. Furthermore, there was no clear evidence in the interviews I conducted and 
analyzed that any technology involved with the fire hydrants had affected the task 
itself. Thus, while the firefighters in the RCFD do need to possess the skill required to 
successfully check fire hydrants within River City, it is not an extremely complex or 
involves a large number of discretion. Regardless, it still is a task that needs to be 
completed, and the fact that it does require a certain amount of skill (albeit not 




Smoke Detector Installation and Maintenance 
It has been long known that the use of smoke detectors can serve as a valuable 
method in preventing injury and death from a fire (Gorman, Charney, Holtzman, and 
Roberts 1985; Mallonee, Istre, Rosenberg, Reddish-Douglas, Jordan, Silverstein, and 
Tunell 1996). Thus, there is a long history of smoke detector programs existing in 
U.S. fire departments (for example, see Gorman et al. 1985; Sults, Sacks, Brise, 
Dickey, Kinde, Mallonee, and Douglas 1998.). As for both the WCFD and RCFD, 
smoke detector programs have existed for a rather lengthy period of time, and were 
implemented prior to the New Economy. In both the WCFD and RCFD a service is 
offered to residents of their respective cities where firefighters from the department 
will come to your home and either (a) install a smoke detector if you do not have one, 
or (b) check the smoke detector(s) you do have to ensure that they are in proper 
working order. To perform this task at each department, a fire company would go to a 
specific street or location within Waterville City or River City, and simply begin 
knocking on the doors of residences. If someone answered the door, the firefighters 
would: 
“Go in, check their smoke detector; make sure they have them in the proper locations 
that they’re working. Replace ‘em if they’re not, or if they don’t have ‘em.” (WCFD 
firefighter) 
 
This basic idea was that this task should be repeated numerous times over the course 
of the firefighters’ shift, and on an annual basis, over and over again, reiterating the 
importance of smoke detectors to the residents of the city: 
“So we go knock on every door, and in our inspection district and it’s divided up 
throughout the year. And ‘Hey, do you have a smoke detector? Have you checked it 
regularly? Change the batteries when you change the clock?’ You know, ‘have a nice 





In addition, both departments also have a form in which information and data is 
collected on each household that has a smoke detector installed. Here, basic 
information was collected from the household’s resident(s) and manually recorded by 
the firefighters. Similar to the building inspection, these data collection instruments 
contained areas which specified the information being requested from the city 
resident and also provided space in which the firefighters could write the resid nt’  
answer. Thus, the precise data that was collected was not needed to be remembered 
by the firefighters themselves, but simply read from the forms. Thus, overall the 
mental procedures involved in performing smoke detector “canvassing” (as referred 
to in the WCFD) or “home inspections” (as referred to by the RCFD) are not as 
overly complex as when compared to performing many of the tasks involved with 
fighting fire or handling non-fire emergencies, and the data collected from my 
interviews provided no indication that mental and manipulative integration used 
during this task had changed over the past 20 years.  
 A similar level of complexity also appeared to be apparent in the manipulation 
involved with installing smoke detectors. The firefighters would manually install 
these smoke detectors into the home. However, interviews with the RCFD did give 
indication that basic hand tools carried with firefighters in the RCFD have allowed 
for a further simplification of smoke detector installation: 
“The installation of smoke detectors in River City, we actually use a toilet plunger. 
And that was a tool given to us. So think about that. [L ughs] So yeah, we have a 
toilet plunger where we come in and we use double-sided tape on the smoke 
detectors. We can’t use the screws because we’re going into people’s houses. We 
don’t want to damage their home so we use double-sided tape. So we can’t reach a lot 
of ceilings so we use a toilet plunger. And that is an assigned tool.” (RCFD 





Instead of having to manually screw in smoke detectors, basic tools – a toilet plunger 
and tape – are used to quickly and efficiently apply a smoke detector to the ceiling of 
a residence. This removes some of the basic manipulation needed when installing 
smoke detectors, and (as mentioned above) also prevents the possibility of residents 
becoming angry over the firefighters putting any holes in their ceilings from screws. 
Furthermore, it also cuts down on the time it takes to install a smoke detector (e.g., 
one WCFD firefighter stated it took approximately 15-30 minutes to perform a smoke 
detector installation for a single home). As there is a much larger number of 
residences in River City compared to Waterville City, and the fact that he RCFD has 
a much higher call volume compared to the WCFD (i.e., receives more emergency 
calls annually compared to the WCFD), the ability to save time on a non-fire non-
emergency may potentially be a more important consideration at the RCFD then 
compared to the WCFD. 
 While there was a difference in the manner (and substantive complexity) that 
was needed by the firefighters at each department when installing smoke detectors, 
there was a more pronounced difference along the lines of the autonomy/control-
related dimension. This was due to two factors, both internal and external to the fire 
departments. First, internally there were different procedures at both departmnts in 
the decision-making revolved around smoke detector installation and maintenance. At 
the WCFD, there was a much more regulated schedule for firefighters to follow when 
performing this task. The main reason for this was that the WCFD is unique in that it 
had a firefighter who served as the Fire Prevention Officer (FPO) of the WCFD and 




programs, on multiple occasions the FPO had written and received various grants to 
fund a multi-faceted, large scale fire (and injury) prevention program within the 
Waterville City borders. This external funding created an extra pot of money that 
could be used to fund these prevention programs, and in essence this appeared to 
create a higher level of overall fire prevention that was conducted by the firefighters 
in the WCFD.  
 In regards specifically to the smoke detector program at the WCFD, while it 
had been initiated by the FPO in the 1980s, within the past 20 years there was a shift 
in how decisions were made regarding the installation and maintenance of the smoke 
detectors. The FPO began conducting basic visual and graphic data analyses of the 
Waterville City limits which was used to take a more scientific approach to the smoke 
detector program by the WCFD. In fact, during my interview with the FPO at the 
WCFD, he showed me a map used to account for the residences in Waterville City. It 
was delineated according to Census tracks, and contained data points for various 
types of fires according to those that involved fatalities and/or large amounts of 
property value being lost. Two of these zones, referred to by the FPO as hot zones, 
fell in the downtown area of Waterville City and contained the large majority of these 
more destructive fires. According to this prevention plan, the WCFD firefighters 
canvassed one of these zones one year, and the remaining zone the next year. Thus, 
any given residence located in these two zones was canvassed every two years.41 For 
the remaining zones, the FPO had a rotation set into place where any residence falling 
                                                
41 This does not imply that every single residence was physically able to be inspected by the WCFD 
when scheduled, as it was not always the case that the residents were home, or would even allow the 
inspection to be conducted. Even when the firefighters make multiple attempts at inspecting the 





in one of these remaining zones would be inspected by the firefighters once every five 
years. As the WCFD FPO stated, “I know exactly where we are going. I could tell 
you where; we could figure it out up to 2020 where we’re going.”  
 While this systematic plan for smoke detector installation/maintenance was 
created by the FPO, it had to be realized at the ground level by the firefighters, as 
they are the ones required to go out and physically install and check the detectors. 
Here, the FPO would give one of the officers on each shift the information as to what 
streets and residences needed to be inspected by the firefighters. The officer c uld 
then assign the day, time, and specific residences to which the firefighters were to go 
and install or check for smoke detectors. This assignment occurred the duration of 
one month in the spring/summer, and as it followed a fairly rigid schedule when and 
where it was conducted (considering the fact that emergencies took priority). The 
WCFD firefighters on each company had little room to make any decisions on the 
performance of this task, but rather went ahead and performed it as instructed. 
Furthermore, with the use of a more systematic approach by the FPO in the past 
(approximately) 15 years, one could assume that the possibility exists that the 
autonomy/control-related skill dimension aspect of this task may have been further
erased over this time period, even if slightly. 
 In addition to this internal factor, there was also an external factor that created 
a difference in the method of smoke detector installation and maintenance. As part of 
the grants received by the FPO on behalf of the WCFD, a variety of community 




method of establishing contact with residents of Waterville City (with particular focus 
on the elderly) and scheduling appointments to go and install smoke detectors: 
“Say somebody new signs up for Meals on Wheels. As part of their screening they 
check to see if they have smoke alarms, how old they [smoke detectors] are, if 
they’re still the nine-volt battery-type, and then they refer it to Jane. If we’re doing 
any type of marketing campaign like on the radio, T.V., or whatever, any calls that 
come in about the smoke alarms, Jane gets them. And what she does is sets it up so 
that two to three days a week she will take an engine company and physically go with 
them to do smoke alarm installations by appointment; people who have physically 
called us, for one reason or another, to give them a smoke alarm.” (WCFD Fire 
Prevention Officer; author’s notation in brackets)42 
 
Thus, numerous organizations and media enterprises operating in Waterville City 
independently from the WCFD have partnered with the WCFD to create a list of 
persons for whom the firefighters need to install smoke detectors. The result is 
appointments that are made by those individuals working in the fire prevention aspect 
of the WCFD, and not the firefighters. Here we see that in this situation there is littl
discretion available for the firefighters as they must follow a specific appointment 
schedule when it comes time to install these smoke detectors. In fact, during one of 
the WCFD shift meetings I was able to attend, there was a sentiment made by  
number of firefighters on that shift regarding the lack of autonomy/control-related 
skill they had during these instances. The point of discussion here was one instance in 
where these appointments overlapped with a local NFL football team’s weekly game.
Not only were the firefighters themselves finding this to be an issue, but it was also 
stated that many of the citizens of Waterville City who had these appointments 
scheduled were also not thrilled that they overlapped with the game. Because, these 
                                                
42 Meals on Wheels is a national, not-for-profit organiz tion that delivers meals to people in need. The 
person referred to as “Jane” by the FPO is an indivdual who was hired with money from one of the 





decisions were made above the firefighters, this task had to be completed and no 
autonomy/control-related skill was able to be enacted. 
 The RCFD had a somewhat similar method of smoke detector installation and 
maintenance. The specific residences and areas which fire companies were to inspect 
came down to the captain of each company from the administration office, and then 
the captain used this list of houses to assign certain shifts of his/her fire company 
specific residences at which to perform these home visits, or inspections, regarding 
smoke detectors. However, there were some differences in how this task was 
performed when compared back to the WCFD. First, these inspections were not 
conducted over the course of one spring/summer month, but rather were continuously 
conducted throughout the calendar year. In addition, there was no systematic method 
supported by data that was used to inform and subsequently assign specific areas that 
smoke detector installation/maintenance was to be performed. Instead, the firefighters 
would simply go to one street, then onto the next, etc. Once the company’s entire area 
was covered, it would simply be repeated again.  
Finally, as with the building and fire hydrant inspections, the River City’s 
computerized government management system also set quotas on the number of 
hours of these home visits that needed to be completed by each company. Eight hours 
was required per period, and with each company having four shifts, this equated to 
two hours of home visits per shift per biweekly pay period. Thus, these differences 
did allow the RCFD firefighters more freedom to choose when exactly this task was 
to be completed during that two week period. However, in regards to the 




difference from the WCFD. The task still had to be completed, and had to be 
completed in a particular manner, leaving little room for discretion available to the 
firefighters. 
Public Education 
 Many of us might remember that during the course of our primary and 
secondary education we were subjected to a series of fire drills throughout the 
academic school year. Often when exiting the building a local fire company would be 
outside to greet and maybe even talk with the students about fire safety. This same 
sort of procedure still remains today. It was something that I remembered quit  
clearly as a high school student. In fact, during the course of my interviews with the 
RCFD firefighters I came to realize that the local River City high school I attended 
was visited by the firefighters of one particular fire engine company that I 
interviewed. Thus, while this practice of fire drills remains, there is also  number of 
additional public education tasks for which the firefighters are responsible. Over the 
course of my interviews at both the WCFD and RCFD, public education appeared to 
be a primary task the firefighters performed in the non-fire non-emergency job-
context. While this public education could occur in a variety of manners, there were 
four dominant types of public education that were discussed consistently through the 
course of interviews. To distinguish these types of public education, I will use the 
following terms: school demonstrations, non-school demonstrations, post-incident 





Public education that occurred in the form of school demonstrations is 
traditionally what one would think about when discussing the role that firefighters 
played in public education. These demonstrations included either the WCFD or 
RCFD sending firefighters to a specific school in an attempt to increase the student ’ 
knowledge regarding fire prevention and fire safety: 
“They also want us to have a rapport with the kids for schools so we kind of; what 
they do, we adopt a school. We adopted one down here…It’s an elementary school. 
We usually go there the first day of school, let ‘em be seen and know that they know 
that we’re here for ‘em. Uh, Fire Prevention Bureau will sometimes get requests from 
the schools, especially during Fire Prevention Week, for presentations. We’ll go 
down there with ‘em and assist the fire prevention guy. We’ll have a guy dress up in 
his turnout gear and stuff and they talk about smoke detectors, get the kids involved 
with it. Give them handouts and stuff to take home. So that’s a big part of the 
education, you know, in that. So yeah, that’s very prominent today. And it, it works. 
It has a purpose.” (RCFD firefighter) 
 
Through interviews with the firefighters, it was discussed that these demonstrations 
were carried out in similar ways. Firefighters from a specific company would be 
assigned to go to a school and assist a presenter from their respective fire department 
during a demonstration given to students. While these could occur throughout the 
year, often they roughly coincided at the beginning of October during or around 
National Fire Prevention Week (for details about National Fire Prevention Week and 
its history; see IPS 2003). These often included both a formal presentation, but also a 
question and answer session where students could ask any questions they have related 
to fire prevention and safety. The portion of the school demonstration in which the 
firefighters were most involved with was providing a real-life example of what a 
firefighter looks like when s/he is actively fighting a fire. This was particularly 




“One of the things we want to make children aware of what (sic) a firefighter in a 
breathing apparatus looks like. So that if they see that, when they need to be rescued 
they don’t think it’s not Darth Vader coming to get them!” (WCFD firefighter) 
 
As for the skill dimensions present during these school demonstrations, there 
is a basic amount of substantive complexity involved. Firefighters must be able to 
properly don their personal protective equipment (PPE), or turnout gear, and be able 
to show the children basic tools and techniques that are commonly used during their 
day-to-day tasks in both the fire and non-fire related emergencies. As for the 
autonomy/control-related dimension, the scheduling of these demonstrations was 
done for the fire companies via one of their administrative offices, and the material 
that was provided to the students during the presentations was not directly developed 
by the firefighters themselves, but rather through their respective departm nt’s fire 
prevention personnel. Therefore, the firefighters themselves had a limited role in the 
discretion and decision-making involved with the scheduling and development of 
these demonstrations.  
However, there was another skill involved with the task of public education, 
not only during these school demonstrations, but also with the other types of public 
education. This was the skill of communication. While the firefighters were not solely
responsible for presenting the information during the demonstrations, they remained a 
vital part in donning the PPE, giving a physical demonstration, and also helping 
answer any questions that the students might have. They were faced with effectively 
relaying and detailing information to large numbers of children in terms that these 
children would be able to understand. In turn, this aspect of the task certainly created 




may initially believe. In fact, these communication skills are something tat needs to 
be developed (take for example, the Toastmasters organization), and can even be 
associated with anxiety that may have some form of adverse affects on individuals 
(Daly, Vangelisti, Neel, and Cavanaugh 1989). In fact, one WCFD discussed the 
difficulty he faced with not only speaking in front of people, but also simply the 
difficulty he has with being the center of attention when donning his gear in front of 
students. While this feeling was only noted by one interviewee, it does emphasize the 
point that not only are these communication skills present, but they also do require 
quite a bit of skill that quite often may very well be overlooked. In each of the 
remaining three types of public education tasks that the firefighters I interviewed 
faced, there was evidence that this communication aspect was present and required a 
higher level of skill than may appear on the surface during this task. 
On final item worth mentioning was that during my interviews with 
firefighters at the RCFD, they also discussed that fire drills werealso a common type 
of school demonstration in which they assisted: 
“We do fire drills twice a year. We do ‘em in April and September…So we set up a 
fire drill and then we time students how long it takes them to get out and so forth. We 
send reports to the Fire Prevention Bureau.” (RCFD firefighter) 
 
Thus, these are again scheduled by the Fire Prevention Bureau for the RCFD, and 
also involve only a moderate level of complexity. Regardless, there are still aspects in 
these types of school demonstrations that combined with the others mentioned above 





Another type of public education that was consistently mentioned throughout 
the interviews was non-school demonstrations. The firefighters I interviewed 
mentioned how schools were not the only locations at which they assisted with the 
provision of fire safety and prevention demonstrations. Other types of organizations 
also received these demonstrations. These included assisted living 
communities/retirement homes (mentioned by firefighters at both the WCFD and 
RCFD), and church groups, organized daycare facilities, and other various 
community gatherings (all mentioned by the WCFD firefighters). While these 
demonstrations may to some extent have overlapped with those that occurred within 
schools, it could be assumed that these types of demonstrations were not identical, but 
rather tailored to the different audiences. For example, one would expect the 
demonstrations provided to first graders in an elementary school to not be identical to 
those presented at an assisted living community. Unfortunately, while many 
firefighters mentioned these types of public education, relatively little description was 
provided as to how exactly these were carried out. Therefore, although the data shows 
that non-school demonstrations were conducted by the firefighters at both 
departments, too little data exists that describes these types of demonstrations. 
Therefore, not enough evidence was provided to make claims regarding the skill 
involved in these types of demonstrations, although one could assume it may be 





Unlike the previous two types of public education that were scheduled 
continuously throughout the year by the WCFD and RCFD’s contact with schools or 
other organizations, the third type of public education occurred in wake of certain fire 
related incidents. There was not one specific definition or type of incident that would 
necessarily cause this post-incident outreach from occurring. However, there were 
some certain characteristics that may have influenced the decision to hold this 
outreach. For example, fires that resulted in a fatality may be cause the fire 
department to conduct post-incident outreach public education. In addition, in 
neighborhoods or areas where a large number of fires had occurred over the course of 
a short period of time may also have led a departmental decision to conduct this type 
of education. A third example that was also mentioned was if suspicious fires (i.e., 
those that may have been or were intentionally set) may have also spawned this 
public education to occur. 
As is fairly obvious, the primary goal associated with these types of public 
education is to have somewhat informal conversations with local citizens about fire 
safety and prevention, with the hope that this type of incident can be prevented and 
will not occur again. Depending on the unique situation, this may involve a number of 
actions, including handing out literature, checking smoke detectors, answering 
questions any citizens may have regarding fire safety, or sometimes even mor . For 
example, one WCFD firefighter mentioned that their FPO may take some of the 




fire has created, or at least talk about the incident and bring a real-life, familiar i age 
to the local citizens. To quote one WCFD firefighter: 
“I was going to say that another time we come out into the neighborhood – significant 
fires. For instance, we have a fire in the north end of Waterville City in January and 
there’s one not less than a year before in that same neighborhood and for what it was 
worth, two nights maybe, the shifts went out and canvassed the neighborhood 
educating them about fire safety, I believe doing smoke detector checks, I’m not 
100% sure on that. Um and it just so happens they went back and pulled records and 
the house that did catch fire we had been in there before and installed a smoke 
detector…The neighbors, when you go and tell them stuff like that, their ears peak up 
and they really listen to you. So that’s a time that uh, our Public Educator, likes to get 
us out there and educate the public.” 
 
Thus, it is hoped that by physically seeing the destruction caused by a fire, or
simply discussing the fire’s origin and destruction, neighbors may be able to 
understand the importance of fire safety and take a more active role in fire prevention 
and safety. However, this also shows that in addition to being able to communicate 
effectively with the public, there are also a slew of other skills required during th s 
task. The firefighters must both know proper information on residential fire safety, 
and must be able to check and potentially install smoke detectors. Thus, in addition to 
this skill of communication, the firefighters must also need to produce a similar 
amount of skill used when performing smoke detector checks and maintenance. 
Furthermore, knowing and being able to provide the proper fire safety/prevention 
information also increases the amount of knowledge one needs, further heightening 
the substantive complexity involved in this task. 
Expanded programs 
While the above three types of public education may have been standard fare 




the WCFD. In fact, although I can only make direct comparisons between the two 
departments at which I conducted interviews, the majority of the WCFD firefight rs I 
interviewed who discussed their expanded programs also mentioned that these 
programs were not common to the majority of fire departments around the U.S. (past 
literature also supports this claim, see Gielen, Dannenberg, Ashburn, and Kuo 1996). 
Through the course of my interviews, it became apparent that the reason these 
programs were developed into an effective form of public education was through both 
collaborations with other agencies and organizations throughout the City, but also via 
the external funding that had been secured by the WCFD’s FPO. Through my 
interview with the FPO, it was apparent that he had a long history of securing external 
funding which was used to develop and maintain these expanded public education 
programs which occurred within the WCFD. There were two types of expanded 
programs that occurred in Waterville City, all connected to the school 
demonstrations. 
The program involved a Fire Prevention Trailer that was able to be transported 
from school to school in Waterville City. This trailer was used to visually 
demonstrate to the children fire safety at the home: 
“Well we didn’t used to have a Fire Prevention trailer that shows kids. That puts kids 
in situation that they have to identify hazards in their own home, you know. The kids 
will come into the house-trailer-type thing that’s pulled behind a vehicle or something 
and there will be certain props around the room that they have to identify as fire 
hazards and that kind of thing. It also shows ‘em; there’s also a bedroom, simulated 
bedroom in this trailer where we fill with fake smoke – it doesn’t hurt them or 
anything – we’ll hit a smoke detector. After telling them how to get out of the place, 
you know, they actually got to crawl out of the building, or come out of a window 
with our help, or they have to call 911 on the phone that we have there. So all this 
stuff, it’s come a long way. We didn’t used to have it when I first came in, so that’s 





The firefighters who were assigned to a certain school would be able to assist children 
in walking through this trailer and create the interactive environment that was used to 
teach about fire safety. To effectively assist in navigating students through this trailer, 
a certain amount of substantive complexity and was needed to be used by the 
firefighters. Furthermore, this particular skill dimension was inevitably created 
through the introduction of this trailer (i.e., the technology). As the trailer had not 
previously existed in the past, with its introduction, it created the need for a new level 
of skill that was otherwise not needed. While the affect on complexity was apparent, 
it was not clear the amount of additional (if any) autonomy/control-related skill that 
was needed to assist with this particular expended program aside from that brough y 
the communication skills used. 
 The second external program was referred to as the Children’s Village. As it is 
explained by a WCFD firefighter: 
“Uh, I teach out at Children’s Village. I’m an instructor there and that’s a two-day 
program for the second graders in [our]  county and various school districts. One day 
is police safety which a police officer will teach them those safety-related skills. We 
teach them about, uh, 911, how to call, they should know their name and address. Not 
only where they live, but where they are if there’s an emergency where they are. Uh, 
smoke detectors. They take a tour of a burned house. They learn the difference 
between good and bad fires. Let’s see, I’m thinking off the top of my head here, but 
there’s a lot of stuff out there. We teach them how to crawl low in smoke. We teach 
them ‘Stop, Drop, and Roll.’ We teach them different ways of getting out of a house, 
how they’re supposed to have two escape routes, the best way out and a second way 
in case that way’s gone. There’s a doll house…that has five different rooms in it and 
has a smoke machine and we teach them that if they can’t get out of the house that’s 
on fire, if they stay in their bedroom that they’re pretty much safe for at least five to 
ten minutes until we can get there, and in the City of Waterville they’re pretty lucky 
because there’s no residence within the town limits that’s anymore than three minut s 
away from a fire truck arriving on the scene.” (Author’s notation in brackets) 
 
 Children’s Village is similar to the trailer in that involves a very interactive 




it is unique for a few different reasons. First, the Village is only experienced by 
children once during the course of their schooling – during the second grade. A 
handful of firefighters I interviewed stated that this was because that over the course 
of using the Children’s Village it was the second graders that were the most recep ive 
of this type of expanded program. A second unique factor of the Village is that not 
only is the WCFD involved with the Children’s Village, but local police 
department(s) also participates. Finally, while all firefighters could be expected to 
assist with the previous three types of public education tasks, and even with the Fire 
Prevention Trailer that is transported from school to school, not all firefighters ar  
expected to assist with the task of public education at the Children’s Village. In fact, 
during my interview with the FPO at the WCFD it was discovered that the firefight rs 
had to volunteer in order to work out at the Village by signing up on a list. Working 
out at the Village was considered overtime (for which the firefighters were financially 
compensated), and there was quite a large list of names of individuals who had 
volunteered to help with this particular public education.  
The Children’s Village and program was brought to fruition in the early 
1990s, and (as with the trailer) was a technology that subsequently increased the 
substantive complexity involved with the task of public education. The firefighters 
who taught out at the Children’s Village all needed to possess the mental and 
manipulative knowledge integration to successfully use this technology to teach the 
second graders who attended. Again, this may have not clearly affected their 
autonomy/control-related skill, yet it clearly did increase the complexity used during 




that occurred in the WCFD, there was clearly an increased level of skill needed to not 
only teach fire safety to the children, but to also be able to successfully use the 
technologies that assisted in teaching these lessons. 
Public Relations Tasks 
The task of public relations was the final task that occurred in the non-fire 
non-emergency job-context that was revealed by the interview data. This particular 
task was interesting, as many times it did not appear as an independent task in its own 
right, but rather was supplemental to many of the other tasks that were performed by 
the firefighters. In fact, in analyzing the interview data, it was somewhat difficult to 
discern to which job-context(s) this task belonged. However, during certain insta ce  
establishing good public relations was one of the primary goals, and therefore it was 
decided it could best be discussed in the non-fire non-emergency context. Regardless, 
it should still be noted that this task definitely blurred the lines of the three job-
contexts previously discussed. 
 In the non-fire non-emergency job-context, there were two types of public 
relations that the firefighters would perform. In some instances, this public relations 
task may include a basic service. For example: 
“Sometimes we do public services like putting flagpoles on flags (sic). Sometimes we 
do light bulbs. Say West End Little League, they needed some light bulbs put up, and 
those kind of service things, you know. As long as it doesn’t cost the citizens of 
Waterville City a lot of money or anything like that, and our officers don’t have a 
problem with it we usually go ahead and take care of something like that.” (WCFD 
firefighter) 
 
In these types of public services, basic maintenance tasks were to be performed, 




firefighters have in their possession, such as ladders. In regards to the 
autonomy/control-related skill dimension, as this above quote shows, sometimes the 
firefighters themselves can decide to act upon a request and may not require complete 
discretion from their commanding officers. However, there are other times wh n the 
discretion is more limited and the officers or even administrative offices may have to 
schedule this type of task. For example, one type of public relations task that 
firefighters I interviewed reported completing was doing a “stand-by” when 
neighborhood fireworks may have been lit off. During these tasks, a fire company 
was individually scheduled to be at a specific location at a specific time, thus 
eliminating the ability for a fire company to have any discretion as to whether or not 
they should be involved with this task. 
 Other public relations tasks overlapped more with fire safety and prevention 
education: 
“We do go to church, not socials, but church bazaars or festivals and we’ll go stand 
by there and again we’ll talk about fire prevention. And the biggest hit is the kids 
seeing the fire engine. We’ll get one of the junior members don (sic) all their turnout 
gear and show them how it works and so on. So that’s other stuff we do outside of 
regular emergencies.” (RCFD firefighter) 
 
Thus, the substantive complexity skills required here parallel very closely those used 
during school (and even some non-school) public education demonstrations. 
Although there may not be an extremely high level of complexity used, there is 
never-the-less a certain level of complexity that must be possessed by these 
firefighters. In addition, the autonomy/control-related skills that firefighters need 
during the communication aspect of public education demonstrations are also needed 




there is an initial autonomy/control-related aspect that is dependent upon whether or 
not a public relations task is scheduled or occurs more sporadically, there may be a 
type of instance where the firefighters have more autonomy/control-related skill than 
they may receive credit for. For example, while giving a public education 
demonstration at a school, they are assisting a speaker from their respective 
department and playing a supporting role during this task. However, during these 
public relations tasks, the firefighters often appeared to be at these events with only 
the other firefighters in their fire company. Therefore, the firefighters play a primary 
role in providing public education or completing basic public services (such as 
installing light bulbs) with relatively full control over the situation and deciding how 
to best proceed. Therefore, a higher level of autonomy/control-related skill may be 
present than one may initially see upon the surface. 
 As mentioned above, aside from public relations tasks that are somewhat 
independent, there are also elements of public relations that need to be performed in 
the three other job-contexts as well. For example, during a fire related emergency, 
both during and after the fire certain firefighters at the scene must also interact with 
citizens of either Waterville City or River City in a variety of manners. This could 
include either getting information regarding how a fire began, attempting to minimize 
the property damaged when suppressing a fire, or even coaxing them to exit a third 
story window when trapped in a room by flames. In the non-fire related emergency 
context, this may include as talking to witnesses of car accidents, getting back round 
information as to why a person may have been unconscious, or discussing with 




are simple tasks such as answering the telephone and “problem solving” (quoting a 
WCFD battalion chief) with a citizen on the phone, or even giving a brief tour of a 
group of neighborhood children or kindergarten class who stops by to look at the fire 
truck. Thus, while there specific public relations tasks that need to be accounted for 
that occur in the non-fire non-emergency job-context, there are also elements of 
public relations that supplement tasks that are part of the remaining three contxts, 
each inevitably creating a need for some basic skill elements that may not be the most 
important and dominant skill needed in that job-context at that specific time, but a 
skill that is never-the-less important. 
Outside-of-Station Training 
As mentioned in the previous chapter discussing the firefighters’ tasks at the 
fire station (Chapter 7), training was one task that occurred both within-station, but 
also outside-of-station. This outside-of-station training included both new recruit and 
evolution types of training, and will be discussed here.  
New recruit 
As mentioned in Chapter 7, a good portion of new recruit training occurs 
inside the fire station. However, while many of the skills needed by firefight rs can 
be discussed and reviewed within-station, the firefighters I interviewed provided data 
that supported the claim that actual experience was a vital ingredient to performing 
these tasks properly. Whether it is throwing ladders, suppressing the fire with a hose, 
establishing the water supply, or even driving the apparatus, the new firefighters need 




learn them. A prime example of this is discussed by a WCFD firefighter I interviewed 
who was on a truck company and discussed one of their newer firefighters and the 
training this new recruit was currently going through:  
“And sometimes it takes you a few weeks to teach somebody something, and if they 
come in with no, with no experience where you got to get the license, it takes 
seemingly forever. Just hour and hour of backing the thing [fire truck] in the slot, 
pulling it out and trying again. And it gets better every time you take them out and 
some days it just wears; you get weary of it. It’s so mundane a task your mind just 
kicks out of gear.” (WCFD firefighter; author’s notation in brackets) 
 
Although not all new firefighters were being trained as drivers, this was simply one 
example of the type of new recruit training that occurs outside of the fire station and 
in the non-fire non-emergency job-context. 
Evolution 
Evolution is the final type of training to be discussed, and is solely performed 
in the non-fire non-emergency job-context. Evolution training is simply taking the 
entire fire company (or in some instances, entire battalions) and physical pra ticing 
the tasks that are needed to be performed quickly and properly when actually fighting 
a fire. This type of training is regularly scheduled to be performed by firefight rs. 
However, there are times when more evolution training may occur compared to other 
times throughout the year: 
“Uh, spring and fall we do a lot more outdoor training. Summer’s kind of hard 
because it’s oppressively hot or nice. Um, you know, so again it’s a seasonal thing for 
some of the more hands-on stuff. Some of it we don’t really have much of a choice. 
We got to do it.” (WCFD firefighter) 
 
Thus, in certain instances in does not appear there is much room for 
autonomy/control-related skill to be exercised by the firefighters; however, they are 




time, there does appear some room for discretion as to the precise amount of training 
that does occur, although it may only be left up to the officers. In the example above, 
the WCFD firefighter shows how this discretion is exercised based upon the weather 
outside. 
In addition, during instances when major fire incidents occur, these can have 
an impact on evolution training. For example, while fighting a fire, if a certain task 
does not go smoothly, or if for some reason is not properly performed, the skill 
required to successfully complete this task may be practiced through evolution 
training by that company or battalion in the near future. As with the standard 
evolution training, this may be from a direct order from one of the battalion chiefs, or 
may even be a task that an individual captain or lieutenant wants to practice with 
his/her fire company. 
Thus, as for the substantive complexity dimension, and for the impact of 
technology on the outside-of-station training, it is truly dependent on the particular 
tasks that are the subject of this evolution training. For example, the same level of 
complexity involved with using a ladder at the scene of a fire is present while training 
on using a ladder in the non-fire non-emergency context. As for technology, the same 
technology used when establishing a water supply for a fire engine at a fire related 
emergency is present during training. True, as there is no true life-threatening 
situation present the pressure may not be the same as during a true fire related 
emergency; however, the same mental and manipulative integration is needed to 
perform the skill in either context. Furthermore, the same tools and technologies are 




With the autonomy/control-related skill dimension, however, it is a different 
story. Here, during evolution training the firefighters themselves do not have the 
amount of discretion and decision-making skill present as when fighting a fire. In this 
instance, their commanding officers decide precisely what is to be trained upon, and 
when it occurs. Furthermore, even during instances in which evolution training that is 
not regularly scheduled is performed, this decision is still only being made by a select 
number of firefighters and not the majority. Thus, during the evolution training, the 
impact of technology and complexity remain consistent with that at the scene of a 
fire, yet the autonomy/control-related skill is at a lower level than when dealing with 
an actual emergency. 
Summary 
 Through the need to be able to successfully perform a multitude of tasks 
required when fighting a fire, the need to be able to deal with a multitude of other 
non-fire related emergencies, and the need to maintain the fire station, the firefighters 
from both the WCFD and RCFD are consistently busy throughout the majority of 
their shift. However, even with the slew of tasks set before them that need to be 
completed within these three job-contexts, the firefighters are also resp nsible for a 
variety of tasks that occur outside the fire station that are not actual emergenci s. Just 
because these tasks are not full-fledged emergencies, and arguably do not require h  
heightened level of absolute skill needed during fire and non-fire related em rg ncies, 
it does not imply that the tasks performed during the non-fire non-emergency job-
context are in anyway unimportant, or do not require a certain level of skill that these




firefighters’ shift. This was nicely put by one lieutenant I interviewed who as 
discussing trying to fit in the various inspections and smoke detector 
installation/maintenance tasks that his truck company was assigned: 
“It’s just; we could be constant all day. All day long. I have to stop these guys and ay 
‘Okay. Between this hour and this hour we’re going to eat lunch. I’m not going to 
make any guarantees, but we’re going to try and get something for lunch.’ And then 
we’ll kick up after lunch.” (RCFD firefighter) 
 
Thus, throughout the course of the day these firefighters are consistently busy, using 
some type of skill to complete a certain task that may be required. 
 Perhaps one of the most unique aspects of the non-fire non-emergency job-
context was the very low impact that technology had on the skills that firefighters 
needed to use to complete the various tasks they were assigned. Unlike the fire and
non-fire related emergency job-contexts, there were no devices such as hydr ulic 
rescue tools or the computerized fire engine pumper that drastically shifted t e way 
they performed tasks. For the most part, any tools or technology used was located in a 
somewhat secondary role. For example, during the in-service and hydrant inspec ions, 
and smoke detector installation and maintenance, there was technology present, but 
external to the fire department as it was present in the structure. While these 
technologies may have been slightly altered over the years (e.g., fire safety codes in 
commercial buildings), they appeared to only have a minimal affect on how the 
firefighters performed the tasks associated with these technologies. As for public 
education, public relations, and outside-of-station training, the firefighters did use a 
variety of tools located on their fire apparatus. Tools such as ladders, hoses, and 
turnout gear (i.e., PPE) were all used during these tasks. However, they were not used 




to this relatively miniscule impact of new tools/technology in the non-fire non-
emergency context. It occurred for the WCFD firefighters by the introduction of the 
Children’s Village in the early 1990s. This introduction subsequently created its own 
set of public education skills that the WCFD firefighters who taught at Children’s 
Village needed to possess, both along the lines of substantive complexity and 
autonomy/control-related skill dimensions. 
 Similar to the absence of skill change resulting from technology, there 
appeared to be a relatively stagnant level of skill found in both dimensions of the non-
fire non-emergency job-context throughout the course of the New Economy. Overall, 
a fairly basic level of substantive complexity and autonomy/control-related skill was 
present in performing in-service/hydrant inspections, smoke detector installation and 
maintenance, public education, public relations, and outside-of-station training. 
However, a few important points should be noted here. First, there were apparent 
departmental differences in regards to these non-emergency tasks, and in turn this 
created differences in skill needed by the firefighters. For example, although basic, a 
certain level of skill was required from the RCFD firefighters to perform hydrant 
inspections. However, the data showed that these were not regularly performed by th  
WCFD firefighters; this skill was not needed on a consistent basis. Second, as the 
WCFD firefighters had a more expansive smoke detector program that was enacted in 
a more systematic fashion, there was a slightly lower level of discretion during this 
task than in the RCFD; however, there was a greater level of complexity involved 
with actually installing the devices. Finally, due to the expanded programs of public 




firefighters in the WCFD to teach using the Fire Prevention Trailer and Children’s 
Village that was not present among the RCFD firefighters. Finally, the skill u ed in 
some of these non-fire non-emergency tasks parallels that involved when performing 
specific tasks in fire related or non-fire related emergencies, although the context they 
are being performed in may arguably not create the heightened level of skilneeded to 
perform these tasks (i.e., putting on PPE in less than one minute to successfully 
respond to an emergency call in a timely manner). Thus, there is some evidence of 
overlap in skill that is used here. 
 In sum, technology appeared to have somewhat a small impact, and the skills 
used in this particular job-context by the WCFD and RCFD firefighters remained 
fairly consistent throughout the course of the New Economy. However, what was 
perhaps the most interesting finding here was the difference between the two fire 
departments. There were clear differences in the precise tasks performed during this 
job-context, and the levels of skills used by firefighters in the two departments. While 
the most notable difference between the two departments may have been the use of 
first aid and medical care, the differences in the non-emergency context spread
throughout many of the tasks performed in this context. 
 Relative to the levels of skill present in the fire and non-fire related 
emergency contexts, the level of skill needed in the tasks performed in non-fire non-
emergencies was not as high. However, this claim in no way discredits the fact that a 
number of skills are required to complete these tasks. All five tasks discussed did 
require a certain level of mental/manipulative integration and problem 




completed, and further added to the large, collective number of skills for which the 
firefighters at the WCFD and RCFD were responsible. These skills were an important 
component of performing one’s job as a firefighter in both the WCFD and RCFD, and 





















Chapter 9: Conclusions and Discussion 
 
Conclusions 
This research was undertaken with the purpose of addressing both the 
improvement of the conceptualization of skill and expanding generalizability of case 
studies past manufacturing and “white-collar” occupations. This was done by 
conducting a comprehensive examination of firefighters using a multi-tiered 
conceptual model that contained the concepts of job-context, skill dimension 
(substantive complexity and autonomy/control-related [Braverman 1998/1974]), and 
the Autor, Levy, and Murnane (ALM) routinization hypothesis (Autor et al. 2002, 
2003a, 2003b). Data was collected through semi-structured, in-depth qualitative 
interviews, and this conceptual model was used to guide the analyses of these data in 
an effort to draw conclusions surrounding two research questions that inquired about 
the skill change of professional firefighters in the New Economy, and the impact of 
technology on this change. 
Change in skills used by firefighters 
The first research question posed in this study was: how have the skills used 
by firefighters to complete the tasks required by their occupation changed in the New 
Economy? In order to answer this question, skill is discussed in regards to tasks that 
need to be performed in four different job-contexts: fire related emergencies, non-fire 
related emergencies, the fire station, and non-fire non-emergencies. In each of these 
contexts, the two dimensions of skill discussed by Braverman (1998/1974) were 




how skill used by firefighters in the New Economy had changed. Thus, using these 
dimensions and job-contexts as a guide, the above question can be answered. 
 The fire related emergency job-context was the first job-context discussed. As 
mentioned above, it was the context with which the firefighters I interviewed most 
easily identified. While firefighters appeared to spend the least amount of time during 
their shifts in the fire related emergency job-context, the volume of tasks that needed 
to be completed while in this context was more than any of the other three. While not 
all tasks completed during a fire related emergency required an extremely high level 
of mental/manipulative integration or decision-making abilities, overall the absolute 
level of skill was at a quite high level. As each task needing to be completed in order 
to extinguish a fire required a specific level of skill, prior to an incident firefighters 
were prepared to enact a certain set of skills depending on their assigned task(s) at the 
scene of a fire. 
 Through analyzing the interview data, the evidence provided some indication 
that showed during certain points in the job-context, the substantive complexity and 
autonomy/control-related aspects of the tasks being performed had diminished. In 
preparing for a fire, this was particularly evident in that autonomy/control-related 
aspects of both receiving an emergency call and navigating/driving to a fire 
emergency had shown some indication of decreasing, particularly through the 
introduction of new technologies such new multi-sensory alarms in the fire station, 
the connection of printers to the gong, and particularly the replacement of manual 
transmission apparatuses with automatic transmissions. In fact, the introduction of 




apparatus. While there was some slight removal of skill from the preparation stages of 
a fire related emergency, the only clear indication of skill removal in the fire related 
emergency context occurred among engine companies while actually fighting a fire. 
New pumps automatically regulated and distributed water flow which allowed the 
firefighters operating the pumps to use less skill than was previously required. 
 Although there were signs of skill change in these two aspects of the fire 
emergency job-context, the duties performed by a truck company at the scene of a 
fire, and the tasks needed to be completed after a fire had been “knocked down” 
remained relatively stable in regards to skill change. Overall forced entry, search and 
rescue, using ladders, and ventilation still required the same level of complexity and 
discretionary dimensions as it had in the past. However, there was also some 
indication of some increase in the skill required (particularly in regards to 
complexity). This was simply a result of the introduction of new tools such as the 
hydraulic rescue tool, aerial ladders, and even technologies external to the Waterville 
City Fire Department (WCFD) and River City Fire Department (RCFD) themselves, 
such as new housing materials and construction. New skills were now required to 
effectively use these technologies. As for the overhaul, salvage, and 
equipment/apparatus checks performed post-fire suppression, the data showed that th  
skills used had remained mostly unchanged since prior to the New Economy. Some 
limited adjustments of skills in these two contexts existed, such as those brought 
about by the introduction of the TICs, and these changes should be noted. Thus, for 
the fire related emergency job-context, an overall a high absolute level of substantive 




fire related emergency job-context, and this remained throughout the New Economy. 
While there were certain instances in which it appeared skills had diminished among 
firefighters within this context, new skills (often brought about by new technologies) 
did appear to further add to the multitude of skills that firefighters used in this 
context. 
 Thus, while the skills used in fire related emergencies have become somewhat 
stagnant, and appear to have even decreased in some manners, a different picture 
arose through the data analyses in regards to the non-fire related emergency job-
context. Compared to 20 years ago, firefighters at the WCFD and the RCFD now 
needed to complete tasks with much more complexity and discretion than was 
previously needed. In particular, the manipulative and mental integration that was 
needed to handle automobile accidents, first aid/medical care, performing CPR and 
using AEDs, and even performing the more simple mechanical/maintenance tasks 
(except for addressing floods) had all increased. This heightened level of skil wa  
created in some instances due to the introduction of new tools and technologies, 
whether it be internally to the fire department (i.e., hydraulic rescue tools, he 
EpiPen®, etc.), or externally (e.g., new models/styles of automobiles, heightened us 
of smoke detectors in buildings, etc.). However, not all of this higher level of 
complexity was due to technology. In some instances the nature and types of non-fire 
emergencies that were addressed by the fire department had changed (e.g., the RCFD 
introducing new levels of Emergency Medical Service [EMS] training). Thus, it was a 




A new heightened level of skill was also found in regards to the 
autonomy/control-related skill dimension in the non-fire emergency job-context; 
however, it did not appear to have risen to a level equivalent to the substantive 
complexity in this context. For example, it is rather apparent of the changing 
complexity over the New Economy for firefighters when involved with handling 
automobile accidents, conducting CPR and using AEDs, and even some 
mechanical/maintenance tasks, yet it does not appear that the autonomy/control-
related dimension had shifted for these tasks in the same manner. Thus, while the 
direction of the skill change found in this autonomy/control-related dimension 
parallels that of the substantive complexity dimension, the absolute levels of skill
appear to differentiate. 
Aside from the skill change found in this context, an examination of first 
aid/medical care warrants a bit of further attention. A few things stick out here as 
important. First, the skill change experienced by firefighters in regards to this 
particular task is arguably the greatest out of any other task in any of the f ur job-
contexts. With the increasing volume of EMS calls, new technologies introduced, and 
higher level of training required by firefighters, this type of task has become a 
advocate of skills that have now become a dominant factor in the job of these 
firefighters at both the WCFD and RCFD. One firefighter in the RCFD went so far as 
to hint that he could foresee the day when he and co-workers were no longer 
firefighters with EMS training, but more EMS workers with firefighting skill . 
However, the other important point in regards to this task was how the skill change 




Technology spawned skill change that resulted in a heightened level of skill occurred 
for both dimensions in both fire departments. However, the structure and organization 
of the RCFD further increased the skill among firefighters used during first 
aid/medical care situations. In the beginning of the New Economy the RCFD had 
begun to train their firefighters as paramedics that allowed more complex medical 
procedures to be performed by their firefighters and with that a heightened level of 
decision-making and discretion. In addition, for the WCFD the amount of discretion 
was minimized when the local EMS service arrived at the scene of a medical 
situation; however, in the RCFD this new heightened level of medical training (i.e., 
paramedic) allowed this discretion to remain with the firefighters themselve . 
In the third job-context examined, the fire station, the skills used by 
firefighters prior to the New Economy had for the most part been continued 
throughout the past few decades and into the present day. Overall the level of skill 
used here was not at an extremely high level; however, perhaps this was not too 
surprising. Checking equipment, housecleaning and chores, and filling out reports are 
all fairly basic tasks. They are tasks that remain vital to the WCFD and RCFD in 
order to keep the station and fire apparatuses in proper working order and ready to 
respond to emergencies that may often be life or death situations. Thus, even if they 
involve basic manipulation and decision-making, they never-the-less have an 
important role to play. 
In regards to skill change involved with fire station tasks, it remains rather 
limited. In regards to the autonomy/control-related skill dimension, there did not 




station. For the most part these tasks were detailed to the firefighters by ither their 
officers or their respective department’s administration. However, there were some 
small signs of an upward shift of the complexity involved in a few of these tasks, 
particularly incident and activity reporting. Computers were introduced to both the 
WCFD and RCFD to use during incident reporting. At the RCFD, all officers who 
completed incident and activity reporting were required to use online software to 
enter data and complete forms. Interestingly, although this was a rather b sic data 
entry task (and some routinized components were able to be completed automatically 
for the firefighters), the method in which computers were introduced did not remove 
any skill. Furthermore, many of the captains and lieutenants kept a written journal as 
had always been done. Thus, computers did not appear to eliminate any skills, but 
rather added additional complexity to a task that could potentially be eliminated by 
this technology if it was implemented as such. In the WCFD, computers had also 
been introduced and could (to some extent) be used for reporting. However, these 
computers had not yet been uniformly introduced, and the software used to enter data 
was not used by the firefighters themselves (rather by the administrative help), which 
truly had a little increasing effect on substantive complexity (albeit an increase never-
the-less). All in all, in the fire station job-context skill change was rather minimal, 
with the data providing some evidence that the complexity in this context had 
increased slightly. 
The final job-context, and arguably the most easily overlooked, was the non-
fire non-emergency. In this context, there was clearly not much change in either the 




slight increase here (i.e., complexity involved with in-service inspections) and a slight 
decrease there (i.e., discretion involved with smoke detector installation and 
maintenance in the WCFD), but skill appeared rather unchanged in the non-fire non-
emergency context across the board.  
However, there was one exception specific to the WCFD. Through the Fire 
Prevention Officer at the WCFD a number of grants had been received which assisted 
in funding expanded public education programs in Waterville City. Not only was the 
department able to invest in drafting and implementing these public education 
programs, but the funds were also able to be used to support two new technologies: a 
Fire Prevention trailer and Children’s Village. These expanded programs relied 
heavily on the WCFD firefighters. Although the firefighters were not all directly 
involved with the design and implementation of these programs, many of them 
volunteered to work in conjunction with the Fire Prevention Officer and other WCFD 
personnel to run the day-to-day operations of these public education programs. In 
turn, these programs brought a new set of mental/manipulative integration and 
discretionary skills that were needed to be used by the firefighters in thisdepartment. 
Thus, although the overall pattern of skill change by all indications remains relatively 
absent, in this one instance there is evidence of an increase in both skill dimensions 
(more so in regards to complexity than autonomy/control-related) among the WCFD 
firefighters. 
In order to understand skill change experienced by firefighters in the New 
Economy, past research may have been tempted to do one of two things. First, there is 




context. If this was the case, the conclusions reached would indicate that the 
firefighter’s skills have remained relatively stable moving into the New Economy, 
with a slight decrease in skill being evident. The second possible conclusion would be 
to lump all the skills together and draw one summary conclusion. If this approach 
were taken, the conclusion drawn may arguably indicate that overall skill has 
increased throughout the New Economy. However, by taking an approach that placed 
skills into job-contexts and noting two different dimensions of skill, a more complete 
and thorough understanding of skill change has been reached. Here it shows that the 
complexity and discretion involved in the fire related emergency context has 
remained fairly stable, with a slight decrease in prepping for a fire and the engine 
tasks during a fire, and some increase spawned by new technologies. This overall 
picture is much different when considering the remaining three job-contexts. In the 
non-fire emergency context, skill has change by increasing in both complexity and 
discretion. However, this parallel movement among these two dimensions is different 
in an absolute sense, where there appeared to be a greater increase in the substantive 
complexity skill dimension. A similar pattern is found at the fire station for 
substantive complexity (more is required than previously needed), yet in regards to 
the autonomy/control-related dimension there is no concrete evidence of any change. 
Finally, although skill change had occurred in all three of the aforementioned job-
contexts, during non-fire non-emergencies a constant level of skill involved with both 
dimensions has remained (with one exception – expanded public education programs 
in the WCFD) Thus, overall there are unique patterns of skill change (or lack of) 




Both the WCFD and RCFD experienced this change in a similar fashion; 
however, two pronounced regional (or local) differences did exist that affected the 
skill among the firefighters in both these departments. In the WCFD, external gra t 
funding allowed the introduction of expanded public education programs that brought 
both the Fire Prevention Trailer and Children’s Village to the WCFD. In turn, 
although skill in the non-fire non-emergency job-context remained relatively 
unchanged, this particular exception did increase the complexity and discretionary 
skills needed (albeit to different levels). This shift was not present in the RCFD; 
however, in the non-fire emergency context there was also a differential skill change 
among both the WCFD and RCFD. While both departments experienced increasing 
skill in this job-context, the advanced levels of training in first aid/medical care at the 
RCFD and the corresponding skill increases were subsequently bigger at the RCFD 
versus the WCFD (and were arguably the biggest change that occurred to skill among 
the firefighters). Therefore, in addition to recognizing these broader patterns of skill 
change across both departments and differences in change at the job-context level, in
regards to certain tasks skill change also occurred differently between the WCFD and 
RCFD. 
Technology’s role in skill change among firefighters 
In the second research question, it was inquired as to what has been 
technology’s role in the change of skill used by firefighters to complete the tasks 
required by their occupation. In order to examine this aspect of the skill, again in each 
job-context, in each skill dimension the impact of technology was examined. In an 




(2002, 2003a, 2003b) routinization argument (i.e., the ALM routinization hypothesis) 
was adopted and used as a conceptual guide. The ALM hypothesis argues that 
computerization and IT are able to either supplement or compliment different tasks 
and the skills that are needed to achieve them. During instances where skills are 
routinized, this technology may be able to operate according to an “IF-THEN-DO” 
logic to replace routinized skills. However, if the skills are not able to be easily
routinized, technology may be adopted that complements these skills. 
In the fire related emergency job-context, the role of technology paralleled the 
overall skill change patterns found. In fact, the removal of certain skills used in 
preparation for a fire and at the fire among engine companies was an outcome of the 
implementation of new technologies to the fire department. Perhaps this is no 
surprise, as technology has long played an important role in the U.S. fire service 
(Coleman 2004), and clearly continues to do so today (even if it does not have the 
high level of impact it once did). In regards to preparing for a fire, there was some 
slight evidence of certain instances where firefighters’ skill may havesomewhat 
diminished. Multi-sensory alarms were beginning to be introduced to the WCFD’s 
fire stations that allowed more selectivity in signaling an incoming emergency call, 
(determined by a set of guidelines based on geography, but also the individual 
concerns regarding the call). In doing so, some autonomy/control-related aspects were 
removed. The introduction of printers and computers to the RCFD’s alerting system  
allowed for the removal of some of the skill in navigating to the scene of a fire 
emergency. This computer technology was able to store geographical data on roads 




replace both complexity and autonomy/control-related elements involved in this task. 
However, due to non-routine aspects of this task such as traffic patterns, road 
closings, and time of the day, not all skills involved here were routinized and (per the 
ALM hypothesis) were not replaced. In regards to driving, automatic transmissions 
were (or in the case of the WCFD, still are being) implemented. This decreas d the 
complexity involved with using manual transmissions at both departments. 
In the fire related emergency job-context, the only clear pattern of both 
substantive complexity and autonomy/control-related skill dimensions being removed 
as a result of technology replacing routinized tasks (Autor et al. 2002, 2003a, 2003b) 
was at the scene of a fire in regards to the operating the engine. A computerized 
control was added to the pump that followed basic physics involving the routinized 
amounts of water pressure needing to be supplied to attack hose lines. Thus, the 
complexity involved with this task had decreased. Interestingly enough, some of the 
discretion previously used by the firefighters operating the pumps also was removed 
by this new technology; however, it did not follow the ALM hypothesis. Throughout 
the course of the interviews I conducted, it appeared that individualized 
considerations may have been made by the pump operators as to how much water to 
supply based on the burning structure and the firefighter using the attack line. This 
was in no way routinized, but as these pumps were now governed by computers, this 
individualized consideration was no longer able to be made. Interestingly enough, 
while these computerized pumps decreased the skill involved in pumping water, from 




departments were found to have little to no direct impact on the skills used by 
firefighters (i.e., did not spawn any changes). 
While the above technologies followed Autor et al.’s (2002) notion that 
routinized skills can be supplemented by computerized technology, this pattern was 
not found in regards to truck companies while at a fire, or after the fire had been 
“knocked down.” In fact, in some instances the introduction of new technology had 
somewhat of an opposite effect where there were even some indications of additional 
skill now being required. Simply by their basic introduction, hydraulic tools did 
create some level of increase of skill in the substantive complexity dimension used in 
forced entry. However, thermal imaging cameras (TICs) did not really have t is affect 
on the truck companies’ tasks. Although they relied on routinized physical properties, 
they were not regularly used by the truck company in search and rescue, thus the 
impact was negligible. The only other new technology introduced through the fire 
department was improvements on the aerial ladders. However, while their new 
designs were able to remove some of the basic routinized manual procedures involved 
when preparing to use the aerial (i.e., removing the steering wheel), how it was used 
was very situational and depended on considerations such as when the truck company 
was due to the scene, the proximity of the truck to buildings, etc. Thus, in some ways 
the removal of complexity in the preparation of the aerial ladder was subsequently 
negated by the actual use of the aerial ladder, as the considerations noted above did 
not allow for this use to be completed in a routinized manner. 
Finally, after a fire was knocked down, the only new technology that affected 




technology had a differing effect on the two different dimensions involved in this one 
task. Through its use, firefighters needed to learn new mental and manipulative skills 
(i.e., actual how to use the technology). At the same time, its thermal imaging 
technology recognized heat patterns (which follow routine laws of physics) 
alleviating the necessity of firefighters to find any remaining burning/smoldering 
embers or fires through more rudimentary manners that rely solely on the help of 
basic hand tools. 
Thus, overall technology has played a rather significant role in the change of 
skill used in the fire emergency context, particularly at the scene of a fire (specifically 
the computerized pumps, the greatest removal of skill in the fire related emergency 
job-context). In this aspect of this job-context, the ALM hypothesis appears to be 
followed rather closely. On the other hand, fire trucks at the scene of a fire and after 
the fire has been “knocked down” were areas of the fire emergency context where 
technology appeared to have slightly increased the skills used in this particular job-
context. 
In regards to the non-fire related emergency job-context, many new tools and 
technologies were implemented over the course of the past 20 years. The overall 
effect of these technologies created an increase in the substantive complexity and 
autonomy/control-related skill dimensions to the respective skill in which they were 
related. Based on the manner of skill change that was experienced in this job-context, 
this was rather expected. However, in applying the routinization hypothesis to th




uniform shift in skill during both dimensions, the reasoning behind this shift is both 
due to non-routine and routine skills.  
According the ALM hypothesis, technology will be used to complement non-
routine skills involved with a specific task. This would then increase the amount of 
skill needed to perform a task. This is the case with a variety of technologies 
introduced in the New Economy. For example, in dealing with automobile accidents, 
it is shown that hydraulic tools were adopted and used to perform the task of cutting 
and prying open cars. This increased the complexity (i.e., firefighters could now 
perform a task not able to be done before), without truly affecting the discretion 
involved in the task. Depending on the type of car and the impact/damage of the 
accident, this could be handled in a number of ways and was not a routine skill. 
Furthermore, car-related technologies (e.g., airbags, gas/electric hyb d motors, etc.) 
have also been continuously changing throughout the past 20 years, and are 
dependent upon a specific car company/model. Therefore, this new technology has 
created a non-routine situation which has created not only an increase in complexity, 
but also in discretion when a firefighter is faced with handling one of these car 
accidents. In the various mechanical/maintenance tasks, other types of techn logies 
were introduced to perform non-routine tasks. These included absorbent materials 
(for fluid spills), hot sticks (for electrical problems), and gas meters (fo  testing gases 
or odors). These technologies were all used to perform fairly simple tasks with fairly 
low to moderate absolute levels of skill.  However, these tasks were non-routine and 
complemented by these technologies. The result was an increase in the substantive 




related dimension remained rather unaffected. Furthermore, with the introduction of 
full-fledged paramedic training for new firefighters, additional medical supplies and 
tools (e.g., various drugs) were able to be used by firefighters to perform non-routine 
skills, increasing both dimensions. 
The second manner in which technology in the non-fire related emergency 
job-context involved increase skill was in fact through routine skills being replaced. 
At first this appears contradictory to the ALM logic; however, stepping back and 
providing a bigger picture allows for one to see why this is the case. For exampl, the 
process of administering a shock to medical patients was based upon an initial 
reading of vital signs. Initially this could only be completed by paramedics. However, 
as these vital signs follow routinized and rhythmic biological patterns, in the past ten 
years the introduction of the AED to the WCFD and RCFD allowed for this 
computerized device to determine the proper routine patterns and administer a shock 
accordingly. Thus, the AED was able to minimize certain routine skills. In the proc ss 
these skills which once belonged to only paramedics could now be simplified by this 
technology to an extent that they were able to be performed by firefighters who had a 
lower level of EMS training. Therefore, the original placement of the skill mattered. 
This skill originally did not belong to firefighters, but due to logic of the Autor and 
colleagues (2002, 2003a, 2003b) argument, it was able to be captured by technology 
and transferred from solely paramedics to firefighters trained only in basic EMS. This 
same logic can be applied to the affect of other medical devices, particularly the 




The only technological innovation to have a clear role at the fire station 
appeared to be the computer that was used to complete incident and activity report. 
The role of this technology was not necessarily what might have been expected, as in 
its current state, both the WCFD and RCFD were not using computers in a manner 
which was replacing the routine components involved with the task of incident and 
activity reporting. At the WCFD, computers had not yet been implemented at all fire
stations to use in the completion of reports. Furthermore, while they could be used for 
basic typing and printing of reports, software programs and intranet connections that 
would allow much of the complexity involved with this task to be removed had not 
been introduced. Thus, the role of computer technology in the WCFD, at least to the 
firefighters, was not extremely unnoticeable. 
Only the RCFD had a widespread implementation of computers. True, the 
computers at the RCFD did allow for some basic information reported during this 
task to be removed from the task itself. Yet the computers themselves added a larg 
amount of complexity that for many of the senior firefighters who traditionally 
completed reporting, was rather complex. Furthermore, even with the implementation 
of this technology, a number of officers still kept a paper and pencil log of the 
incidents and activities they completed. With this in mind, not only was the 
complexity of this task heightened by the need to learn computer technology, but (in 
the eyes of the firefighters) it created double the amount of work for firefighters 
completing this task as both electronic and paper forms were being completed. Thus, 
these computers were actually not used in a routinized manner that would minimize 




would be the one aspect of the fire station job-context in which one might assume to 
see the routinization hypothesis used to show the supplementation of many of the 
skills in this task by a computer. 
Technology played a relatively small role in the fire station context (compared 
to the fire and non-fire related contexts), and its effects in the non-fire non-emergency 
job-context followed a similar pattern. In fact, with one exception the effects of 
technology in the non-fire non-emergency job-context were not very noticeable. This 
one exception was the introduction of the Trailer and Children’s Village to the 
WCFD. The introduction of these technologies subsequently created new skills. This 
in turn increased the mental and manipulative integration needed to be used by the 
WCFD firefighters, but also the amount of discretion and problem solving they 
needed to display when handling the children who participated in these two expanded 
programs. These skills were non-routinized, and did not exist prior to the introduction 
of these two technologies. 
Clearly technology does play an important role in the skill change of 
firefighters. Above it was noted that the biggest change in skill was apparent in the 
non-fire related emergency context. Not surprisingly, this particular context was also 
where new technologies had the largest role. The new technologies introduced 
increased the skill involved in many of the tasks examined, and did so according to 
the ALM routinization hypothesis. Furthermore, this increase was more presnt in the 
complexity skill dimension versus the autonomy/control-related skill dimension. In 
the fire related emergency context, the role of technology again mirrored the 




skill involved in the preparation for a fire and at the scene fire among engine 
companies. However, what was unique in this job-context was that not only was the 
decrease in skill apparent in the complexity dimension, but the effects were also f lt 
in the autonomy/control-related dimension. Thus, not only did the directions in which 
skill was affected differ between the non-fire and fire emergency job-contexts, it also 
differed in which dimensions it affected. While these two portions of the fire related 
emergency job-context were affected, among truck companies at the scene of a fir , 
and after a fire had been “knocked down,” the data found new technologies to 
actually have increased skill. 
There was only a relatively small role played by technology at both the fire 
station and in non-fire non-emergencies. However, what was interesting here was that 
the impact of technology itself differentiated between the two fire departments. For 
example, for the RCFD technology did play a role in skill change (increased the 
complexity involved with reporting incidents and activities), while in the WCFD the 
introduction of the Fire Prevention Trailer and Children’s Village heightened both 
skill dimensions among the WCFD firefighters. Thus, although the role of technology 
in these two contexts was small, it was important to note as it differentiated according 
to the two different departments studied. 
 While the ALM hypothesis (Autor et al. 2002, 2003a, 2003b) did allow for an 
understanding of the impact of technology on skill change among the firefighters I 
interviewed, its integration with Braverman’s (1998/1974) skill dimension 
conceptualizations further enhanced the understanding of technology’s role on skill 




and autonomy/control-related dimensions of skill. The interview data showed here 
that only one new technology, the engine pumps used to supply water at fire related 
emergencies, removed skill from both dimensions in the “technologically 
deterministic” (Vallas 1990) manner that Braverman expected. On the contrary, the 
new technology introduced in most instances appeared to required additional skills be 
learned by the firefighters who used them, in many instances affecting the substantive 
complexity and autonomy/control-related dimensions to different extents. Thus while 
the diminishing skill level hypothesized by Braverman was not found, the use of his 
skill dimensions in conjunction with Autor et al.’s hypothesis did provide insight that 
may have otherwise gone unnoticed. 
A final conclusion to make is that again, the use of multiple job-contexts and 
multiple skill dimensions allows for a more thorough and intricate examination of 
technology’s role on skill change. By not noting the multiple contexts involved with 
firefighting skills, a researcher might draw conclusions based on only a certain 
number of skills. Arguably these skills examined may more readily fall into the two 
emergency job-contexts, which show that technology does play a somewhat 
significant role in skill change. Yet, when considering all the skill in the fire station 
and non-fire non-emergency job-contexts that skill does not radically affect, it 
appears that drawing conclusions from solely the two emergency contexts inevitably 
leads to a bias in the results. Furthermore, although an increase or decrease in skill 
might yield a higher/lower level of one skill dimension should not be taken to imply 
that a shift in the other dimensions will automatically be the result. Furthermore, the 




also provided a basis in which to assess the manners in which skill has (or has not) 
changed within each skill dimension. Collectively this multi-tiered conceptual model 
has shown that while technology does have an important effect on the skills used by 
firefighters to complete their tasks, its role is more important in some job-contexts 
than others, and has a greater effect on the substantive complexity dimension than the 
autonomy/control-related. Therefore, although its role is important to recognize, it is 
also important make sure that the impact of technology it not overestimated. 
Discussion  
Limitations 
 As with any research, the preceding study did face some limitations. These
need to be considered when interpreting the results and discussing the research’s 
implications, and therefore they will be mentioned here. First, the conclusions of thi  
study were reached through the analyses of data that came from two independent fire 
departments in the state of Maryland. These conclusions can confidently be 
generalized to these two departments, and to some extent other professional (i.e., non-
volunteer) fire departments in the state of Maryland. However, caution should be 
warranted to stretching this generalizability much further. True, the skill change and 
impact of technology found here may be similar to other fire departments in the U.S.; 
however, this assumption cannot fully be supported through the use of this case study. 
Furthermore, these results also cannot be assumed to accurately represent skill change 
and technology’s impact in the public service sector as a whole. Thus, while 
generalizability is somewhat more limited in case studies such as this (it is a




discovered, and that this method allows a more detailed analyses that may have 
otherwise been missed. 
 The second important limitation to note is that the method of data collection – 
the use of semi-structured interviews – may have not been the absolute ideal method
to use. Arguably, observations (either participant or non-participant) or their 
integration would have been an ideal manner in which data could be collected. Yet 
due to the danger and risk posed by a number of tasks that firefighters must complete, 
this method of data collection was simply not able to be utilized to an extent where 
enough quality data could result and be used to answer the research questions. It 
should be noted that while this “ideal” method was simply not a reality, I still was 
able to spend much time around the fire stations at both the WCFD and RCFD when I 
was not conducting interviews, including a number of more formal observations, and 
also ride along with two firefighters to a non-fire emergency response. Regardless, 
interview data was truly the primary data used in this study and that was 
systematically analyzed.  
Another point to note here was that as the interviews I conducted were 
sometimes interrupted (i.e., an incoming emergency call to which the interview e had 
to respond), special considerations had to be made by myself as the interviewer such 
that the interview could begin again upon the firefighter’s return. This also wa not 
ideal, but was simply the nature of interviewing firefighters who work rotating 
schedules in an often unpredictable occupation. 
 Finally, as discussed in the Literature Review (Chapter 2), research on skill 




have been numerous conceptual and operational methods used in its study. Because 
of this issue, the ways in which researchers have approached the study of skill has 
varied widely, and in turn its study has been approached in a variety of different 
manners. Thus, while I attempted to conduct as thorough of a review of the 
theoretical and empirical literature as possible, and integrated what I believed to be 
some of the most justified, dominant, and best concepts and methods as possible into 
a model to guide my research, this is not to say it is the definitive model for studying 
skill change and is the one method that should be used. I do strongly believe that it is 
a well-informed model that has potential to be used in a variety of studies that 
empirically examine skill, skill change, and the role of technology on skill change; 
however, at the same time I recognize there are many other conceptual and 
operational considerations that were not included in this study. Thus I would 
encourage future research to use this particular model, but at the same time be open to 
building upon it to further our understanding of this topic. Although this point may 
not necessarily be a limitation per se, I feel that is still an important consideration that 
should be noted.   
Implications 
 Albeit limitations exist, there also exist a number of implications that have 
resulted from the findings of the above research. The first, and arguably one of the 
most important, is that in order to continue to seek an understanding of skill change in 
the New Economy, we must take a more complex and systematic approach to our 
empirical research. As the results of this study show, skill change among firefighters 




increase/decrease, etc.). Rather, it occurs in a much more multifaceted manner. While 
in some job-contexts of the occupation it was found that skill has been drastically 
altered, in another context there was little or no affect at all. Furthermor , in one job-
context present in firefighting, the skills drastically increased, yet in another it was 
lowered to a rather basic level. Furthermore, just because the complexity involved in 
completing a task required of firefighters is heighted, it does not imply that the 
discretion and decision-making will follow suit. Thus, these contradicting changes are 
important to note if we are to truly recognize the intricacies involved with skill 
change, and build upon this present research.  
This more complex understanding must also be applied to determine the role 
of technology in skill change. Through increasing computerization of the workplace, 
most would clearly expect that with computers and computerized devices becoming 
ever-present in a wide variety of occupations, they will continue to have an impact on 
workers’ skills. This was clearly true for the firefighters in this study. Thus, the 
routinization of tasks (or lack of), and consequently the impact computers have on 
these tasks, is a valuable research vein for scholars to pursue; however, it is not
enough. Integrating this argument with the conceptual foundations laid down by past 
researchers must also be accomplished. This is precisely what was sought to be 
accomplished in this present study. In doing so, it was found that through this manner 
arguably a more complete understanding of technology’s role on skill can be found. 
Thus, an important consideration for future research is to strive to achieve a more 
detailed and holistic understanding of skill change and the impact of technology on 




However, in order to achieve this more complete understanding we also need 
to attempt to create and use better and more theoretically-informed conceptual models 
in our research. As shown here, by doing so the result may be that a much greater 
understanding of exactly how firefighters’ skills have changed in the New Economy, 
and how technology has impacted these skills, has been achieved. Thus, a second 
important implication that should be derived from this research is that we must place 
our focus not only on the results of our research, but also how they are reached. This 
implies that we not only continue to put thought into the conceptualization and 
measurement of skill, but also strive to build upon these past foundations. Obviously, 
the specific type of study, population being examined, or even resources available 
play a role in accomplishing this task. However, they should not be the guiding factor 
as to how we conceptualize and measure skill. As Spenner (1985) noted, these 
considerations were once a driving factor of sociological research on skill. However, 
this should not be taken to imply it is the best method of research. As sociologists and 
researchers we conduct studies with the intention that other researchers will adopt 
ideas and improve upon them. Thus, I argue that to gain a complete understanding of 
skill change, we need to adopt better conceptual arguments. This is precisely what the 
conceptual model in the present study was used to do, and as a result it led to 
extremely interesting results. Whether or not this study’s conceptual modeis th  best 
model to follow could be argued. However, the results of this study make it difficult 
to argue that using more thorough conceptual arguments is ot a beneficial avenue for 




Another implication is that future studies should strive to increase the 
generalizability past professional firefighters in two fire departments. This could be 
accomplished by conducting similar examinations on additional populations of 
firefighters, occupation, industries, etc. The conceptual model used here may serve as 
a valid guide in the understanding of skill change among not only firefighters at other 
departments throughout the U.S., but also in other occupations or industries. While 
the specific job-contexts would need to be altered, and the individual skills examined 
would be different, the same model used in the present study could be applied to a 
variety of studies in a way that could increase generalizability. 
Related to the implication of improving generalizability, another implication 
for future research would be to determine how researchers may be able to 
operationalize the multi-tiered conceptual model I have introduced in this present 
study to large-scale quantitative studies. A review of the literature shows that 
different findings have been made by researchers depending on if they have 
conducted their research through the use of qualitative case studies, or if they utiliz d
large-scale quantitative analyses of secondary data. One reason for these differences 
clearly involves the differences in how skill is conceptualized and measured. 
Therefore, by applying the conceptual model used in the present study to a larger 
scale quantitative study, one might be able to reach a more holistic understanding of 
scale on a much more generalizable level, and in addition speak to the differences of 




A Final Note (Summary) 
In the above study, a multi-tiered conceptual model was used to examine skill 
change in the New Economy among professional firefighters. The results of thi study 
showed the skills of firefighters have clearly changed, and have done so in a non-
uniform fashion. While the skills of firefighters have shifted in one manner during the 
fire related emergency job-context, they have also shifted in an opposite manner in 
the non-fire related emergency job-context. At the same time, the skills needed during 
non-fire non-emergencies and at the fire station have remained relatively stable 
throughout the transition into the New Economy. While these findings are in 
themselves interesting, it is also important to note that depending on what dimension 
of a skill is being considered, any changes that have been introduced may not 
necessarily affect each dimension in a similar manner. A change in one dimension 
does not necessarily signify a change in another dimension, or even necessarily a 
change in a similar manner. Furthermore, the role of technology on skill change has 
also been as complex as skill change itself. New tools and technologies have also had 
a mixed effect depending on the job-context and skill dimension examined. Thus, 
through this approach, it was found that the skills used by firefighters in the New 
Economy have clearly been altered. By taking the lessons learned here from this 
empirical study of firefighting in the New Economy, it is hoped that the implications 
of these findings can be taken and applied to future research. Through this effort we 
can further our understanding about skill change in the New Economy and the impact 








Table 1. Overview Comparison between the Dictionary of Occupational Titles 
(DOT) and the Occupational Information Network (O*NET) 
 
 DOT O*NET 
Format Book Database 
   
Flexibility Fixed format Flexible system, allowing users 
to reconfigure data to meet their 
needs 
   
Reflection of Economy Reflected industrial economy 
and the predominance of blue-
collar workers 
Reflects the occupations of 
today’s labor market and the 
need for multi-skilled workers 





Task-based – described 
workers’ functions in relation to 
data, people, and things 
Skills-based – describes job 
requirements and worker 
attributes, as well as content 
and context of work using 483 
variables 
   
Definition of Occupations Offered isolated dictionary 
definitions of occupations 
Offers new means of 
identifying and describing 
occupations, using a 
classification system linked to 
labor market information 
   
Linkage to Other Systems Required complex crosswalks 
to other systems 
Uses SOC easing direct links to 
other systems 
   
Skill Transferability Provided no measure of skill 
transferability making it 
difficult to create job clusters or 
explore career paths 
Gauges transferability of skills 
making it easy to create job 
clusters and explore career 
paths across clusters 













Table 2. Example Pattern of River City Fire Department’s Eight-day Rotating Shift 
Schedule 
 
 Day on the Shift Schedule 
Type of shift 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Day shift A A B B C C D D 

























Figure 1. Skills Used by Firefighters Conceptualized According to Job Skill Level 






















































Figure 3. Conceptual Model of the Skills Used by Firefighters in Different Job-




























Appendix A: Questionnaire Instrument 
Description of Current Daily Tasks 
 
For the first few questions I would like you to think about the activities and duties 
you complete during the course of a shift in which you work. Please be as detailed as 
possible. I would love to hear about even the smallest tasks which at some times may 
even be taken for granted. 
 
1. In average, how long does a shift in which you work last? 
 
2. Think of the time you spend at the fire station. About how many hours (and 
minutes) of your shift is spent at the fire station? 
 
3. Could you please describe the different types of responsibilities and tasks that 
are needed to be completed by you arrive at the fire station? You could simply 
walk me through the time you arrive to the time you leave and describe how 
you complete the required tasks and responsibilities. 
 
4. Now I am going to try to understand a little more in-depth the tasks you 
mentioned above (Ask for each task mentioned above in Question #3): 
a. What needs to be done in order to [Insert Task Name]?  
b. How often is [Insert Task Name] needed to be completed? 
c. Was [Insert Task Name] ever completed in a different manner?  
d. When did this older manner of [Insert Task Name] change?  
e. Why did this change take place? 
f. Do you have any opinion on this change? If so, could you elaborate? 
 
5. Think of the time you spend at the scene of a fire. About how many hours 
(and minutes) of your shift is spent fighting fire? 
 
6. Could you please describe the different types of responsibilities and tasks that 
are needed to be completed by you when arrive at the scene of a fire? You 
could simply walk me through the time you receive the call at your fire station 
to the time you leave the scene of a fire to return back to the station and 
describe how you complete the required tasks and responsibilities. 
 
7. I am sure in order to fight different types of fire there are different tasks that 
need to be completed. If I am correct, could you maybe provide some 
examples? 
 
8. Now I am going to try to understand a little more in-depth the tasks you 
mentioned above (Ask for each task mentioned above in Question #6 and #7): 




b. How often is [Insert Task Name] needed to be completed? 
c. Was [Insert Task Name] ever completed in a different manner?  
d. When did this older manner of [Insert Task Name] change?  
e. Why did this change take place? 
f. Do you have any opinion on this change? If so, could you elaborate? 
 
9. Think of the time you spend at the scene of an emergency response call which 
does not involve fire. About how many hours (and minutes) of your shift is 
spent dealing with these types of calls? 
 
10. Could you please describe the different types of responsibilities and tasks that 
are needed to be completed by you when you arrive at the scene of a non-fire 
emergency? You could simply walk me through the time you receive the call 
at your fire station to the time you leave the scene of addressing the 
emergency call and return back to the station and describe how you complete 
the required tasks and responsibilities. 
 
11. What are the different types of these non-fire emergency response calls? 
Could you describe how the tasks that need to be completed differ from call to 
call? 
 
12. Now I am going to try to understand a little more in-depth the tasks you 
mentioned above (Ask for each task mentioned above in Question #10 and 
#11): 
a. What needs to be done in order to [Insert Task Name]?  
b. How often is [Insert Task Name] needed to be completed? 
c. Was [Insert Task Name] ever completed in a different manner?  
d. When did this older manner of [Insert Task Name] change?  
e. Why did this change take place? 
f. Do you have any opinion on this change? If so, could you elaborate? 
 
13. Finally, in addition to the types of activities we have discussed above, I know 
there are also other types of tasks and duties that you must have outside of the 
fire station that are not considered emergencies. For example: 
checking/installing smoke detectors. About how many hours (and minutes) of 
your shift is spent dealing with these types of non-emergency activities? 
 
14. Could you please describe the different types of responsibilities and tasks that 
are needed to be completed by you when at the scene of a non-emergency? 
You could simply walk me through the time you receive the call at your fire 
station to the time you leave the scene of addressing the emergency call and 
return back to the station and describe how you complete the required tasks 
and responsibilities. 
 
15. Now I am going to try to understand a little more in-depth the tasks you 




a. What needs to be done in order to [Insert Task Name]?  
b. How often is [Insert Task Name] needed to be completed? 
c. Was [Insert Task Name] ever completed in a different manner?  
d. When did this older manner of [Insert Task Name] change?  
e. Why did this change take place? 
f. Do you have any opinion on this change? If so, could you elaborate? 
 
Introduction of New Technologies and Effects on the Firefighter 
 
I am now going to ask you some questions about different types of technologies 
which have been introduced to your job. By technology I not only mean things that 
have been computerized, but any improvements and innovations that have been 
introduced. Also, I am not interested in the time prior to 1990, so please don’t worry 
about reaching back past this date. 
 
1. Thinking just of your duties at the fire station, what types of new technologies 
have been introduced in this post-1990 time period? 
 
2. Now, I am going to try and understand a little more in-depth the technologies 
you mentioned above (ask for each technology mentioned above in Question 
#1): 
a. Has [Insert Technology] caused you to not need any skills you had 
previously needed? 
b. Has [Insert Technology] created any new skills which you now need? (i.e. 
Have they complimented any of the skills you use? 
c. Do you have any opinion about this technology? If so, could you 
elaborate? 
 
3. Now I want you to think specifically about computers and computerized 
devices used at the fire station. Could you briefly describe how these specific 
computer technologies are used?  
a. Do you have any opinion about this computer technology? If so, could you 
elaborate? 
 
4. Thinking just of your duties while fighting a fire, what types of new 
technologies have been introduced in this post-1990 time period? 
 
5. Now, I am going to try and understand a little more in-depth the technologies 
you mentioned above (ask for each technology mentioned above in Question 
#4): 
a. Has [Insert Technology] caused you to not need any skills you had 
previously needed? 
b. Has [Insert Technology] created any new skills which you now need? (i.e. 
Have they complimented any of the skills you use? 






6. Now I want you to think specifically about computers and computerized 
devices used at the scene of a fire. Could you briefly describe how these 
specific computer technologies are used?  
b. Do you have any opinion about this computer technology? If so, could you 
elaborate? 
 
7. Thinking just of your duties at non-fire emergencies, what types of new 
technologies have been introduced in this post-1990 time period? 
 
8. Now, I am going to try and understand a little more in-depth the technologies 
you mentioned above (ask for each technology mentioned above in Question 
#7): 
a. Has [Insert Technology] caused you to not need any skills you had 
previously needed? 
b. Has [Insert Technology] created any new skills which you now need? (i.e. 
Have they complimented any of the skills you use? 
c. Do you have any opinion about this technology? If so, could you 
elaborate? 
 
9. Now I want you to think specifically about computers and computerized 
devices used at the scene of a non-fire emergency. Could you briefly describe 
how these specific computer technologies are used?  
a. Do you have any opinion about this computer technology? If so, could you 
elaborate? 
 
10. Thinking just of your duties at the various non-emergency calls you need to 
address, what types of new technologies have been introduced in this post-
1990 time period? 
 
11. Now, I am going to try and understand a little more in-depth the technologies 
you mentioned above (ask for each technology mentioned above in Question 
#10): 
a. Has [Insert Technology] caused you to not need any skills you had 
previously needed? 
b. Has [Insert Technology] created any new skills which you now need? (i.e. 
Have they complimented any of the skills you use? 
c. Do you have any opinion about this technology? If so, could you 
elaborate? 
 
12. Now I want you to think specifically about computers and computerized 
devices used at a non-emergency call. Could you briefly describe how these 
specific computer technologies are used?  








Next, I would like to ask a few different questions about some of your background 
information. It should not take very long. 
 
1. (identify the respondent’s sex) 
 
2. What year did you become a paid firefighter? 
 
3. Did you serve as a volunteer firefighter prior to becoming a paid firefighter? If 
so, for how many years? 
 
4. Did you serve as a paid firefighter prior to working for the (Insert Name of 
Fire Department) Fire Department? If so, for how many years? 
 
5. How old are you (in years)? 
 
6. What racial identity do you identify with? 
 
7. Would you consider yourself of Hispanic ethnicity? 
 
8. What is/was your father’s main occupation? 
 
9. What is/was your mother’s main occupation? 
 
10. Are you currently married? 
 
11. (If not currently married) What is your marital status? 
 
12. What is your official title with the (Insert Name of Fire Department) Fire 
Department? 
 
13. Could you briefly describe to me the different types of companies you have 
served on during your tenure as a paid firefighter for (Insert Name of Fire 
Department) Fire Department? 
 
14. (If served as a volunteer prior to their current position) Could you briefly 
describe to me the different types of companies you have served on during 
your tenure as a paid firefighter for (Insert Name of Fire Department) Fire 
Department? 
 
15. (If served as a paid firefighter prior to their current position) Could you 
briefly describe to me the different types of companies you have served on 






Education and Training Background 
 
Finally, I would like to ask you a few questions about the different types of formal 
education and training you have received. 
 
1. What is the highest grade level you have completed? 
 
2. (If attended/graduated college) What types of college degrees have you 
completed? 
 
3. (If attended/graduated college) What was your major/area of specialization in 
college? 
 
4. Have you been involved in any vocational or technical training during or after 
high school? 
 
5. Specific to your current occupation as a firefighter, what types of training 
have you received? 
 
6. (For each occupation-related training) Could you give a brief description of 
the training program? 
 
7. (For each occupation-related training) How long did this training last?
 
8. Specific to your current occupation as a firefighter, what types of official 
certifications have this/these training opportunities produced? 
 













Appendix B: Potential Technologies Used by Firefighters 
Table A. Potential Technologies/Tools Used by Firefighters to Complete Tasks 
Required by their Job, Listed by Category a 
 
Category Technology/Tools 
Safety Equipment/Personal Protective 
Ensembles (PPE) 
1. Accountability Tags (Personal Identifiers) 
2. Personal Alert Safety System (PASS) Device 
 3. Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA) 
 4. Gloves 
 5. Goggles 
 • Safety Goggles 
 • Face Shield 
 • SCBA Face Shield 
 6. Helmet 
 7. Coat 
 8. Pants 
 9. Boots 
 • Common Rubber 
 • Leather Pull-up 
 • Leather Lace-up 
 10. Hood 
 11. Pocket Tool 
 12. Infrared Camera 
 13. Ear Protection 
 • Foam Plugs 
 • Rigid Earmuffs 
 • Headsets 
 14. Integrated SCBA and PASS 
  
Apparatus/Vehicles b 1. Truck Company 
 2. Engine Company 
 3. EMS Vehicle/Ambulance 
 4. Fireboat 
  
Computers & Software 1. Hardware 
 • Standard PC Computers 
 • Mobile Data Computers 
 • Mobile Data Terminal 
 2. Software 
 • Firehouse Software 
 3. Various Training Simulators  
  
  
Alternative PPE for Specific Situations 1. Wildland Fire Ensembles 
2. Ice Ensembles 
 3. Technical Rescue Ensembles 
 4. Shift-Water Ensembles 
  
Communication/Emergency Calls 1. Computer-aided Dispatch (CAD) Systems 
 2. Fire Alarm Boxes (or Emergency Boxes) 
 3. Fire Alarms (within buildings) 
 4. Telecommunication Devices for the Deaf (TDD) 





Communication/Emergency Calls 6. Portable Radios (i.e. Walkie-Talkie) 
 7. Mobile Microphone 
 8. Call Logs 
 • Magnetic 
 • Digital 
  
Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus 




 • Aluminum 
 • Fiberglass 
 • Kevlar/Carbon 
 3. Regulator 
 4. Face Piece 
  
Portable Fire Extinguishers 1. Portable Fire Extinguisher 
 • Water 
 • Foam 
 • Carbon Dioxide 
 • Halon and Clean Agents 
 • Dry Chemical 
 • Wet Chemical 
  
Water Supply Components 1. Fire Hydrants 
 • Wet Barrel Hydrant 
 • Dry Barrel Hydrant 
 • Dry Hydrant 
 • Specialty Hydrants 
 2. Water Distribution Valves 
 • Gate 
 • Check 
 3. Portable Water Tank 
 4. Water Supply Gauges 
 • Bourdon 
 • Pilot 
 • Panel 
  
Fire Hoses 1. Fire Hose Types 
 • Hard Suction 
 • Booster 
 • Attack 
 • Soft Suction 
 • Small-diameter 
 • Medium-diameter 
 • Large-diameter (Supply) 
 • Occupant Use 
 • Forestry 
 2. Hose Bed 
 3. Hose Washer 
 • Manual 
 • Automatic 
 4. House Couplings 





Fire Hoses 6. Hose Tools 
 • Rope Hose Tool 
 • Hose Strap 
 • Spanner Wrenches 
 • Hydrant Wrench 
 • Hose Roller/Hoist 
 • Hose Clamp 
 • Hose Jacket 
 • Hose Bridge 
 • Hose Cart 
 7. Hose Connectors 
 • Double Female 
 • Double Male 
 • Increaser 
 • Reducer 
 • Adapter 
 8. Wye 
 9. Hose Cap 
 10. Distributor/Extension Pipe 
  
Nozzles 1. Nozzle Types 
 • Solid Stream (Smooth Bore, Straight Bore, Solid Tip) 
 • Combination 
 • Constant/Set Volume 
 • Variable, Adjustable, or Selectable Gallonage 
 • Cellar or Bresnan 
 • Piercing 
 • Water Curtain 
  
Foam and Foam Application Devices 1. Foam Application Devices 
• Eductor 
 • In-line Eductor 
 • Bypass Eductor 
 • Compressed Air Foams Systems (CAFS) 
 2. Foam Types 
 • Protein Foam 
 • Fluoroprotein Foam 
 • Aqueous Film Forming Foam (AFFF) 
 • Fluoroprotein Film-Forming Foam (FFFP) 
 • Detergent-type Foam 
  
Protective Systems (Sprinkler and 
Detectors) 
1. Heat Detectors (Rate-of-Rise; Fixed Temperature) 
2. Smoke Detectors (Ionization; Photoelectric) 
 3. Gas Detectors (Carbon Monoxide) 
 4. Flame Detectors (Ultraviolet; Infrared; UV-IR Combo) 
 5. Electroluminescent (EL) Marking Systems 
 6. Sprinkler Heads (Old-style; Upright; Pendent; Spray) 
 7. Sprinkler Pipe Systems 
 • Wet Pipe 
 • Dry Pipe 
 • Deluge 









 • Local Application and Hood 
 • Total Flooding 
  
Ladders 1. Truck-mounted Aerial Ladders 
 2. Tower Ladder 
 3. Articulating Boom ladder 
 4. Straight Ladder 
 5. Extension Ladder 
 6. Roof and Hook Ladder 
 7. Folding Ladder 
 8. A-frame Combination Ladder 
 9. Pompier Ladder (or Scaling Ladder) 
  
Forcible Entry and Rescue Tools 1. Power Hydraulic Spreaders 
 2. Power Hydraulic Cutters 
 3. Power Hydraulic Rams 
 4. Air Chisels 
 5. Reciprocating Electric Saws 
 6. Striking Tools 
 • Flathead Ax 
 • Maul/Sledge 
 • Battering Ram 
 7. Prying Spreading Tools 
 • Halligan Tool 
 • Claw Tool 
 • Kelly Tool 
 8. Cutting Tools 
 • Ax 
 • Handsaws 
 • Bolt Cutters 
 • Wire Cutters 
 • Power Cutting Tools – Saw 
 i. Carbide-Tipped Blades 
 ii.  Metal Cutting Blades 
 iii.  Masonry Cutting Blades 
 iv. Chain Saws 
 v. Recipricating Saws 
 vi. Cutting Torch 
 9. Pulling Tools 
 • Hook 
 • Pike Pole 
 10. Other Types of Tools 
 • Bam Bam or Dent Puller 
 • Duck Bill Lock Breaker 
 • K Tool and Lock Pullers 
  
Salvage/Overhaul Materials 1. Salvage Cover 
 2. Floor Runner 
 3. Water Vacuum 






Hazardous Material Protective Clothing 1. Level A 
2. Level B 
 3. Level C 
 4. Level D 
 5. High-temperature Clothing 
 6. Low-temperature Clothing 
  
Air Monitors 1. Oxygen Monitor 
 2. Flammable Gas Monitors 
 3. Toxic Gas Monitors 
 4. Photo-ionization Monitors 
  
Terrorism-related Items 1. Agents of Warfare/Chemicals 
 • Nerve 
 • Incendiary 
 • Blood/Choking 
 • Blister (Vesicants) 
 • Irritants (Riot Control) 
 • Anthrax 
 • Ricin 
 • Radiological Dispersion Devices (RDD) 
a This list was compiled through examining firefighter raining manuals and professional trade journals in preparation of interviews. 
b While there are a few general apparatus types, they are also customized towards specific fire departmen s. Thus, depending on the 







Abbott, Andrew. 1993. “The Sociology of Work and Occupations.” Annual Review of  
Sociology, 19:187-209. 
 
Adler, Paul S. 1988. “Automation, Skill, and the Future of Capitalism.” Berkeley  
Journal of Sociology, 33:1-36. 
 
Agnew, Andrew, Paul Forrester, John Hassard, and Stephen Procter. 1997.  
“Deskilling and Reskilling Within the Labor Process: The Case of Computer 
Integrated Manufacturing.” International Journal of Production Economics, 
52(3):317-324. 
 
Alcaly, Roger. 2003. The New Economy: What It is, How It Happened, and Why It is  
Likely to Last. New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux. 
 
Attewell, Paul. 1990. “What is Skill?” Work and Occupations, 17(4):422-448. 
 
Autor, David H., Frank Levy, and Richard J. Murnane. 2002. “Upstairs, Downstairs:  
Computers and Skills on Two Floors of a Large Bank.” Industrial and Labor 
Relations Review, 55(3):432-447. 
 
Autor, David H., Frank Levy, and Richard J. Murnane. 2003a. “Computer-Based  
Technological Change and Skill Demands: Reconciling the Perspectives of 
Economists and Sociologists.” Pp. 121-154 in Low-Wage America: How 
Employers Are Reshaping Opportunity in the Workplace edited by Eileen 
Appelbaum, Annette Bernhardt and Richard J. Murnane. New York, NY: 
Russell Sage Foundation. 
 
Autor, David H., Frank Levy, and Richard Murnane. 2003b. “The Skill Content of  
Recent Technological Change: An Empirical Exploration.” Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, 118(4):1279-1333. 
 
Axinn, William G., Lisa D. Pierce, and Dirgha Ghimire. 1999. “Innovations in Life  
History Calendar Applications.” Social Science Research, 28(3):243-264. 
 
Ballantine, Jr., John W. and Ronald F. Ferguson. 2003. “Plastic Manufacturers: How  
Competitive Strategies and Technology Decisions Transformed Jobs and 
Increased Pay Disparity Among Rank-and-File Workers.” Pp. 195-226 in 
Low-Wage America: How Employers Are Reshaping Opportunity in the 
Workplace edited by Eileen Appelbaum, Annette Bernhardt and Richard J. 
Murnane. New York, NY: Russell Sage Foundation. 
 
Barley, Stephen R. 1990. “The Alignment of Technology and Structure through Roles  





Barriball, K. Louise and Alison While. 1994. “Collecting Data Using a Semi- 
structured Interview: A Discussion Paper.” Journal of Advanced Nursing, 
19(2):328-335. 
 
Bartel, Ann, Casey Ichniowski, and Kathryn Shaw. 2003. “’New Technology’ and Its  
Impact on the Jobs of High School Workers: A Look Deep Inside Three 
Manufacturing Industries.” Pp. 155-194 in Low-Wage America: How 
Employers Are Reshaping Opportunity in the Workplace edited by Eileen 
Appelbaum, Annette Bernhardt and Richard J. Murnane. New York, NY: 
Russell Sage Foundation. 
 
Belli, Robert F. 1998. “The Structure of Autobiographical Memory and the Event  
History Calendar: Potential Improvements in the Quality of Retrospective 
Reports in Surveys.” Memory, 6(4):383-406. 
 
Blauner, Robert. 1964. Alienation and Freedom: The Factory Worker and His  
Industry. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.  
 
Bolstad-Johnson, Dawn M., Jefferey L. Burgess, Clifton D. Crutchfiled, Steve  
Storment, Richard Gerkin, and Jeffrey R. Wilson. 2000. “Characterization of 
Firefighter Exposures During Overhaul.” American Industrial Hygiene 
Association Journal, 61:636-641. 
 
Bound, John, and George Johnson. 1992. “Changes in the Structure of Wages During  
the 1980’s.” The American Economic Review, 82(3):371-392. 
 
Braverman, Harry. 1998 [1974]. Labor and Monopoly Capital: The Degradation of  
Work in the Twentieth Century. New York, NY: Monthly Review Press. 
 
Brennan, Denise. 2002. “Selling Sex for Visas: Sex Tourism as a Stepping-stone to  
International Migration.” Pp. 154-168 in Global Woman: Nannies, Maids, and 
Sex Workers in the New Economy edited by Barbara Ehrenreich and Arlie 
Russell Hochschild. New York, NY: Owl Books. 
 
Burris, Beverly H. 1998. “Computerization of the Workplace.” Annual Review of  
Sociology, 24:141-157. 
 
Burris, Beverly H. 1999. “Braverman, Taylorism, and Technocracy.” Pp. 37-52 in  
Rethinking the Labor Process edited by Mark Wardell, Thomas L. Steiger, 
and Peter Meiksins. Albany: State University of New York Press. 
 
Cain, Pamela S. and Donald J. Treiman. 1981. “The Dictionary of Occupational  






Caroli, Eve. 2001. “New Technologies, Organizational Change and the Skill Bias:  
What Do We Know?” Pp. 259-292 in Technology and the Future of European 
Employment edited by Pascal Petit and Luc Soete. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 
Publishing. 
 
Carr, Nicholas G. 2003. “IT Doesn’t Matter.” Harvard Business Review, 81(5):41-49. 
 
Carr, Nicholas. 2008. The Big Switch: Rewiring the World, from Edison to Google.  
New York: W. & W. Norton Company, Inc.  
 
Coleman, Ronny J. 2004. “Overview of the History, Tradition, and Development of  
the American Fire Service.” Pp. 2-20 in Firefighter’s Handbook: Essentials of 
Firefighting and Emergency Response edited by Thomson Delmar Learning. 
2nd ed. Clifton Park, NY: Thomson Delmar Learning. 
 
Cronshaw, Steven F. and Amanda J. Alfieri. 2002. “The Impact of Sociotechnical  
Task Demands on Use of Worker Discretion and Functional Skill.” Human 
Relations, 56(9):1107-1130. 
 
Dadayan, Lucy and Enrico Ferro. 2005. “When Technology Meets the Mind: A  
Comparative Study of the Technology Acceptance Model.” L cture Notes in 
Computer Science, 3591:137-144. 
 
Daly, John A., Anita L. Vangelisti, Heather L. Neel, and P. Daniel Cavanaugh. 1989.  
“Pre-performance Concerns Associated with Public Speaking Anxiety.” 
Communication Quarterly, 37(1):39-53. 
 
Desmond, Matthew. 2006. “Becoming a Firefighter.” Ethnography, 7(4):387-421. 
 
Desmond, Matthew. 2007. On the Fireline: Living and Dying with Wildland  
Firefighters. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Egger, Hartmut and Volker Grossman. 2005. “Non-Routine Tasks, Restructuring of  
Firms, and Wage Inequality Within and Between Skill-Groups.” Journal of 
Economics, 86(3):197-228. 
 
Emmons, Howard W. 1990. “Firesafety Science – The Promise of a Better Future.”  
Fire Technology, 26(1):5-14. 
 
Fine, Charles H. and Daniel M.G. Raff. 2001. “Automotive Industry: Internet-Driven  
Innovation and Economic Performance.” Pp. 62-86 in The Economic Payoff 
from the Internet Revolution edited by Robert E. Litan and Alice M. Rivlin. 
Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press. 
 






Geilen, A.C., A.L. Dannenberg, N. Ashburn, and J. Kuo. 1996. “Teaching Safety:  
Evaluation of a Children’s Village in Maryland.” Injury Prevention, 2(1):26-
31. 
 
Giret, Jean Francois and Josep Maria Masjuan. 1999. “The Diffusion of  
Qualifications in the Spanish Labour Market.” Journal of Education and 
Work, 12(2):179-199. 
 
Glenn, Evelyn Nakano and Roslyn L. Feldberg. 1995. “Clerical Work: The Female  
Occupation.” Pp. 262-286 in Women: A Feminist Perspective edited by Jo 
Freeman. Mountain View: Mayfield Publishing Company. 
 
Goos, Maarten and Alan Manning. 2007. “Lousy and Lovely Jobs: The Rising  
Polarization of Work in Britain.” Review of Economics and Statistics, 
89(1):118-133. 
 
Gordon, Robert J. 2000. “Does the ‘New Economy’ Measure Up to the Great  
Inventions of the Past?” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 14(4):49-74. 
 
Gorman, Richard L., Evan Charney, Neil A. Holtzman, and Kenneth B. Roberts.  
1985. “A Successful City-wide Smoke Detector Giveaway Program.” 
Pediatrics, 75(1):14-18. 
 
Green, Francis, Alan Felstead, and Duncan Gallie. 2003. “Computers and the  
Changing Skill-Intensity of Jobs.” Applied Economics, 35(14):1561-1576. 
 
Grimshaw, Damian, Huw Beynon, Jill Rubery, and Kevin Ward. 2002. “The  
Restructuring of Career Paths in Large Service Sector Organizations: 
‘Delaying’, Upskilling and Polarisation.” The Sociological Review, 50(1):89-
116. 
 
Hadden, Wilbur C., Nataliya Kravets, and Carles Muntaner. 2004. “Descriptive  
Dimensions of US Occupations with Data from the O*NET.” Social Science 
Research, 33(1):64-78. 
 
Handel, Michael J. 2003. “Skills Mismatch and the Labor Market.” Annual Review of  
Sociology, 29:135-165. 
 
Hawley, Christopher. 2004. “Terrorism Awareness.” Pp. 911-936 in Firefighter’s  
Handbook: Essentials of Firefighting and Emergency Response edit d by 
Thomson Delmar Learning. 2nd ed. Clifton Park, NY: Thomson Delmar 
Learning. 
 




of Fire in American Culture 1775-1925. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press. 
 
Hodson, Randy. 2001. Dignity at Work. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Hodson, Randy, Gregory Hooks, and Sabine Rieble. 1994. “Training in the  
Workplace: Continuity and Change.” Sociological Perspectives, 37(1):97-118. 
 
Injury Prevention Service. 2003. Injury Update: A Report to Oklahoma Injury  
Surveillance Participants (September 30, 2003). Oklahoma City, OK: 
Oklahoma State Department of Health. 
 
Isler, Jonathan M. 2007. “A Tale of Two ‘Unorganizables’.” Qualitative Sociology,  
30(4):443-458. 
 
Jude, James R. 2003. “Personal Reminiscences of the origin and History of  
Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation (CPR).” American Journal of Cardiology, 
92(8):956-963. 
 
Kerr, Clark, John T. Dunlop, Frederick H. Harbison, and Charles A. Myers. 1964.  
Industrialism and Industrial Man: The Problems of Labor and Management in 
Economic Growth. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
 
Karter, Jr., Michael J. 2009. Fire Loss in the United States 2008. Quincy, MA:  
National Fire Protection Agency. 
 
Katz, Lawrence F. and Kevin M. Murphy. 1992. “Changes in Relative Wages, 1963- 
1987: Supply and Demand Factors.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
107(1):35-78. 
 
Kerber, Richard E., Lance B. Becker, Joseph D. Bourland, Richard O. Cummins,  
Alfred P. Hallstrom, Mary B. Michos, Graham Nichol, Joseph P. Ornato, 
William H. Thies, Roger D. White, and Bram D. Zuckerman. 1997. 
“Automatic External Defibrillators for Public Access Defibrillation: 
Recommendations for Specifying and Reporting Arrhythmia Analysis 
Algorithm Performance, Incorporating New Waveforms, and Enhancing 
Safety.” Circulation, 95(6):1677-1682. 
 
Kraft, Philip. 1999. “To Control and Inspire: U.S. Management in the Age of  
Computer Information Systems and Global Production.” Pp. 17-36 in 
Rethinking the Labor Process edited by Mark Wardell, Thomas L. Steiger, 
and Peter Meiksins. Albany: State University of New York Press. 
 
Leigh, Duane E. and Kirk D. Gifford. 1999. “Workplace Transformation and Worker  






Levine, Chester, Laurie Salmon, and Daniel H. Weinberg. 1998. “Revising the  
Standard Occupational Classification System.” Monthly Labor Review, 
122(5):36-45. 
 
Levy, Frank and Richard J. Murnane. 2004. The New Division of Labor: How  
Computers Are Creating the Next Job Market. New York, NY: Russell Sage 
Foundation. 
 
Linden, Greg, Clair Brown, and Melissa M. Appleyard. 2004. “The Net World  
Order’s Influence on Global Leadership in the Semiconductor Industry.” Pp. 
232-257 in Locating Global Advantage: Industry Dynamics in the 
International Economy edited by Martin Kenney and Richard Florida. 
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 
 
Littler, Craig R. and Peter Innes. 2003. “Downsizing and Deknowledging the Firm.”  
Work, Employment and Society, 17(1):73-100. 
 
Lloyd, Caroline. 1997. “Microelectronics in the Clothing Industry: Firm Strategy and  
the Skills Debate.” New Technology, Work, and Employment, 12(1):36-47. 
 
Maile, Frank J. 2004. “Ladders.” Pp. 369-416 in F refighter’s Handbook: Essentials  
of Firefighting and Emergency Response edited by Thomson Delmar 
Learning. 2nd ed. Clifton Park, NY: Thomson Delmar Learning. 
 
Mallonee, Sue, Gregory R. Istre, Mark Rosenberg, Malinda Reddish-Douglas, Fred  
Jordan, Paul Silverstein, and William Tunell. 1996. “Surveillance and 
Prevention of Residential-fire Injuries.” New England Journal of Medicine, 
335(1):27-31. 
 
Marchant, Roger, Nabeel Kurban, and Stephen Wise. 2001. “Development and  
Application of the Fire Brigade Intervention Model.” Fire Technology, 
37(3):263-278. 
 
Mariani, Matthew. 1999. “Replace with a Database: O*NET Replaces the Dictionary  
of Occupational Titles.” Occupational Outlook Quarterly, 43(1):2-9. 
 
Marks, Abigail and Dora Scholarios. 2007. “Revisiting Technical Workers:  
Professional and Organisational Identities in the Software Industry.” New 
Technology, Work and Employment, 22(2):98-117. 
 
Marx, Karl. 1976 [1867]. Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Volume I.  
Translated by Ben Fowkes. New York: New Vintage Books. 
 
McCarl, Robert. 1985. The District of Columbia Fire Fighters’ Project: A Case Study  





Meiksins, Peter. 1994. “Labor and Monopoly Capital for the 1990s: A Review and  
Critique of the Labor Process Debate.” Monthly Review, 46(6):45-59. 
 
Moon, M. Jae. 2002. “The Evolution of E-Government among Municipalities:  
Rhetoric or Reality?” Public Administration Review, 62(4):424-433. 
 
National Fire Protection Agency (NFPA). 2007. NFPA 1001: Standard for Fire  
Fighter Professional Qualifications. 2008 ed. Quincy, MA: National Fire 
Protection Agency. 
 
Paraskos, John A. 1993. “History of CPR and the Role of the National Conference.”  
Annals of Emergency Medicine, 22(2):275-280. 
 
Penn, Roger. 1982. “Skilled Manual Workers in the Labour Process 1856-1964.” Pp.  
90-108 in The Degradation of Labour? Skill, Deskilling, and the Labour 
Process edited by Stephen Wood. London: Hutchinson. 
 
Peterson, Norman G., Michael D. Mumford, Walter C. Borman, P. Richard Jeanneret,  
Edwin A. Fleishman, Kerry Y. Levin, Michael A. Campion, Melinda S. 
Mayfield, Frederick P. Morgeson, Kenneth Pearlman, Marilyn K. Gowing, 
Anita R. Lancaster, Marilyn B. Silver, and Donna M. Dye. 2001. 
“Understanding Work Using the Occupational Information Network 
(O*NET): Implications for Practice and Research.” Personnel Psychology, 
54(2):451-492. 
 
Parcel, Toby L. and Charles W. Mueller. 1989. “Temporal Change in Occupational  
Earnings Attainment, 1970-1980.” American Sociolgoical Review, 54(4):622-
634. 
 
Pianta, Mario. 2005. “Innovation and Employment.” Pp. 568-598 in The Oxford  
Handbook of Innovation edited by Jan Fagerberg, David C. Mowery, and 
Richard R. Nelson. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Piva, Mariacristina, Enrico Santarelli, and Marco Vivarelli. 2005. “The Skill Bias  
Effect of Technology and Organisational Change: Evidence and Policy 
Implications.” Research Policy, 35(2):141-157. 
 
Preece, David. 1995. Organizations and Technical Change: Strategy, Objectives, and  
Involvement. New York, NY: Routledge. 
 
Reich, Robert B. 1991. The Work of Nations: Preparing Ourselves for 21st-Century  
Capitalism. New York, NY: Vintage Books. 
 




2006. “Occupationally-specific Skills: Using Skills to Define and Understand 
Jobs and their Requirements.” Human Resources Management Review, 
16(3):356-375. 
 
Robinson, Peter and Marco Manacorda. 1997. “Qualifications and the Labour Market  
in Britain: 1984-1994 Skill Biased Change in the Demand for Labour or 
Credentialism?” London School of Economics and Political Science, Centre 
for Economic Performance Discussion Paper No. 330. 
 
Rogers, Jackie Krass. 1999. “Deskilled and Devalued: Changes in the Labor Process  
in Temporary Clerical Work.” Pp. 53-78 in Rethinking the Labor Process 
edited by Mark Wardell, Thomas L. Steiger, and Peter Meiksins. Albany, NY: 
State University of New York Press. 
 
Rolfe, Heather. 1990. “In the Name of Progress? Skills and Attitudes Towards  
Technological Change.” New Technology, Work and Employment, 5(2):107-
121. 
 
Rotundo, Maria and Paul R. Sackett. 2004. “Specific versus General Skills and  
Abilities: A Job Level Examination of Relationships with Wage.” Journal of 
Occupational and Organizational Psychology, 77(2):127-148. 
 
Sadler, Philip. 1970. “Sociological Aspects of Skill.” British Journal of Industrial  
Relations, 8(1):22-31. 
 
Shields, T.J. 2003. “Fire Safety Engineering Research and Technology Centre  
(FireSERT) University of Ulster: Recent Developments.” Fire Technology, 
39(3):275-284. 
 
Shults, Ruth A., Jeffrey J. Sacks, Laurel A. Briske, Pamela H. Dickey, Mark R.  
Kinde, Sue Mallonee, and Malinda Reddish Douglas. 1998. “Evaluation of 
Three Smoke Detector Promotion Programs.” American Journal of Preventive 
Medicine, 15(3):165-171. 
 
Smith, Dennis. 1978. History of Firefighting in America: 300 Years of Courage. New  
York, NY: The Dial Press. 
 
Smith, Karen, Denis Rich, John Pastoriza Pinol, Judy Hankin, and John McNeil.  
2001. “Acceptance of a Medical First-responder Role by Fire Fighters.” 
Resuscitation, 51(1):33-38. 
 
Smith, Vicki. 2001. Crossing the Great Divide: Worker Risk and Opportunity in the  
New Economy. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 
 




New Uses of the Dictionary of Occupational Titles in Social Research.” 
Sociological Methods & Research, 9(2):239-264. 
 
Spenner, Kenneth I. 1983. “Deciphering Prometheus: Temporal Changes in the Skill  
Level of Work.” American Sociological Review, 48(6):824-837. 
 
Spenner, Kenneth I. 1985. “The Upgrading and Downgrading of Occupations: Issues,  
Evidence, and Implications for Education. Review of Educational Research, 
55(2):125-154. 
 
Spenner, Kenneth I. 1990. “Skill: Meanings, Methods, and Measurement.” Work and  
Occupations, 17(4):399-421. 
 
Spenner, Kenneth I. 1995. “Technological Change, Skill Requirements, and  
Education: The Case for Uncertainty.” Pp. 81-137 in The New Modern Times: 
Factors Reshaping the World of Work edited by David B. Bills. Albany, NY: 
State University of New York Press. 
 
St. John, Dorothea R. and Reggie D. Sheppard, Jr. 1983. “Emergency Medical  
Services – EMS Dispatch and Response.” Fire Chief Magazine, 26(8):142-
144. 
 
Stark, David. 1980. “Class Struggle and the Transformation of the Labor Process: A  
Relational Approach.” Theory and Society, 9(1):89-130. 
 
Steinberg, Ronnie J. 1990. “Social Construction of Skill: Gender, Power, and  
Comparable Worth.” Work and Occupations, 17(4):449-482. 
 
Szafran, Robert F. 1996. “The Effect of Occupational Growth on Labor Force Task  
Characteristics.” Work and Occupations, 23(1):54-86. 
 
U.S. Census Bureau (Census). 2008. American FactFinder. Retrieved April 9, 2008  
from: http://factfinder.census.gov.  
 
U.S. Department of Labor (DOL). 1991. Dictionary of Occupational Titles. 4th ed,  
revised. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Labor. 
 
U.S. Fire Administration (USFA). 1997. Uses of NFIRS: The Many Uses of the  
National Fire Incident Reporting System. Emmitsburg, MD: U.S. Fire 
Administration. 
 
Vallas, Steven Peter. 1990. “The Concept of Skill: A Critical Review.” Work and  
           Occupations, 17(4):379-398. 
 
Vallas, Steven. 1998. “Manufacturing Knowledge: Technology, Culture, and Social  





Vallas, Steven P. and John P. Beck. 1996. “The Transformation of Work Revisited:  
 The Limits of Flexibility in American Manufacturing.” Social Problems,     
 43(3):339-361. 
 
Van der Vecht, Bob, Frank Dignum, John-Jules Ch. Meyer, and Martijn Neef. 2008.  
“A Dynamic Coordination Mechanism Using Adjustable Autonomy.” Lecture 
Notes in Computer Science, 4870:83-96. 
 
Vielkind. Jimmy. 2007. “FDNY Exam Has ‘Em Fuming.” NY Daily News, March 25.  




Walter, Andrea A. 2004. “Emergency Medical Service.” Pp. 689-720 in Firefighter’s  
Handbook: Essentials of Firefighting and Emergency Response edit d by 
Thomson Delmar Learning. 2nd ed. Clifton Park, NY: Thomson Delmar 
Learning. 
 
Walton, Richard E. 1985. “From Control to Commitment in the Workplace.” Harvard  
Business Review, 63(2):77-84. 
 
Weinberg, Bruce A. 2000. “Computer Use and the Demand for Female Workers.”  
Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 53(2):290-308. 
 
Weinschenk, Craig, Ofodike A. Ezekoye, and Robert Nicks. 2008. “Analysis of  
Fireground Standard Operating Guidelines/Procedures Compliance for Austin
Fire Department.” Fire Technology, 44(1):39-64. 
 
Wilkinson, Barry. 1983. The Shopfloor Politics of New Technology. London:  
Heinemann Educational. 
 
Wilson, David B. 2008. “The Importance of a Comprehensive Document Search in  
Systematic Literature Reviews.” JRSA Forum, 26(3):1,6-7. 
 
Wutz, Thomas J. 2004. “Fire Department Organization, Command, and Control.” Pp.  
21-44 in Firefighter’s Handbook: Essentials of Firefighting and Emergency 
Response dited by Thomson Delmar Learning. 2nd ed. Clifton Park, NY: 
Thomson Delmar Learning. 
 
Zigmont, Jason. 2007a. “Balancing Requirements.” Fire Rescue 1, January 15.  
Retrieved April 9, 2008 from: http://www.firerescue1.com/Columnists/Jason-
Zigmont/articles/275518-Balancing-Requirements/.  
 
Zigmont, Jason. 2007b. “Responsibility Needed to Balance Requirements.”  






Zuboff, Shoshana. 1988. In the Age of the Smart Machine: The Future of Work and  
Power. New York, NY: Basic Books, Inc. 
